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1.  Introduction
Urban labour markets in developing countries are often analyzed within the dual
labour market framework. In this framework, two labour market segments are
distinguished:   (1) a "formal", modern sector, consisting of large scale industries,
the public sector and other regulated professions. The wage in this sector is above
the market clearing level. This situation is maintained by non-competitive  wage
setting procedures such as collective labour agreements, minimum wage legislation,
efficiency wages, etc. (2) On the other hand the "informal" or traditional sector
comprises a wide range of small scale activities. Production generally uses simple
technology and requires little capital or formal skills. No barriers to entry exist  and
earnings   are at competitive levels. Rural-urban migration, attracted   by high formal
sector wages but mostly absorbed by the informal sector, is believed to be the
driving force in the expansion of the informal sector in the seventies. A dualistic
urban labour market exists if the formal sector maintains its superiority in spite of
the excess job seekers.
The question of what exactly constitutes the informal sector is an ongoing debate.
The  1972 ILO (International Labour Office) Employment mission to Kenya defined
economic informality as a "way of doing things characterized by: (1) ease of entry,
(2) reliance on indigenous resources, (3) family ownership of resources, (4) small
scale of operation, (5) labour intensive and adapted technology, (6) skill acquired
outside the formal school system,  and (7) unregulated and competitive markets".
Since then different authors have used different definitions. Recurring themes are:
small scale and unregulated markets. The first has the advantage that it is easy to
measure. The second that it is related closely to economic theory. The two themes
often go together: avoidance of regulation is only possible by staying invisible to
those enforcing it. For small enterprises the costs of enforcement outweigh the
benefits.
Economic policy designed to promote economic growth and/or reduce inequality
has to take into consideration the prevailing labour allocation mechanism. Given
that labour is the most abundant asset of the poor, it is expected that their principal
mechanism to achieve consumption smoothing is through labour supply responses.
Restrictions in mobility of labour hinder an efficient allocation of labour over
economic activities. The welfare consequences of, for instance, a reduction in
public sector wages depend upon the combined effects resulting from adjustments
in the supply and demand side of the labour market.
The objective of this study is to increase our understanding of the functioning of
the urban labour markets in developing countries, in particular the supply side. We
will do so by focusing on one country: Bolivia. Chapter 2 provides background
information regarding Bolivia. Bolivia is the poorest country on the Latin American
continent. The informal sector provides more than half of total urban employment,
1
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more than in any other Latin country (based on ILO studies in 1985, cf Thomas
1992, p.68). After a period of turbulent economic and political crisis in the first
half of the eighties, the economy was stabilized in 1985 and since then has been
growing at a very moderate pace. As a direct result of the adjustment program the
informal sector expanded strongly in 1985 providing 61 percent of total urban
employment in 1986. Since then its size has decreased slightly. We provide an
institutional and economic discussion of the urban labour market. Moreover, we
discuss the tax system and conclude that income taxes do not play a major role.
For the empirical chapters 4-6 we use cross section data from the national
household survey in 1989. More information about this survey is given in the last
section of chapter  2.
In Chapter 3 we survey the literature of theoretical and empirical studies regarding
urban labour markets in developing countries. The theoretical models    are    all
extensions of the, mathematically equivalent, Harris-Todaro (1970) migration
model or the Mincer (1976) minimum wage model. Both assume segmented
markets, where one segment is covered by minimum wage regulation. Employment
in the covered (formal) sector is limited. Unemployment or on-the-job search arises
because individuals queue up for the high paying formal sector jobs. The models
emphasize that (1) informal sector workers prefer a formal sector job if available
and (2) the formal sector offers a higher wage than the informal sector for similar
jobs. The empirical studies cast doubt on these assumptions. A significant
proportion of informal sector workers does not seem to prefer formal sector
employment. A comparison of wage offers leads to mixed results.
Chapters 4,5 and 6 contain an empirical analysis based on the 1989 Bolivian
household survey. Chapter 4 contains a comparison   of wage offers   in the formal
and informal sector. We find that, generally speaking, expected wages are higher
in the formal sector for males, while they are higher in the informal sector for
females. The latter is in contradiction with the simple theoretical models. This
suggests that other factors besides the wage offer influence sector participation. The
results are influenced  by   the   way in which we corrected for selectivity   bias.
Selectivity bias arises when workers that have entered into a sector differ in
characteristics unobservable to the researcher from those who have not. Formal
sector workers, for example, may be risk averse and would therefore not be good
entrepreneurs in the informal sector. In this instance, ignoring the selectivity bias
would lead to an overestimate of their potential informal sector earnings. We
employ two different models, each implying a different selectivity correction. The
first one explicitly models the informal sector as a buffer sector, in between non-
participation and the formal sector. The second model treats the two sectors
identically. Using both models,  we  find that informal sector earnings  are  more
dispersed than formal sector earnings. Returns to education are higher in the formal
sector. Correcting for selectivity    bias    has a significant effect    on the results.
Especially the estimate for the constant term in the wage equation is sensitive to the
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model specification. On the basis of specification tests we have a slight preference
for the first model for males and the second model for females.
Chapter 5 models the sector participation decision   in more detail. The results   for
females in chapter 4 suggest that a simple model where wage offers and rationing
of formal sector jobs determine sector participation is not sufficient. We develop a
model that distinguishes three factors: wage offers, sector specific non-monetary
returns and rationing. Preferences for sectors   are   not only determined by potential
earnings in each sector, but also depend upon non-monetary returns attached to
participation in a sector. For example, health insurance in the formal sector or
additional freedom in the informal sector may be a consideration in the sector
participation decision. Rationing arises from labour market segmentation. It is
modelled as the probability that an individual is not able to enter the formal sector.
Information on search, including on the job search, is used to identify the model. It
is   assumed that search   is an indication of rationing. The model is estimated using
simulated maximum likelihood. We find that males attach higher non-monetary
returns to participation in the formal sector. For females, on average, non-
monetary returns are not significantly diTferent across sectors. The probability of
rationing varies around 30 percent and decreases with education. A simulated
increase in the unemployment rate by 5 percent had hardly any effect on the
preference of working for males. For females, however, the preference of non-
participation increased, suggesting that the discouraged worker effect plays a role.
The model presented in chapter 5 predicts a decrease in the female participation
rate if economic conditions worsen. Macro-economic figures, however, suggest the
opposite. One possible explanation is the presence of intra-household effects.
Females may decide to start working because the earnings of their husband have
fallen. In chapter 6 we analyze the joint labour supply decision of two adults
households. We follow a structural approach, in which we specify a quadratic
household utility function. As in the previous chapter we allow for participation in
two sectors and for non-monetary returns that influence the sector participation. We
find that a change in the males' own or the females' wage offer affects the labour
supply of males very little. Female labour supply is negatively affected by a rise in
the wage offer for males, with a cross elasticity of -0.3. A simulation exercise, in
which we decreased the formal sector wage offer by 10 percent, resulted in an
average decrease of household consumption by 5.0 percent and an expansion of the
informal sector by 5.9 percent. One should realize that such an exercise only
considers labour supply responses. Taking into account demand factors might   lead
to a greater decrease in household consumption and a smaller increase of the
informal sector, because the decrease in the demand for informal sector services
would be taken into account.
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Conclusions   are in chapter   7.    In this chapter,    we   try to reconcile    the   empirical
results from chapter 4 to 6 an see whether the results combined yield useful
information for policy analysis.
2. The Country of Focus: Bolivia
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the history and the economic situation of
Bolivia: Moreover, the dataset  used   in the empirical chapters   will be discussed.
Bolivia is an appropriate country to study within the dual labour context since the
urban informal sector is large, providing about half of total employment. Bolivia is
a small, but very diverse country. It is landlocked, bordered on the north and east
by Brazil, to the south by Paraguay and Argentina, to the southwest by Chile and
to  the  west  by  Peru.  It  has  an  area of 1,098,581 square kilometres  and is divided
into nine provinces.  In  1989 the country  had  7.1   million  inhabitants2. The country
is diverse in its climate and vegetation. The lowlands, found in the east of the
country, record an average temperature  of 25   ' C. Stanta  Cruz  is  the  main  city  in
this region. The valleys are found in the middle of the country and vary in altitude
between 1000 and 3000 meters. The average temperature in this part of the country
is    1 5     'C. The principal cities    in this region are Chocabamba and Sucre    (the
capital). The highlands (altiplano) are located  in the western  part  of the country  and
have an average altitude of 3500 meters. The area comprises the cities of Oruro,
Potosi   and   La   Paz   (seat   of the government). About 52 percent   of the population
lives  in  this area. Average temperatures range  from  -3.5   ' C   in  June  to  24.5   ' C
during November and December.
In the last decades, economic performance has been poor and Bolivia is now the
poorest countries on the Latin American continent. GNP per capita in 1989
equalled US$ 620. This is substantially lower than in the neighbouring countries. A
similar story holds for social indicators. The illiteracy rate among adults was 26
percent in 1985 and life expectancy at birth was only 54 years in 1989. All
neighbouring countries score much better on these indicators. The important sectors
in the economy of Bolivia are the primary sector and the service sector. The
primary sector accounted   for 36 percent   of   GDP   in    1989 (of which 22 percent
constitutes agriculture and 14 percent mining). The share of the service sector in
GDP   was 47 percent   in   the   same year. Hydrocarbons and mineral exports
accounted  for 70 percent of total exports  in   1987.
'This chapter is partly based on findings that were made during a visit to Bolivia in February
1993. Special thanks are due to those who helped me to acquire this information. They are:
Guillermo R. Alborta V. (Labour ministry), Juan Carlos Aguilar (World Bank), Silvia E. de
Pab6n (CEDLA), Susana Arze 0., Javier Comboni (both UDAPE) and Manuel Contreras  and his
staff at UDAPSO. I am responsible for any errors.
2 Figures reported in this study do not include the latest results of the 1992 census. The 1992
census reported a population of 6.4 million.
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The organization of the chapter is as follows: section 2.2 provides a short overview
of the history of Bolivia until 1985. Bolivia's economy deteriorated rapidly  in the
first half of the eighties. In 1985, a successful stabilization package was
implemented. The groundwork for the current economic situation was laid in 1985
and therefore, to analyze the current economic situation, the period starting from
1985    should be taken into consideration. Section 2.3 discusses the stabilization
program in broad terms. Many of the laws influencing the labour market were
instituted along with the stabilization program. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss the
institutional framework. The former gives an overview of the tax structure that was
implemented while the latter gives an overview of the regulation affecting the
labour market more specifically.   The  data  that  will  be  used  in the empirical
chapters of this study are discussed in section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 History
Earlv Historv. Around A.D. 600 the region around lake Titicaca was dominated by
the Aymard and Inca civilization. The Aymards dominated the region south of the
lake, the Inca's the northern side of the lake. By the 10th century much of the
Aymard civilization had been conquered by the Incas. Spanish colonization started
in  the 16th century. The discovery  of the mineral wealth,  such  as  the vast silver
and mercury deposits of Potosi, made the central Altiplano the administrative seat
of the Spanish colonial rule. In the 17th century Potosi was the wealthiest and most
populated city with around 160,000 inhabitants in 1650, more than London and
Paris together at that time. The first uprising against the Spanish rule started in
1809 with a declaration of independence in La Paz. The rebellion failed, but the
resistance against the Spanish rule remained.
In 1825, after a long war, the region known as Alto Per,1 was granted
independence. A few years later, the country changed its name into its present one,
Republic of Bolivia, after one of its liberators: Sim6n Bolivar. Sucre, close to
Potosi but with a milder climate, was named capital city. The post-independence
period (1825-1880) can be characterized by the violence and corrupmess of the
successive dictators. A positive exception was the 10 year rule of Andrds de Santa
Cruz (1829-1839) who tried to reinstitutionalize the ancient Incan political order
and unified Peru and Bolivia by force. His ambitions were halted by Chile which
feared the political and commercial rivalry of a powerful Peruvian-Bolivian
confederation. The subsequent rulers interchanged office frequently and as a result
the political power of Bolivia in the region diminished. In 1879 Bolivia became
engaged in a conflict with Chile which resulted in the loss of its coastline.
By the early 1900s, tin mining started to play a predominant role in the economy,
taking over the lead from silver. In this period the political party consolidation took
place and the country enjoyed an unprecedented period of economic growth and
political stability. The economy remained largely confined to mining and related
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activities. The vast majority of the population (70 percent) continued to live in a
feudal rural economy and was excluded from political decision making (until 1952
less    than 3 percent   of the population were entitled   to   vote). The political power
remained in the hands of the mining elite, represented in both the liberal and the
conservative party.
In  1932 the Chaco war with Paraguay broke out and Bolivia lost a large part of its
territory. The costs of the defeat were substantial. Perhaps as many as 60,000
Bolivians died in the conflict and the foreign debt reached 500 billion pounds. The
embarrassing defeat triggered the forces leading to the 1952 revolution.  The
traditional social system of Bolivia had been undermined by the large mobilization
of men to the front and the faith in the civilian politicians had eroded. In 1936, the
military seized power. The military leaders, favouring a dominant role of the state
in the economy, nationalized Standard Oil of Bolivia and named it "Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos"  (YPFB).
In the years leading to the revolution, governments interchanged power frequently.
The military intervened into politics  on a regular basis. The different regimes  all
favoured a strong role of the state. The differences were in orientation, from
military socialism enforcing reforms from above, to conservative representing the
interests of the establishment. In this period, the US increased its influence in
Bolivia to safeguard its supply of strategic minerals. At the time, Bolivia was the
largest tin exporter     in the world. Supported during the periods of military
socialism, unionization of labour increased, especially within the mining, railway
and education sector. New political parties were formed. One of them was the
"Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario" (MNR) , a party with a nationalistic
orientation.
Contemporarv history. The populist 1952 revolution elevated the MNR to head
Bolivia's first truly nationalistic revolutionary government. Victor Paz Estenssoro
was installed as president. The MNR sought broadly based, fundamental reforms in
society. Universal suffrage, nationalization of mines and land reforms were among
the first acts of the revolutionary government. An educational reform act in 1953
promised education for all. To finance the reforms, Bolivia became increasingly
dependent on foreign aid, despite the initial nationalistic orientation of the
revolution. In the short run, the assistance guaranteed the economic survival of the
revolution. In the long run, however, the conditional US aid forced the government
to moderate its initial policies. Overall, the major redistribution of wealth implied
by the agrarian reforms initially destabilized the economy. As shown in figure  2.1,
between 1952 and 1958, inflation soared and GDP fell at an average annual rate of
2 percent. The economic crisis increased foreign dependency. In 1956, ideological
struggles resulted in a breakup of the MNR party.
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In the years from 1956 to 1964 the MNR fragmented and the political support for
the government weakened. Economic crisis forced the government to install an
IMF supported stabilization program in 1956. The unpopular economic plan
fragmented the MNR party. Paz, who headed the subsequent governments was the
only figure who was acceptable to all parties. Realizing that the democratic support
for the revolution was fading, Paz paved the way for a military takeover in 1964.
At first the military rationalized their new rule as a way to protect the revolution.
However, in 1968, after the first elections, they decreed one official party and
moved to open repression. The rule was conservative and relied on foreign
investments  and the middle class for support. The policy of "disciplined labour",
which was achieved by at times violent confrontation with the miners, destroyed
the labour autonomy. In 1969 a socialist military rule took over promoting
"revolution from above". Labour unions were allowed to reorganize   and   the
subsidiary of US Gulf oil was nationalized. In 1971 the conservative Banzer took
over by military coup. Banzer relied on repressive ruling to restore social order.
Increased foreign aid, favourable international market conditions for minerals and
relative stability lead to an average GDP growth of 5 percent over the 1960s and
1970s. Large public investments and job patronage increased the role of the state in
the economy (estimated at 33 percent of GDP in 1978). Public investments
exceeded private and there was a large private capital outflow. The economic
expansion of the 1970s came to a standstill in 1978. Commercial banks started to
question Bolivia's debt service capability. By the time it had become evident that
the quality of the public investments was often dubious and the oil reserves were
not as ample as initially portrayed. Combined with the international debt crisis,
Bolivia experienced a severe drop in foreign capital inflow. Economic crisis and
US pressure to restore a civilian rule led in 1977 to the downfall of Banzer. After
fraudulent elections with military interventions in 1978, 1979 and 1980, Siles
assumed office as Bolivia's first civilian president in 14 years.
The lack of external capital flows and the failure to implement a successful
stabilization package led to an economic crisis of unprecedented severity in the first
half of the 1980s. The inability to borrow money on international markets and the
fact that the economy was declining sharply in real terms made it impossible to
satisfy the high demands that were made on the new, democratic government. The
tax system virtually collapsed, with total government revenues falling from about 9
percent of GNP in  1981 to about 1.3 percent of GNP in the first half of 1985.  The
huge public sector deficit, approaching 25 percent of GDP by 1985, was
increasingly financed through issuing money. Inflation surged, reaching 28,000
percent at an annual rate during the first nine months in 1985. GDP fell 10 percent
from   1980   to   1985, 24 percent   in per capita terms. The government attempted   six
stabilization packages. However, these were ad hoc, not well coordinated and
opposed by the unions. Due to lack of funds, payments to foreign creditors were
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suspended in 1984. The economic crisis forced the Siles government to call for
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Figure 2.1    Real  GDP per Capita  from  1950  to  1990.  (1950= 100 Source:   1950-
1985 Summers,R. and A.M. Heston (1988), 1985-1990 World Bank documents)
2.3 The 1985 Stabilization
The successful stabilization program was carried out by the newly elected center-
right government of Victor Paz Estenssoro3. The agenda of the so called "New
Economic Policy"   was far reaching and included a massive devaluation  of the local
currency (93 percent), trade liberalization, fiscal reforms, internal price decontrol
and decentralization or privatization of public enterprises. Government expenditures
were reduced to levels financeable by available funds. The austerity package had
drastic consequences   in all sectors  of the economy. The sharp   rise in public sector
prices, especially that of oil, raised the cost of living and increased government
revenues. A virtual halt of government investments, a tight freeze on pubic sector
wages at depressed levels and a moratorium on foreign debt services decreased the
3 For a overview of Bolivia's economic crisis and subsequent stabilization program see
Morales and Sachs (1988).
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expenditure side of the government budget. Approximately 32,000 COMIBOL (the
state owned mining company) workers lost their jobs. The Emergency Social Fund,
an employment generation project, was created to run parallel with the adjustment
program to combat its social costs (Newman, Jorgensen and Pradhan 1991). The
adjustment policy was successful in that it stabilized the economy. Within 10 days
after the program was announced the inflation was halted and prices actually began
to fall. However, the restoration of economic growth took longer. In the first year
GDP fell by 2.6 percent. In 1987, growth picked up again and GDP increased by
around 2.7 percent, still     less     than     the     rise in population,      but a dramatic
improvement over the first half of the 1980s.
The subsequent years were economically stable with an average GDP growth of
2.8 percent in the period 1987-1990. Even thought this was a reasonable
performance in aggregate terms, the rise in per capita terms was insignificant since
population grew at a rate of 2.8 percent p.a. In 1991 GDP growth was strongly
positive. Overall GDP growth  was 4.1% which resulted  in  a per capita growth  of
2.1 percent. The main sectors contributing to this growth were mining (7.6
percent), agriculture (7.2 percent) and manufacturing (6.7 percent). The economy
remained reasonable stable in the period following the adjustment: inflation
averaged around 17 percent over the period from 1987 to 1991. The deficit of the
non-financial public sector averaged around 2 percent of GDP over the same
period. The current account balance deficit remained around 9 percent of GNP.
2.4 Tax Structure
The extremely low tax revenues before the stabilization program induced the Paz
Estenssoro government to introduce a completely new system of taxes. Before 1985
government revenues had been largely dependent on exports by state enterprises
and income taxes. Declining world prices for minerals and an overvalued exchange
rate discouraged exports and drove production into illegal channels. Hyperinflation
made it almost impossible to collect income taxes. As taxes were collected in local
currency it was difficult to correctly index taxes and even a small delay in payment
made the revenue virtually worthless. The new system, which was designed in
1986 and implemented in May 1987, relies heavily on consumption taxes to
generate government revenues. The new tax system has been responsible for an
impressive rise in government revenues. Tax revenues increased from 2.9 percent
of GDP in 1985 to 6.2 percent in 1987.
4Reported GDP figures exclude the value added of coca production. Although difficult to
quantify, various studies show a declining role of coca in the economy. According to the
estimates, the contribution of coca decreased from 26% of GDP in 1986 to 6% in 1991. The
decline is mostly contributed to a fall in world prices.
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The main sources of government revenues are (1) taxes and transfers from the state
petroleum company     (YPFB), (2) value added taxes     and (3) custom duties.
Revenues from YPFB are the largest source of revenue for the government
although the relative share    has been declining slowly. Revenues through   YPFB
dropped from 62 percent of total revenues in 1986 to 43 percent in 1989. The
share of the revenues from value added tax (VAT) has been rising steadily. In 1989
VAT payments equalled 23 percent of total revenues. Since the introduction  of  the
new system, custom duties have varied around 11 percent of total revenues. In the
following paragraphs we will discuss in more detail the taxes that directly affect the
operation of the urban labour market.
There is a value added tax on all goods and services, excluding real estate, export
activities and interest payments. This tax was implemented in 1987 at a rate of  10
percent. In March 1992 the rate was raised to 13 percent. The "Specific
Consumption Tax" (ICE) levies an additional tax on certain luxury goods. These
goods include alcoholic beverages, tobacco, cosmetics and perfumes. The tax rate
varies between 30 and 50 percent. For electricity there is an additional tax of 10
percent. Furthermore there is a "Transaction Tax" (IT). The rate was 1 percent
until 1989 and 2 percent thereafter. The difference with the VAT is that taxes on
intermediate transactions cannot be deducted.
Not all firms include value added  tax in their sales. Small firms that qualify  for  the
"Simplified Tax Regime" are exempted from VAT payments. In lieu, they pay a
small fixed amount based on their estimated annual income. Businesses qualify for
the simplified tax regime if they have an annual working capital of Bs 9600 (in
1989 1Bs=0.37US$) or less, have annual sales of Bs 48,000 or less or sell goods
and services with a unit value of Bs 100 or less. Most of the firms that operate in
the informal sector fall under this regime. These firms do not issue receipts for
their sales. Revenues from this tax are relatively small, in 1989 this tax accounted
for 0.4 percent of total treasury revenues.
The system provides an incentive for firms to remain small and not to register for
VAT payments. Small businesses can operate more competitively as they do not
have to pay VAT. The government promotes compliance with the tax rules by
imposing sanctions on those businesses failing to pay the appropriate taxes. For
example, in 1989, 3705 businesses were closed for failing to pay taxes.
Furthermore, the government sponsored publicity campaigns appealing to national
patriotism. In general, the presumption is that large businesses will be noticed by
tax law enforcement officers. For small businesses, the administrative costs of
collection do not offset the revenues.
The system also provides an incentive for larger businesses to register for VAT.
The system works as follows:    only VAT paying businesses are entitled to issue
receipts on their sales. Individuals can use these receipts to deduct their VAT
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payments on purchases from their income tax. Income is taxed at the same rate as
the VAT. In principle, if an individual does not save and spends all income at VAT
paying firms, he or she does not pay any income tax. As a result, income tax can
be seen as a tax on savings and purchases with non-VAT paying firms. A tax credit
can be obtained if the tax credits exceed the liabilities. Through this system, VAT
paying businesses are favoured by costumers and there is an incentive for firms to
register for VAT payments. The system has some deficiencies. A secondary market
for receipts has arisen. Individuals can overstate their VAT payments by
purchasing additional receipts.  Also, the administrative burden to cross-check  the
receipts issued by the vendors with the receipts declared by the tax payer is great.
It is likely that falsified receipts are in use.
The system described above explains the name that is used for income tax:
Complementary Tax to the VAT. The tax covers income from all sources,
including dividends and interests. The rate is identical to the VAT rate, 10 percent
from 1987 to 1992, in 1992 raised to 13 percent. Contributions to social security
(5 percent) and to the national housing fund ( 1 percent) are deductible. In addition,
everyone has a personal allowance. Every individual receives a tax credit of 10
percent of two minimum salaries and the tax credit for the VAT payments. For the
rest  there  are  few tax deductions.   In the empirical chapters  we  do  not  make  a
distinction between before and after tax income. Considering that the
Complementary VAT raised only 3.3 percent of total revenues in 1989, this
should not cause any problems.
Firms have to pay a "presumed profit tax" which is equal to 2.5 percent of their
net  worth, the difference between assets and liabilities.   In   1990   this  tax was raised
to 3 percent. Revenues from this tax have been relatively low, in 1989 the
contribution of this tax to total revenues was 2.5 percent. The tax induces
companies to undervalue their properties for tax purposes. Furthermore, the system
favours the service sector over the manufacturing sector, as firms operating in the
service sector will usually  be less capital intensive.
2.6 Labour Markets
Ever   since    1980 the informal sector has accounted   for   more   than   half of urban
employment. The number of individuals employed in the informal sector is strongly
influenced by economic policy. Figure 2.2 presents the share of the urban labour
force employed in the formal and informal sector from 1980 to 1989. (UDAPE
1991) During the period of economic crisis in the beginning of the eighties, the
share    of the informal sector increased only slightly. Job patronage and strong
unions kept the share of formal sector employment about constant. There was a
sharp rise in informal sector employment just after the reforms: from 1985 to
1986, urban formal sector employment fell by 62,209 jobs, i.e. 14 percent. In the
same   year the informal sector   grew with 116,704 people (UDAPE 1991). This
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Figure 2.2 Share of formal/informal sector in urban employment (c.f. UDAPE
1991, sector definition not stated).
supports the view of the informal sector as a buffer sector. Income generated from
the informal sector is needed in a period of economic recession5.
There is no one to one relationship between formality and sector of economic
activity. The formal and informal sector operate in overlapping sectors  of  the
economy. For males, in 19896 formal sector employment was concentrated in the
public sector (32 percent), manufacturing (14 percent), transport (13 percent) and
construction (12 percent). For females, formal employment is largely concentrated
in the public sector (63 percent). For males, informal sector employment is
concentrated in commerce (24 percent), personal services (18 percenO, construction
(17     percent) and manufacturing (14 percent). For females, informal sector
employment is concentrated in commerce (69 percent) and personal services (14
5 Horton (1994) provides an excellent overview of the adjustment process in the labour market
in the eighties.
6Source: household survey data 1989, definition formal/informal sector based on worker's
status (see section 2.7).
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percent).   The  data  show that female employment is concentrated in specific sectors
of the economy: the public sector for formal sector employment and commerce for
informal sector employment. For males, formal and informal activity overlap, it
found particularly in sectors of manufacturing, construction and transport.
Most of the labour market regulation affects the formal sector. The basis of the
regulation was put forth in the "Ley General de Trabajo" of 1942 (see Rodriguez et
al. 1992). In the beginning of the 1980s additional provisions were made, mostly
favouring the rights of the workers. In 1985, as part of the New Economic Policy,
a number of labour regulations were eliminated. The policy was aimed at
reenforcing market powers in the labour market, establishing a closer link between
work effort and pay. The policy change (1) allowed for wage negotiations to take
place at firm level instead of sector level, (2) eased the hiring and firing of
employees and (3) abolished most bonuses (such as subsidized food stores) for
public sector workers. The minimum wage legislation was maintained. In the
following we will briefly discuss the current regulation facing firms and workers in
the formal sector.
The minimum monthly wage was Bs 60 from March 1988 to December 1990. In
1990 it increased to Bs 120. Using the exchange rate of 1989, Bs 60 equalled about
US$20. This is fairly low and does not seem to be a major obstacle for entry into
the formal sector. In the private sector the enforcement of this law is weak. The
minimum  wage is mostly offered  in the public sector for unskilled workers.  For
comparison, the average monthly wage in the private sector in 1989 was around
500 bolivianos while in the public sector it was about 155 Bolivianos (UDAPE
1991).
Collective bargaining takes place in the sectors in which the government is
involved. Union power in the private sector is small, negotiations take place at firm
level and the unions have little impact. This is a direct result of the loosening of
the firing rules. Union power used to be strong in the mining sector, but with the
malaise in this sector the influence of the unions has diminished accordingly. At
this moment, unions are strong in the public sector and in the hydrocarbon sector
(YPFB). In these sectors collective labour agreements exist.
In the case of a labour dispute, workers have the right to go on strike. However,
for a strike to be considered legal several juridical steps have to be followed. This
is a lengthy process that takes at least 30 days. After workers and employers have
been in an official state of dispute for at least 10 days, the government will offer to
mediate. Within 15 days the government mediator will propose a settlement. This
proposal is definitive.    If the employers   do not accept the proposal   they   have   the
right to close the factory and fire all workers. If the workers do not accept the
proposal they have the right to go on strike. They should give at least 5 days notice
before commencing. In the case of a legal strike the employer has to continue
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paying the salary to the worker. Today, there are relatively few strikes as unions
have become more tolerant.
There are no unemployment benefits as such. In lieu, employers in some cases
have to compensate fired workers. The regulation   is as follows:   if the worker   has
been employed for less than three months or if there is a clear understanding at the
initiation of employment that the relation will terminate at a certain date, no
redundancy pay is required. If employment has lasted for more than three months
there is a distinction between dismissal with and without justifiable cause. In case
dismissal is with justifiable cause (as defined by the ministry of labour) no
compensation is required. If the dismissal is without justifiable cause, the employer
has to compensate the worker the equivalent of three monthly salaries plus one
monthly salary for every year of service. In practice it is very hard to prove that
dismissal is with justifiable cause. Employers can evade indemnity payments by
contracting workers for less than three months on a continuous basis.
It  is   compulsory   for all formal sector firms and workers   to join social security.   It
covers health insurance, disability insurance and old age pension. Employers
contribute about 15 percent of the wage bill to social security. Workers contribute
around 5 percent. All workers have to join the state run National Social Security
Fund. Moreover, a sector specific fund has to be joined. The efficiency of the
current system has been questioned. Administrative costs use up a large percentage
of   the   flow of funds (estimated   at   up   to 25 percent). Those   who can afford   it,
purchase additional insurance in the private sector. Currently the pension scheme is
organized as a pay-as-you-go system. The height of the pension is largely
determined by the total contributions at the time and, as a consequence, there is
little relationship between any individual's contribution and the benefit. Presently
the government is thinking of changing the system into a system of personal
capitalization, establishing a closer link between contributions and benefits.
2.7 Data
The empirical research in the following chapters draws upon data from the second
round of the 1989 Bolivian household survey (Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, EIH
89), which is one round of a pooled cross section survey7 conducted by the
Bolivian Central Bureau of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica) since 1976.
The survey covers 7246 households in 8 urban centers comprising the three major
geographical zones. It is a multipurpose survey. The survey collects individual
level information on a wide variety of topics including education, labour supply,
health and migration. Household level information is collected on expenditures,
non-labour income and housing. Household survey data, in contrast to firm level
data, are particularly appropriate for measuring activity in the informal sector since
'Every year different households are interviewed.
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they are drawn from the entire urban population. Firm level data often do not
include non-listed firms (micro-enterprises), of which the bulk of the informal
sector consists. The survey collects a measure for household consumption and, for
every family member separately, detailed information on labour supply, earnings,
education, health, fertility and migration. The labour section of the survey is
extensive. It provides information on occupation, earnings, hours worked and
search behaviour.
Table 2.1 presents the distribution of the sample over the 8 urban centers and some
regional summary statistics. Cochamamba, Santa Cruz and Trinidad have relatively
high mean per capita expenditures. The average family size is 6.6. The variables
"econ act" and "unemployment' characterize the local labour market. The "econ
act" variable denotes the number of people (males and females) working or
looking for work in the (random) sample. It relates to the size of the local labour
market and may pick up scale effects. It varies between 695 for Potosi to 2486 for
St. Cruz. The lowest unemployment rates (males and females jointly) is found in
Trinidad    (0.053)    and the highest in Oruro    (0.107). High average per capita
expenditures seem to coincide with more favourable economic conditions and low
regional unemployment rates.
Table 2.1: Distribution of sample over urban areas plus regional summary
statistics
No of monthly unempl. econ
households p.c. expend. rate act
Sucre 583 91.3 0.069 947
La Paz 1338 91.7 0.097 2328
Cochabamba 1192 135.6 0.076 2287
Oruro 776 61.5 0.107 1191
Potosi 439 62.9 0.098 695
Tarija 526 85.1 0.093 979
Santa Cruz 1414 147.1 0.076 2486
Trinidad 996 134.1 0.053 1874
Total 7264 110.1 0.082
In the subsequent analysis we will use a measure of household net dissavings,
defined as total household consumption minus total household labour income. This
8 Defined as the number of individuals who did not work and searched for during the past
week divided by the economically active population (those who searched or worked during the
past week).
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measure is constructed on the basis of household consumption and individual
income data that are collected in the survey. Questions on household expenditures
are answered by the head of the household. Total expenditures is constructed by
aggregating 27 different categories. These categories constitute a fairly complete set
of    the main expenditure items. Recall periods vary according    to    the    type    of
expenditure. A rent is imputed for house owners. Individual earnings are more
difficult to measure9. Earnings are collected using only one question for each
activity. For those involved in household production or in a family business it is
difficult to measure earnings. For those participating   in the labour market  one   can
make a more accurate estimate of their earnings. Looking at the primary activity
only, 97.6 percent of the working prime age males and 85.6 percent of the working
prime age females  work  in an activity for which  it is possible to measure earnings.
Further examination of the quality of the data on household consumption, earnings
and non-labour income indicates that the calculated household savings measure is a
meaningful estimate of actual savings. The mean of monthly household
expenditures in the survey equals 682 Bs whereas the mean household income
(earnings plus non-labour income) equals 657 Bs. This implies an average
household dissavings of 25Bs (0.33 standard error). The figures on household
expenditure and income are comparable in magnitude. Savings may be
underestimated due to the difficulty of measuring earnings for household production
or family labour. Besides, the different time units in which earnings and
consumption are measured give rise to measurement error. Regression analysis
taking household expenditures as the dependent variable and a constant term,
household income and family size as explanatory variables gives the following
result (standard errors in parentheses):
Expen = 262.6 + 0.47 Inc + 16.5 FS R2 -0.30
(18.4) (0.009) (2.61)
There is a significant positive relation between expenditures and income. As
income increases, the share of expenditure decreases and that of savings increases.
As  noted in chapter  1, the exact distinction between formal/informal sector  is  an
issue of ongoing debate. The information collected in the survey allows for
different definitions of the formal and informal sector. To investigate the effect of
the use of different definitions we have produced table 2.2. For the working
population aged 19 to 65, this table presents a cross tabulation using two commonly
used   definitions. The first definition  uses   the   size   of the enterprise   as the primary
'I'he same question about earnings is used for wage workers and self-employed workers. The
respondent can choose whether to report by day, week or month. Questions on the average
number of hours worked per day and the average days worked per week make it possible to
impute hourly earnings.
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indicator of formality.   If  the  size  of the enterprise  is  less  than  6,  the  work  is
classified as informal. However, as is common, independent professionals, such as
lawyers and doctors, are classified with the formal sector workers. Household
workers and family workers are left unclassified. The second definition is based on
the worker's status and corresponds to the definition used by Magnac (1991): wage
workers and independent professionals are classified as formal, and self-
employedio workers as informal. Others, that is employers, and home and family
workers, are left unclassified. Of all workers, 4 percent are employers, and are
therefore not classified according to Magnac's definition. Both definitions do not
classify home and family workers. For this group it is very hard to measure their
labour supply and earnings. The change of definition does not affect the sector of
classification for 80 percent of the workers (if we include non-classified). Thus, it
does not seem to make a large difference which definition is used. In order to
make our study comparable with Magnac's we follow his definition in this and the
next two chapters. In chapter 5, we will add a capital asset criterion to the sector
assignment of self-employed workers.
Table 2.2 Comparison of two definitions of formality
(percentage of working individuals)
Definition according to siZe
Definition according
to worker's status not
formal informal classified total
formal                             34                      16                     0                       50
informal                          0                       39                     0                        39
not classified                 2                     2                     7                     11
total                                36                      57                      7                        100
The estimation results in chapters 4 and 5 are based on subsamples of 6349 out of
7937 males, and 7293 out of 9028 females. From the original sample, 855 males
and 864 females were excluded because they were not working as a result of health
problems or because, at the time of the survey, they attended full-time education.
455 males and 648 females were excluded since, according to our definition of
formal and informal sector, they could not be classified. These are home or family
workers and employers. 19 males and 9 females were excluded because of missing
or implausible information on earnings or hours worked. We excluded 10 males
'oAccording to the survey an individual is engaged in self-employment if: The person worked
without dependence on a boss, managing his own economic unit, with or without the help of
family workers or unpaid apprentices, but without using more than two salaried workers.
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and 5 females as the education level was not reported, 9 males and 8 females as
reported household expenditures were extremely different from reported household
income, 226 working males and 175 working females as they did not report
earnings, and 14 males and 19 females as of missing information on other
household income.
Table 2.3 Sample means by labour market state (sample standard deviations    of
other variables than dummies in parentheses, see appendix I for a description of
variables)
male not female not
formal inform working formal inform working
education level:
basic 0.21 0.35 0.24 0.09 0.39 0.29
inter 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.08 0.16 0.15
medio 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.22 0.20 0.29
middle technical 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.05
higher technical 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.01
normal (teacher) 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.03
university 0.19 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.03 0.05
other 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.13
married (dummy) 0.79 0.85 0.59 0.55 0.71 0.80
ethnic 0.30 0.39 0.33 0.19 0.46 0.34
age (in years) 35.9 39.7 38.8 33.8 39.3 36.8
(10.7)  (11.6) (15.4) (9.3) (11.3) (12.7)
per cap net dissavings (/100) 0.01 -0.04 0.79 0.24 -0.04 0.37
(2.20) (1.88) (1.71) (2.79) (1.65) (1.99)
hourly earnings 2.39 2.58 1.94 2.01
(primary activity' 1) (4.4) (4.5) (1.8)   (4.6)
hours worked per week 49.7 52.3 38.5 46.9
(primary activity) (16.8) (19.2) (16.5) (24.7)
number of observations 3605 1863 881 1439 1972 3882
The research focuses on labour supply behaviour of individuals from 19 to 65 years
of age. Table 2.3 provides summary statistics for the individuals that were included
in the estimations. The table uses the definition of formality based on the worker's
status. On average, formal workers have a higher education level than informal
workers. This difference is the greatest among females. The percentage of
individuals reporting to have completed university training is strikingly high. The
" The survey collects limited information on the secondary activity. Secondary activity hours
and earnings could not be computed in the same way as for the primary job. The number of
people with primary and secondary activity in different sectors is small: 2.5 percent of males and
1 percent of females. We therefore ignore the secondary activity in this study.
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variable "ethnic' is a dummy variable obtained from the language question: if the
respondent commonly speaks another language than Spanish, the variable is set to
one. Ethnic workers are overrepresented in the informal sector. The variable "per
cap net dissavings" is defined as family expenditures minus family earnings divided
by family size. There is no significant difference in the average net dissavings
between workers in different sectors. The reason for using this specific other
family income measure will be discussed in chapter 4.
The distribution of the natural logarithm of hourly earnings is given in figure 2.3.
Hourly earnings are higher for males than for females. For males, the distribution
of log hourly earnings is similar in the formal and informal sector. For both sexes,
average informal earnings are higher than average formal earnings. For females,
the distribution of log formal sector earnings is skewed to the right. The standard
deviation  of the informal sector earnings  is  more than twice  that  of the formal.
Both for males and females, the average number of hours worked per week is
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Figure 2.3 Distribution of Log Hourly Earnings 12
12 Smoothing is done using kernel density estimation with Gaussian kernel and the normal
reference rule bandwidth (see Scott 1992, p. 131).
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Due to measurement problems, reported hourly earnings may underestimate the
monetary benefits of formal sector jobs compared to informal sector jobs. Fringe
benefits  are not included in reported formal sector wages. 57 percent of males   and
72 percent of females working in the formal sector, reported to have received
benefits other than the regular wage. The survey does not collect a monetary
equivalent for these. 48 percent of males and 64 percent of females in the formal
sector are enroled in social security, the costs of which are partly borne by the
employer. Income taxes hardly play a role: in 1989, they represented 3.3 percent
of total tax revenues (World  Bank 1989). Informal sector earnings  may not always
be    measured    net of costs. The questionnaire   does not contain enough detail    to
correct   for   this.    This   type of problem may affect estimates   of wage differentials
between the two sectors, but will not affect the estimates of the (reduced form)
sector allocation equations.
To get an idea of the extent to which the data represent national figures, the
information contained in the survey can be compared with official estimates from
other sources (ILO, 1991). In the survey, 78 percent of all males and 47 percent of
all females have a paid job. The activity rates, i.e. the fraction of people working
or looking for work, amounts to 84 percent of males and 51 percent of females.
Official estimates report activity rates of 93.4 and 26.5 for males and females in
the   same age group, nationwide   in    1990   (i.e.    for both rural and urban areas).
Official estimates report an average of 44.8 hours of work per week for employees
(i.e. a subset of all formal sector workers). The official estimates differ
substantially from the ones obtained from the (urban areas only) EIH data.  It is
not clear to us whether the quality of the official estimates would be "better" than
the ones obtained  from  the EIH survey.  At  the  time  of the survey there  was  no
other reliable employment survey in operation. The official estimates are probably
also based on the EIH survey, and the difference could be caused by the use of
different definitions or by the guestimate that is included in the official estimate for
the rural areas.
2.8 Conclusion
Bolivia seems to be an appropriate country to study urban labour markets in
developing countries. After the economic crisis in the first half of the eighties, the
second half of the eighties has been reasonably stable and one can expect that the
labour markets have adjusted to a new equilibrium. In 1989, the informal sector
provided employment to about half of the working population in urban areas. But
what factors determine the allocation of labour over sectors? In analyzing the urban
labour market one cannot neglect the rural labour market and migration. The
allocation of labour over sectors depends on how the markets interact. Do labour
markets operate competitively or is the allocation a constrained equilibrium?
Careful analysis of such issues calls for a theoretical framework. The question of
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how to model labour markets for developing countries, both from a theoretical and
applied point of view, is the subject of the next chapter.
3. Modelling the Urban Labour Market in Developing Countries
3.1 Introduction
The ideal economic model captures the observed stylized facts, is empirically
falsifiable and leads  to a better understanding  of the functioning  of the economy.   A
model of the urban labour market in a developing country must capture two major
empirical facts. (1) First, it must allow for wage dualism, where a formal and
informal sector exist simultaneously. This is observed in practically all urban
centers in developing countries. The informal sector  can  take  up a sizable portion
of the urban labour market. For example, in Latin America, the informal sector
labour force ranged from 24 to 63 percent of the total employed labour force in
1985 (Mezzera 1985). Wage dualism arises in a segmented market, where in one
sector non-competitive wage setting mechanisms prevail. This could be caused   by
strong union involvement in one sector, minimum wage legislation, etc. Because
entry into the covered (formal) sector is restricted one can observe that workers
with identical characteristics are paid differently in different sectors of the
economy. In a competitive setting, all workers would move to the sector with the
highest wage offer and wage dualism would disappear. (2) Second, the model has
to allow for the existence of open unemployment and underemployment13. Open
unemployment rates are sizable  and   can   run  up to double digits. The magnitude  of
the problem is disguised by the fact that some workers engage in marginal work,
working few hours for a very low pay. They are not counted as unemployed, but
they are, just like unemployed, rationed because they would prefer a regular job
for the going wage to their current position. These workers are also referred to as
underemployed.
Continuing rural-urban migration has led to the understanding that the urban and
rural labour markets are interrelated. If urban wages increase faster than rural
wages this will lead to rural migrants seeking work in the urban labour market.
The increased competition that results will affect the expected wage offer for urban
residents. The pioneering    work    in    this    area is Harris and Todaro    (1970)    who
developed an equilibrium model to explain the persistence of open unemployment
in urban areas  of a developing country. This model  will be discussed  in more detail
below.
Empirical testing of labour market models requires detailed data on an individual
level. The conclusions that follow from theoretical models, such as the Harris-
Todaro model, can be confronted with survey data regarding earnings, search for
" Open unemployment is defined as population not working, available for employment and
actively seeking work divided by total economically active population. For underemployment no
standard definition exists. Often an individual is considered underemployed   if  he   or she works
involuntarily less than some norm number of hours.
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work,   migration  etc. In testing, one should correct for heterogeneity   in the labour
force. For example, an observed wage differential can be attributed to differences
in skills or restrictions on entry in sectors. While the first is still possible in a
competitive setting, the second is only possible when there is labour market
segmentation. The scope of the testing depends on data availability. Data that allow
to test a complete urban-rural labour market model are rarely available. Usually the
tests focus on one specific issue such as wage dualism or urban-rural migration. In
this study we will use urban survey data. Our tests will therefore be focused on
wage dualism and labour market segmentation. We will abstain from migration
issues.
How does a policy intervention in one sector influence participation and earnings in
this and other sectors? This is the main question we would like to address with a
labour market model. A policy intervention could be anything from a layoff of
public sector workers, or the institution of a wage floor, to the promotion of
enhanced seeds for farmers. All have a direct effect on the earnings of workers and
will thus influence the rest of the labour market. A definite answer cannot be
expected since it would require extensive modelling of both demand and supply
effects. The focus here will be on the labour supply effects within the urban
economy. The objective is to focus on the questions we can answer with the data at
hand, hoping that this will ultimately lead to an increased understanding of urban
labour markets in developing countries.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: section 3.2 provides a survey of the
theoretical models of labour markets in developing countries. A brief overview of
the empirical literature is contained in section 3.3. Finally, section 3.4 contains
some suggestions on how the theoretical and empirical models can be improved.
3.2 Review of Theoretical Models
We  begin  with a brief exposition  of the influential Harris-Todaro (1970) model.
Their objective was to develop a model which could explain the persistence of open
unemployment in urban areas of a developing country. The model distinguishes two
sectors: (1) an agricultural and (2) a formal urban sector. Agriculture is assumed to
be a free entry sector with a given wage Wc. In the formal urban sector a higher
wage prevails, Wf. The wage in the formal sector is above market clearing levels
and employment in the formal sector is rationed. Let F denote the total amount of
urban sector jobs. The labour force, L, is assumed homogeneous. Sector
preferences depend on wages    only.     As the formal sector    wage is above    the
agricultural   wage, any individual prefers a formal sector  job   to an agrarian  job.
However, not everybody will seek employment in the formal sector as the
probability of obtaining formal sector employment diminishes as more individuals
queue up for the limited number of positions that are available. Two strategies are
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possible: (1) remain in agriculture and (2) seek formal sector employment. In
equilibrium, the expected returns for both strategies will equate:
Ea( W)     =    E  HO
- Wa = PW, (3.1)
where E  is the expectation if the first strategy is followed and Ef for the second
strategy. If no formal sector job is found the individual does not work and has zero
returns. p denotes the probability of obtaining a formal sector job. This probability
equals the total number of formal sector jobs (19 divided by the number of formal





The labour force is divided into formal sector job seekers plus agricultural workers
(LD.
L=Ls +La (3.3)
Ex post,  of the total amount of formal sector job seekers  (Ls), a fraction p obtains a
formal sector job and a fraction (1-p) remains unemployed (U). Note that in this
model on-the-job search from agriculture is not allowed for. The agricultural sector
is considered geographically separated from the urban sector. In equilibrium,
p=W /lif, L,=(Fl /4, and U=(1-p)Ls. As an example, in the case where W= 6,
Wa=3, F= 200 and L=1000, in equilibrium Ls=400, 4=600, p=1/2 and U=200.
The main contribution of the Harris-Todaro model is that it can explain the
allocation of labour over sectors in a developing country as a result of demand side
factors. For example, an increase in the urban wage is predicted to lead to an
increase in unemployment in the urban sector. Also rural-urban migration can be
studied within the context    of this model. However, an informal sector    is    not
included in the model. The increased recognition of this sector in the mid seventies
led economists to extend the Harris-Todaro model to allow for an informal sector.
Such a model would provide a more accurate description of reality. Moreover, if
one carries out a simple numerical exercise in terms of the Harris-Todaro Model
in which one plugs in estimated values for the exogenous variables, the urban
unemployment rate that follows is generally too high (cf Fields 1975 p. 168). The
equilibrium unemployment rate equals the ratio of the agricultural and the formal
sector wage. According to Fields (1975) observed wage differentials vary from 1/2
to 1/8, yet the highest unemployment rate observed in the seventies in LDCs is 20
percent. A possible explanation for the overprediction could be that some of the
formal sector job seekers do not search from unemployment but engage in informal
sector work while they continue to search On the job.
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Fields (1975) extends the Harris-Todaro model to include an informal sector. Just
like agriculture the informal sector is considered to be a free entry sector. Because
the informal sector is located in the same geographical area as the formal sector,
on the job search is allowed for from the informal sector. In fact, because there are
no search costs in this model, all informal sector workers engage in on the job
search. Fields (1989) improves upon the 1975 model by (1) making an explicit
distinction between ex ante strategies and ex post outcomes and (2) by allowing for
search from agriculture. The discussion below presents a simple version of the
1989 model which includes the first feature, but excludes the latter for the sake of
clarity. Three strategies exist: (1) remain in agriculture,   (2)   look for formal sector
employment from unemployment and (3) look for formal sector employment from
the informal sector. On-the-job search is assumed to be less efficient than full time
search from unemployment. Denote the agricultural wage, the formal sector wage
and the informal sector wage by Wa,lif and Wi respectively. The first two are
exogenous in the model, the latter endogenous. The allocation of labour in
equilibrium is found by equating the expected returns from all strategies
Ea(B  =  E,(W)   =  Ei(W)       -       Wa  =  Pllf  =  OPWf+(1 -Bp)Wi (3.4)
where  8  (0<0<1)  is the relative efficiency  of on  the job search relative to search
from unemployment. There are several reasons why the efficiency of on the job
search from the informal sector may be lower. The limited time that is available
for searching or the negative stigma effect associated with working in the informal
sector may lower the chance of entry into the formal sector. The number of formal
sector job seekers (Ls) equals the labour force queuing up for formal sector jobs
weighted by their relative efficiency of search.
Ls = L/+0Lia (3.5)
where L; denotes those individuals in the labour force that choose, ex ante, to
search from unemployment and Lt those who choose to search from the informal
sector. As in the Harris-Todaro model the probability p equals the total number of





Of the individuals that choose to search from the informal sector, Li a fraction
(1 -Bp) remains in the informal sector.
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Li'  =  (1 -ep)Li (3.7)
where L; denotes the labour force, ex post, in the informal sector. The informal
sector wage depends on the number of entrants in this sector. The demand for




In this simple version  of the model   Q is taken as exogenous. In various extensions
Q is modelled as a function of the formal and informal sector wage bill. This
complicates the expression for a closed form solution and is not necessary for the
current argument. Ex ante, the labour force is divided into those who search from
unemployment 6Lp, those who search while working in the informal sector OLD and
agricultural workers (LD. Ex post, the labour force divides in unemployed (U),
formal sector workers, (L0, informal sector workers (LO, and agricultural workers
(L,)
L=L;+Lr+La=U+Lf+LF+La (3.9)
As before, of the workers that choose to search from unemployment (L;), a fraction
p obtains a formal sector job and a fraction (1-p) remains unemployed (U). In
equilibrium it follows from  (3.4)  that p= WjI;if and  W,=(B'c-#PWf)/(1-Op)  and from
(3.4) that Ls=(FWf)/Wa and La=((1-8)Fl;198(2)/(Wa(1-0)). Ll and L follow directly
from (3.5) and (3.7). U and Lc follow from (3.9). As a possible extension of the
example introduced earlier one could take  W=6,  Wa=3,  F=200,  L= 1000,  8=1/2
and Q=450. The equilibrium allocation of labour that follows is L;=250, L;=300,
4=400, Lf=E=200, Lf=225, La=450, U=125, W,=2 and p=l/2. Since a
demand for informal sector services is included in the model, in equilibrium,
unemployment has decreased as compared to the outcome in the Harris-Todaro
model.
The Fields model has some strong implications that can be tested empirically.
First, according to the model, all informal sector workers are dissatisfied with their
current position and engaged in on-the-job search. This is also referred to as the
staging hypothesis, which claims that the informal sector can been seen as a staging
post on the way to entering the formal sector. Second, the informal sector is
considered to have free entry. All workers can start working in this sector without
any major obstacles. Third, in equilibrium, the wage in the informal sector is less
than in the formal sector for every individual. Formal sector employment is
rationed and more favourable than informal sector work. The next section contains
a survey of empirical studies regarding these implications, including results for
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Bolivia where available. We will draw in part upon a recent survey of empirical
studies by Thomas (1992).
3.3 Review of Empirical Studies
The conclusion from Field's (1975,1989) model that every worker in the informal
sector is dissatisfied with his or her current position and seeks work in the formal
sector can be easily tested with survey data. Using survey information on "on-the-
job" search activity of informal sector workers one can conclude that this
proposition does not hold in practice. For example, Welling and Sutcliffe (1984)
found low numbers of informal workers actively searching for work on the basis of
survey data from South Africa. Strassmann (1987) found that 71 percent of
homeworkers in Lima would require a considerable financial incentive to tempt
them to move to the formal sector (c.f. Thomas 1992). For Bolivia, in 1989, we
find that only 7 percent of the males working in the informal sector are engaged in
active on the job search. The rejection of the proposition need not be that strong,
however. It is still possible that some informal sector workers would prefer a
formal sector job if they got one offered, but do not engage in active search
because the potential gain does not outweigh the costs of searching. These,
discouraged, searchers are also rationed for formal sector jobs. For Bolivia, if we
include discouraged searchers14 with the active searchers, the search rate for
males rises to 29 percent. The high rate of discouragement seems to be justified.
Van Lindert (1990), using his own survey data of 1980, finds that migrants change
jobs frequently but do not move much towards jobs with a higher status. Chapter 5
contains a more elaborate discussion on job search and discouragement in Bolivia.
Theoretical models consider the informal sector as a free entry, competitively
operating sector. In a recent essay, Fields (1990) concludes that "entry into the
informal sector is clearly not as easy as the popular image would lead us to
believe". Vending spots  on the street  may be costly,  and even places for begging
sometimes have to be paid for. Initial capital investments for small firms may be
hard to finance as potential entrepreneurs in the informal sector may encounter
difficulties in obtaining credit. For Bolivia, a survey among own account workers
in  1983  in  La Paz showed  that 70 percent  of the workers financed their initial
investment out of personal or family savings (see Sainz et al. 1988). Only 10
percent took a loan and the majority of these were obtained through informal
channels.   In some sectors   of the economy informal workers are organized  in
associations (gremios). For example, for street vendors, the gremios distribute  the
vending spots. Although this is not a formal regulation, it may impose barriers to
entry. This effect, however, does not seem to be very strong. The same survey
14We define discouraged workers as those who answer "There is no work' when they are
prompted why they do not look for work. For a more thorough discussion see page 67.
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showed that of the informal sector workers in La Paz 40 percent knew about the
existence of a gremio for their activity and only 23 percent had actually joined one.
The theory supposes that the wage in the informal sector is lower than in the
formal sector for every individual. Empirical studies (see Fields 1990, p 61) have
shown that there is a substantial overlap in the income distribution in the two
sectors. This does not necessarily imply that the theory is rejected. Skills are
distributed heterogeneously across workers.    If a highly qualified informal sector
worker earns more than a poorly qualified formal sector worker this does not imply
that the wage offers in the formal sector are lower. In comparing wage offers one
should correct for heterogeneity in productivity.
Not all factors influencing productivity are observed by the researcher. Selectivity
bias occurs when there are unobserved factors that influence productivity as well as
the   selection into sectors. In making predictive statements about wage differentials
one has to correct for this bias. As an example, suppose there are two labour
market states: working and not working. Selection bias may occur if one predicts
the wage of non-participants on the basis of the relationship between wages and
individual characteristics of workers only. Suppose, for example, that only
individuals with a high level of entrepreneurial skills work. Entrepreneurial skills
are unobserved to the researcher. In this case, ignoring selectivity bias would
probably   lead  to an overprediction  of the potential wage offer for non-participants.
A simple prediction would assume that their entrepreneurial skills are equal to
those of workers. To correct for selectivity  one  has to explicitly model the selection
process into sectors.
There is a large literature that deals with empirical testing of wage dualism and
labour market segmentation in developing countries. Heckman and Hotz (1986),
analyze earnings of prime age males in the labour market of Panama. They test for
wage dualism between low income earners and other workers. They recognize
explicitly that it is not sufficient to correct for observed heterogeneity in the labour
force. They face a problem of sample selection bias because the sample definition
for the two subgroups is based on a variable that is endogenous to the wage
equations. They correct for this bias and conclude that the earnings functions are
significantly different  over   the two sectors. Gindling   (1991),   in an analysis   of  the
labour market of San Jost, Costa Rica, distinguishes between the private formal,
the public and informal sector. He only uses data from employed workers, with a
positive monthly income. In this case, the sample definition is exogenous but there
may be non-random selection into sectors. Because there are three sectors,
Gindling employs the multinomial logit model (McFadden 1974) to model the
selection process. He finds that there is non-random selection into sectors. Higher
educated enter into the public sector while less educated enter into the informal
sector. He finds no sector selection bias in the wage equations and proceeds with
least squares estimates. The predicted wage differential for an average individual
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between the private formal and the informal sector ranges from 15 to 19 percent.
The informal sector wage exceeds the formal sector wage for only 9 percent of the
workers. These are all workers with less than primary education. Tannen (1991),
using data of prime age males from the urban labour market in North-east Brazil,
finds that including a Heckman correction term in a (rather restrictive) model
eliminates the previously found formal-informal sector wage differential. He
concludes that earnings, properly corrected for skills, are not different in the two
sectors.
All studies discussed so far use data of working individuals only. Non-participants
are left out of the analysis. The analysis is thus conditional on the participation
decision. Selection bias problems arise when one wants to make predictive
statements for the population as a whole, including non-participants. This problem
is not so serious for males. Their participation rate is usually rather high. But for
females, ignoring the participation decision could substantially affect the results.
Magnac (1991) develops a model that can be used to analyze the sector
participation decision simultaneously with the labour supply decision. His model is
an extension of the Roy (1951) model. There are three possible labour market
states: not to work, work in the formal sector and work in the informal sector. The
individual is assumed to maximize a utility function which depends on consumption
and leisure. Under the assumption of a linear budget constraint one can derive an
indirect utility function depending on wage and non-labour income which is
increasing in the wage. Moreover, one can define a reservation wage under which
the individual will decide not to participate. In the empirical model, Magnac
models the log of the reservation wage as a linear function of individual
characteristics plus an error term
In(wR) = ZBR+ER (3.10)
in which
wR = the reservation wage,
Z =  a vector of individual characteristics determining potential wages, home
productivity and taste shifters,
cR =  an error term.
The log wage offers in the formal and informal sector are modelled as a linear
function of individual characteristics
ln(w)  =   XB,+€i           i=l  for  formal  sector and (3.11)
i-2 for informal sector
with
w,=   the wage offer in sector i,
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X  =       a  vector of individual characteristics determining potential wages.
4 =   an error term.
Under the hypothesis of competitive markets one would expect individuals to
participate if at least one of the wage offers is higher than the reservation wage. If
participating, the individual will choose to enter the sector in which the wage offer
is the highest. However, if there are restrictions to entry into the formal sector,
some individuals with a comparative advantage in the formal sector may decide not
to participate in that sector because the costs of entry are too high compared to the
advantage of participating. Rationing, in this model, is viewed as costs of entry
into the formal sector and is considered in the participation decision. The costs are
proportional to wages (waiting queues). The log of costs, c, of entry is given by
111(c + 1)    =   Xr +€c (3.12)
The sector participation decision will now be based on a comparison of the wage
offer    in the informal sector,    ln(wD,    with    the wage offer    in the formal sector
discounted     for the costs of search, ln(wi/(c + 1)).     The     test of labour market
segmentation is based on a comparison of this model with the competitive model in
which the costs of search, c, are restricted to be equal to zero (T=O). Magnac,
using data of married woman in Columbia, rejects both labour market segmentation
and the equality of the wage equations in the formal and informal sector. He finds
that the assumption of competitive markets appears to be an accurate description of
the labour market. It seems like there is a selection, as modelled in the Roy model,
going on. For example, individuals with a higher education, who have a
comparative advantage in the formal sector, have a higher probability of
participation in the formal sector. This conclusion is different from the ones
discussed earlier and supports a separate analysis of female labour supply.
On the basis of the results from the empirical literature one can conclude that the
theoretical models need further improvement. The main criticism of the existing
theoretical models seem to be: (1) barriers to entry are also found in the informal
sector. (2) Direct evidence using information on search, shows that not all informal
sector workers are dissatisfied with their position. (3) Tests for labour market
segmentation, based on wage differentials between sectors, produce mixed results.
It seems that the main problem is that the theoretical models treat the informal
sector as homogeneous without recognizing the wide range of activities and
individuals that are found in the informal sector.
How can we reconcile the contradicting conclusions from the theory and the
empirical evidence? Two mainstreams can be found in the literature: (1) on the
basis of field research in Costa Rica, Fields (1990) proposes to distinguish two
sectors within the informal sector: an upper and a lower tier informal sector. The
upper tier informal sector workers are, given the constrained choices open to them,
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voluntarily in the informal sector. They often acquired their skills in previous
formal sector employment. Barriers to entry in this sector exist. The lower tier
informal sector is a free entry sector. Workers participate in small scale activities,
for example, selling lottery tickets. The latter sector corresponds with the informal
sector as it was originally introduced in the Fields (1975) model. (2) Many authors
have recognized that an observed wage differential between sectors does not
necessarily imply labour market segmentation. Individuals are heterogeneous and
may have sector specific preferences that are incorporated in the sector selection
decision. Rosenzweig (1988) questions the conclusions based on wage differentials
as follows: "Do they suggest barriers to entry -non competing groups- or do they
merely reflect compensatory differentials, rewards for unmeasured skills or
compensation for unmeasured differences    in the disutility    of the workplace?".
Sector specific preferences could explain why some individuals do not search for
formal sector employment even though the formal sector wage offer is higher.
3.4 Suggestions for Improvement
This section list some suggestions for improvement of the existing theoretical and
empirical models.  The main criticism to the theoretical models seems  to be  that the
informal sector is modelled as fully homogeneous. In the (Fields 1989) model the
total demand for informal sector services is shared equally among informal sector
workers. One possible way of introducing heterogeneity in this model is the
following: assume that individuals differ in their entrepreneurial ability, denoted by
p (see Brock and Evans 1986, p. 51-53). Entrepreneurial skills are distributed over
the population according to the distribution function H(p), with support [pmini Pm,x] ·
In agriculture and in the formal sector there are no returns to entrepreneurial
ability. In the informal sector incomes rise with entrepreneurial skills according to
Wi(p) = Wig(P) (3.13)
with g a non-decreasing function denoting the returns to entrepreneurial skills. In
the previous model   g was constant   for   all   p.    In the present, extended model   the
expected returns in the informal sector differ across individuals. In equilibrium, the
expected returns of the marginal individual who chooses the "search from informal
sector" strategy equals the expected returns for the individuals who choose the
other strategies:
FFa=pl*5-0pwt(1-ep)1*'1(F) (3.14)
Here 3 denotes the entrepreneurial skills    of the "marginal individual".    If   g    is
strictly increasing, individuals with entrepreneurial skills greater than P have the
greatest expected returns from the "search from informal sector" strategy. As a
result the model predicts a sorting among individuals: individuals   with   high
entrepreneurial skills choose the "search from informal sector" strategy, the others
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choose either   of the remaining strategies. However,    it   is not guaranteed   that   all
individuals who choose "search from informal" actually decide to search on the
job. It is possible that for some individuals with high entrepreneurial skills,
informal sector earnings exceed the formal sector  wage  (1<(P)> Wf). For these
individuals there is no reason to search for formal sector work. Thus, a new
strategy emerges, namely, to enter into the informal sector without search on the
job. W, remains the variable that ensures equilibrium in expected returns. In
equilibrium, the demand for informal sector services equals the total informal
sector earnings:
0   =   L Wi(P.) 17«,)  =p'  +  " -e"f'(p' =p' 1 (3.15)
9 9
With   W (p') - W ·   If  g   is strictly increasing  one   can   show that compared   to   the
previous model:     (1) the informal sector (Lf) decreases because     Q is shared
unequally among individuals. (2) The number of individuals that choose to search
from unemployment (Li) increases. This happens because the number of formal
sector job seekers is constant (L;+BL,==FByIK, with Lr those who, ex ante,
choose "search from informal"). Hence a decrease in Lf causes L; to increase. (3)
The   number of individuals that remains in agriculture OLD increases. This model
has the advantage over the previous one that it allows for some individuals in the
informal sector to be better off than in the formal sector. Moreover, the effects of
a change in the distribution of entrepreneurial skills in the informal sector can be
studied within the context of this model. Other possible extensions, such as an
explicit modelling of risk, are reviewed by De Wit (1991, chapter 2).
In the next chapters we improve upon the empirical modelling. We start by an
analysis of wage offers in the formal and informal sector. Since we will examine
both male and female employment we model the participation decision as well. We
experiment with different types of selection models.     Next, in chapter    5,     we
explicitly deal with the critique that observed differences in wage offers do not
necessarily imply barriers to entry but may also be indicating compensating wage
differentials. Next, in chapter 6, we have a closer look at the participation decision
and allow for intra-household effects. All these extensions improve upon analysis
of the labour supply decision. Demand side effects are modelled rather
parsimoniously. We exploit regional differences in labour markets and individual
search information which we interpret as an indication of rationing. More rigorous
modelling of the demand side would be worthwhile. This would require a more
general equilibrium model approach. However, the available cross section allow for
a partial approach only.
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4. Formal and Informal Sector Employment
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we analyze earnings and labour market participation in urban areas
in Bolivia, using household survey data from 1989 described in section 2.7. We
analyze the determinants of potential earnings in the formal and informal sector,
considering, for example, returns to education and the effects of local labour
market conditions.     Are    the wage determination mechanisms    in    the two sectors
different from each other? Moreover, we analyze participation. What factors
determine whether an individual works in the formal or informal sector? Are the
two sectors competitive and is the difference between potential earnings sufficient
to explain the sector someone is in? Or do other factors matter, such as (non-
monetary) sector preferences or barriers to entry?
The objective is to find out which labour market model describes the Bolivian
urban labour market best. Do the markets operate competitively and is the
distinction between formal and informal sector just semantics? Or are the two
markets segmented with barriers to entry in the formal sector? Or does the "weakly
competitive equilibrium" as defined in Magnac (1991) provide the best description?
In the latter, different wage determination mechanisms in sectors exist but there are
no barriers to entry. In the analysis we allow for heterogeneity in the labour force
and   correct for non-random selection into sectors. The analysis is reduced   form
because the factors (wage offers, preferences and rationing) driving the sector
participation decision    are not modelled separately. We examine predicted    wage
differentials between sectors. In the case of competitive markets and homogeneous
preferences every individual would move to the sector with the highest returns. In
that case, predicted wage differentials would be sufficient to explain the sector
participation decision.
Three labour market states are distinguished: not working, working in the informal
sector, and working in the formal sector. In a two sector framework, models
analyzing labour market segmentation and returns to human capital have been used
extensively.  See, e.g., Hartog and Oosterbeek  (1993)  for a developed country  and
Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988) for a developing country. These studies
condition on participation in the labour market. Particularly for females,
conditioning on participation limits the validity  of the results. For three labour
market states no established approach exists.
In this study two models based on different approaches towards the informal sector
are used. In the first one the informal sector is viewed as an intermediary sector
between not working and the formal sector. This stems from the traditional staging
hypothesis in, for example, the pioneering work of Fields (1975): formal sector
employment is rationed and all informal sector workers would be better off in a
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formal sector job (cf section  3.2).  In the second approach, competitive markets  are
assumed    and    the two sectors are treated symmetrically.    Examples are Magnac
(1991), who tests for labour market segmentation in Columbia, and Gindling
(1991), who analyzes urban labour markets in Costa Rica (cf section 3.3). We
consider both approaches and analyze the sensitivity of the results for the choice of
model. In particular, estimated wage equations may differ, because the models lead
to different corrections for selection bias (Heckman and Hotz 1986). We choose
between models on the basis of specification tests.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. In section 4.2, we introduce the two
models. Results are discussed and evaluated in section 4.3. Conclusions are
mentioned in section 4.4.
4.2 Models
The main objective of this chapter is to analyze factors driving participation, sector
choice and earnings in the formal and informal sector. We use two models. The
models consist of two wage equations, one for each sector, and two reduced form
equations explaining the selection mechanism. They differ with respect to the latter.
The number of hours worked is not considered. Wages are hourly wage rates,
obtained by dividing total earnings by the number of hours worked.
In the first model, the choice between working in the formal sector, working in the
informal sector, and non-participation, is modelled using ordered probit. In the
second model, multinomial logit is used. The selection equations are in reduced
form, in the sense that the wage rate is not included as an explanatory variable.
Wage effects are thus indirectly reflected through, for example, age and education
effects. The model is also reduced form in the sense that we consider someone's
actual state only. Information on preferred labour market state  or job search  is  not
taken into account. We do not disentangle effects through preferences from those
through rationing, costs of search, etc.
Ordered probit selection model In the first model, the three labour market states
are ordered: participation    in the formal sector - participation    in tile informal
sector - non-participation. An underlying latent variable can be interpreted as an
indicator of formality. Non-participation includes being engaged in household
production which is associated  with the lowest level of formality.
We do not explicitly specify an underlying structural economic model leading to
this ordering. The economic interpretation is the staging hypothesis of the Fields
(1975) model: informal sector employment is inferior to formal sector employment;
informal sector earnings exceed unemployment income. In equilibrium, a move
from unemployment to the informal sector involves an increase in earnings at the
cost of a reduced efficiency of search. In this view, economic formality is
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associated with increasing economic activity and a decreasing search effort (see
also Todaro 1989, p. 268). In a dynamic setting, new labour market participants or
immigrants from rural areas would first accept a job in the informal sector, and
simultaneously look for formal sector work.
The formal representation  of the model   is:
working in formal sector if Y < ai
Y = Z61 + e3 working in informal sector  if    a i   <   Y< a2 (4.1)
non-participant if a2 < Y
The subscript indicating the individual is suppressed. Y is a latent variable, the
inverse  of the "degree of formality'.  4   - N(0,1), independent  of Z.  Z  is a vector
of individual, family, and regional characteristics. Since the system is reduced form
(wage rates are eliminated), Z contains all variables in the wage equations. In
addition, Z contains taste shifters that do not result from potential earnings
differences. By means of normalization, Z contains no constant term.
In the standard version of the model stated above, at and a2 are constant across
the sample. Identification requires only one of them to be constant, however.
Keeping the other a constant limits model flexibility: choice probabilities depend
on Z through the one index Z61 only; the probability of informal sector employment
would depend  on  Z only through the non-linearity  of the distribution function  of €3.
This is a general drawback of the standard ordered probit model. To allow for
more flexibility, we parametrize a2:
a2(2) = a 1 + exp(Z62) (4.2)
According to (4.1) and (4.2), the probability of formal sector employment is
determined by Z61 only, but the choice between informal employment and non-
participation depends   on   both   Z61    and Z62. Incorporating the exponential   term   in
04(Z)  guarantees  02   >   at ·
Multinomial logit selection model In the second model, no a priori ordering among
the three states is assumed. The model can be interpreted in terms of utility
maximization. Let }1 be the indirect utility associated with participation in sector i.
We assume
working in formal sector (f   max{ Yl,Y2'Y3  =Yl
Yi = Zai + ni working in informal sector  (f max{ Yi'Y2'Y31 =Y2
non-participant  if   max{ Yl'Y2'Y) =Y)
(4.3)
Here 11,-  EV(I) (an extreme value type I distribution), and 71.92.93 independent.  Z
is  the  same  as  in the ordered probit model. Alternative  i is chosen  if its utility
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exceeds that of all other alternatives. Of course, since the actual and preferred state
do not necessarily coincide, the interpretation of utility maximization should not be
taken literally. If someone prefers but cannot   find a formal sector  job,    Y,   will   be
small. Thus K reflects both rationing and preferences.
Normalization requires one 6; to be constant (we choose 63 = 0) · Define
n;    =   max(yj)    - n i 01=1,2,3 j#0 (4.4)
Domencich and McFadden (1975) show that the probability of being in state i
equals
exp(Z6i)
Pi = prob(qi' < Zai) = F,(Zat) =
E exp(Z6j) (4.5)
j= 1,2,3
Here Fi is the distribution function of 11 i', which also depends on Z6j, jt i.
Wage equations The natural logarithm of the potential hourly wage rate wi in
sector i is modelled as
ln(wi)   =   XiB i   + fi i=l(formal), 2(informaD (4.6)
X contains explanatory variables: personal characteristics (human capital variables),
and variables describing the condition of the labour market by urban area. 4 is a
normally distributed error term.
Error structure  In the ordered probit  case, the three error terms   El,  E2 and €3  are
assumed to be jointly normally distributed with zero mean and a full covariance
matrix. The covariance of El and E2 is not identified, since we observe one wage at
most.
In the multinomial logit case, we follow Lee (1982) (see also Maddala
1983, p. 273). Let
e.   =  0-1(Fi(ni))  = Ji(ni )
(4.7)
3i
Here $-1 is the inverse of the standard normal distribution function. (4.7) implies
that   fii'     - N(0,1). Alternative   i is chosen   if  e31'    <    Ji(Z60. We assume   that,   for
i = 1,2,  (ei,E3i'), is bivariate normal  with  mean  (0,0) and covariance matrix  E;,  with
Ei(2,2) = 1. These assumptions  make it convenient to estimate the multinomial logit
model and wage equations with a two step method or maximum likelihood.
Identification Both models are generalizations of two sector self-selection models,
of which the model of Roy (1951) is the seminal example. Identification of this
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type of models is discussed in Heckman and Honora (1990) and Heckman (1990).
Results  in the latter can straightforwardly be extended  to our models.
First, the complete model is identified under the specific distributional assumptions
on the errors, even without exclusion restrictions on the regressors in one or more
of the equations. This changes if distributional assumptions are relaxed     and
replaced by, for instance, the semiparametric assumptions of independence of
errors from regressors and zero error means or medians. For this case, Heckman
(1990, p. 314) proves identification under the assumption that at least one of the
regressors in the selection part is excluded from the wage equations. This condition
is satisfied in our case: Z contains variables referring to family composition and
other family income, not included in X. In practice, whether results depend on
distributional assumptions, may thus depend on the explanatory power of the
additional regressors in the selection equations.
Moreover, semiparametric estimation of the constant terms in the wage equations is
harder than estimating slope coefficients. Semiparametric identification    of    the
constant term in,  say,  the wage equation of sector 1, relies  on the assumption that a
non-zero population fraction has a probability close to one of being selected into
sector  1.  As a consequence, semiparametric estimates  of the constant term would
be inaccurate if few observations have selection probability close to one. In other
words, parametric estimates of constant terms may be particularly sensitive to the
choice of distributional assumptions.
Net dissavings To allow for an income effect on labour supply, some measure for
full income or income excluding earnings is included in Z. For consistency with a
life cycle framework (Blundell and Walker 1986), the measure should be corrected
for savings: in a two stage budgeting framework, the within period allocation of
leisure and consumption is conditional on full expenditures in the same period, or,
equivalently, on net dissavings, defined as consumption expenditures minus
earnings. We use net dissavings per capita, assuming that the household's net
dissavings are shared equally among family members.       In this theoretical
framework, net dissavings may be treated as an exogenous variable. However, if
unobservable factors affect net savings and labour supply, treating net savings as
exogenous leads to biased results. We therefore have instrumented   for net savings.
Non-labour income is the main instrument. Details are is described in Appendix
4A.
Estimation If Z, including net dissavings, is exogenous, the models can be
estimated by full information maximum likelihood, or with a consistent two step
estimator. The latter can be used to obtain starting values for maximizing the
likelihood. Differences between the two sets of estimates can be used to carry out a
Hausman test for model misspecification. Details on both estimators are mentioned
in  appendix  4B.
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Allowing for endogeneity of net dissavings as described in Appendix 4A, does not
substantially complicate the estimation. In an auxiliary first OLS step, an equation
explaining net dissavings is estimated. OLS residuals are then added to the
systematic parts of the selection equations. Non-zero coefficients of these residuals
indicate endogeneity. See Appendix 4B. Standard errors     of    ML     have     been
corrected for the uncertainty in the first step estimates, using the results of Newey
(1984).
4.4 Estimation Results
Tables with detailed estimation results of two step and ML estimations, are in table
4Cl and 4C2 in the appendix. The following discussion is based on the, more
efficient, ML results 15.
Wage equations In Table 4.1 we present estimates for the wage equations. The
estimates of the age pattern and the constant term in the informal sector are
sensitive to the choice of selection model. For most other explanatory variables the
estimated coefficients in both models are comparable in sign and significance. The
hypothesis of equal wage equations is clearly rejected for both models and both
sexes using a likelihood ratio test16
The coefficients on the age variables are significant (at 5 percent level) only for
females in the formal sector. A maximum is reached at about 46 years of age.
Females in ethnic minorities are significantly underpaid in both sectors according to
both models. For males, the signs are the same, but significance levels are lower.
The variables "economic activity" and "unemployment" describe local labour
markets conditions. "Economic activity", which is used as a proxy for the size of
the local labour market, is positive and significant in all cases. The local
unemployment rate has a negative effect on earnings, and the effect is largest in the
informal sector. This suggests that the informal sector is more competitive, and
that less favourable labour market conditions have a greater negative impact on
earnings in the informal than in the formal sector.
Table  4.1 also contains estimates  of the error variances  of  the wage equations  and
of error covariances between   wage and selection equations. The informal sector
15 The terminology in the sequel ignores the preliminary step instrumenting for per capita net
dissavings. The two step estimator thus is actually a three step estimator. Similarly, what we call
maximum likelihood is not ML of the full model, but the two step estimator with OLS in the first
step, and quasi generalized ML on the rest of the model in the second step.
16LR test statistics   are for males 232 (probit)   and 184 (logit)   and for females 48 (probit)   and
100 (logit) exceeding critical values of X (14) for every sensible significance level.
Table  4.1. ML estimates wage equations (standard errors between parentheses, * significant at 5 % level)
A
ordered probit multinomial logit
ti
C/1
males females males fernales
formal informal formal informal formal informal formal informal
cnst 0.042 0.221 -1.777 0.273 -0.058 -1.961' -1.887 1.874'            A
(0.174) (0.278) (0.288) (0.331) (0.168) (0.302) (0.278)
(0.387)  age 0.026' -0.005 0.081' 0.009 0.031' 0.095' 0.083 -0.024
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
(0.015)             
age squared /100 -0.007 0.030= -0.088' 0.000 -0.013 -0.094. -O.092 0.034
(0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016)
(0.018)          inter 0.082 0.052 0.220 0.256' 0.082 0.077 0.227 0.275'
(0.049) (0.061) (0.088) (0.071) (0.048) (0.065) (0.088) (0.076)          21
medio 0.245' 0.28£ 0.523' 0.360 0.248' 0.204' 0.540 0.529'
(0.041) (0.054) (0.075) (0.064) (0.040) (0.058) (0.073) (0.069)
midtech 0.449 0.377 0.813' 0.566' 0.441' 0.215 0.853' 1.001'
(0.078) (0.136) (0.104) (0.121) (0.076) (0.137) (0.100) (0.131)
hightech 0.582 0.371' 1.02K 0.813' 0.582' 0.143 1.079' 1.38
(0. too) (0.169) (0.141) (0.245) (0.099) (0.167) (0.137) (0.251)
normal 0.078 -0.419' 0.972' 0.125 0.106 -0.610' 1.044' 1.208'
(0.083) (0.166) (0.121) (0.175) (0.080) (0.166) (0.112) (0.161)
university 0.827 0.600' 1.311' 0.718' 0.854' 0.227" 1.371' 1.407
(0.048) (0.080) (0.110) (0.117) (0.046) (0.091) (0.102) (0.127)
other 0.211= -0.404 -0.209 -0.042 0.211' -0.537 -0.210' -0.042
(0.067) (0.106) (0.098) (0.074) (0.064) (0.118) (0.098) (0.080)
yrs incompl educ 0.061 0.046 0.088 -0.002 0.062 0.017 0.094 0.039
(0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021)
econ active /10 0.172' 0.136' 0.176' 0.151' 0.169' 0.118' 0.177. 0.117'
(0.023) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.022) (0.036) (0.032) (0.038)
unemployment *10 -0.664' -0.889' -0.704' -0.854' -0.676' -1.218' -0.727 -0.904'
(0.090) (0.133) (0.121) (0.149) (0.087) (0.145) (0.121) (0.157)
ethnic -0.061 -0.073 -0.183' -0.145' -0.066' -0.028 -0.194' -0.311'
(0.034) (0.045) (0.055) (0.048) (0.033) (0.048) (0.054) (0.053)
ai 0.905' 0.986 0.68£ 0.95£ 0.878' 1.114 0.689 1.138'
(0.012) (0.026) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.033) (0.013) (0.039)
4 0.704' 0.653' -0.080 0.268' 0.655' -0.923' -0.138 0.803
(0.023) (0.040) (0.076) (0.062) (0.022) (0.048) (0.068) (0.070)            A
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wage  variance is larger  than  that  of the formal sector  wage. This corresponds  to
the notion that the formal sector is more regulated, leading to a smaller earnings
dispersion. The covariances determine the differences between the potential wage
distribution for the whole population, and the actual wage distribution among those
selected in the sector concerned. It is the latter which is reflected in the sample,
and the former which we try to analyze. For males, the positive coefficients for the
formal sector imply negative selectivity effects. This is not what one would expect.
For males in the informal sector, the selectivity effects are positive according to
both models17. This means that, for given observed characteristics, those with
highest unobserved informal sector skills indeed work in the informal sector. For
females, the multinomial logit model leads to exactly the opposite results: the
selection effect is positive for the formal, and negative for the informal sector. The
difference between the two models seems substantial here: according to the
multinomial logit model, the selectivity effects are much stronger than according to
the ordered probit model. The correlation coefficients   for the informal sector   are
surprisingly high, explaining the huge selection effects, particularly in the
multinomial logit model.
Education level is incorporated as follows: first, dummies are used to indicate the
highest level of courses attended. Seven levels are distinguished. "Basic", which is
the lowest education level,    is the excluded reference category. Second, for those
who did not complete the course, we used the deviation between the level attained
and the level if completed, expressed in years. This deviation is zero if the course
is finished and negative otherwise. Those who followed training that was not
classified, are included in the estimation. For them, the dummy variable OTHER is
set to one and "years of incomplete education" to zero.
For a discussion of the effect of education on the wage offers we turn to table 4.2.
For each level of (completed) education, we have calculated the predicted log
wage. For the formal sector, the wage pattern as a function of education level is
robust with respect to the chosen model. The relative increase in wage offer from
lowest (basic) to highest (university)  type of education  is  0.84 for males  and  1.34
for females. For the informal sector the estimates vary substantially with the choice
of the selection model. In particular, the estimated average wage levels are quite
different according to the two models.  This may be explained by the problems with
semiparametric identification of the constant term (cf. the discussion in section
4.3).    Returns to education are lower    in the informal sector   than    in the formal
sector, as we would expect under the segmented labour market hypothesis.
17Because the probability of non-participation is small for males, this statement is valid for the
ordered probit model as well.
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Table 4.2. Effect of education on predicted log wages (age=35,   city =La   Paz,
ethnic=0. Standard errors in parentheses)
Males Females
years educ ord probit mult logit ord probit mult logit
FORMAL
basic                 5 0.638 0.603 -0.300 -0.390
(0.048) (0.047) (0.144) (0.130)
inter                 8 0.720 0.685 -0.080 -0.163
(0.052) (0.050) (0.137) (0.127)
medio              12 0.883 0.851 0.223 0.151
(0.042) (0.040) (0.110) (0.101)
midiech               13 1.078 1.044 0.513 0.464
(0.078) (0.076) (0.100) (0.095)
hightech       15 1.220 1.186 0.729 0.689
(0.097) (0.095) (0.124) (0.122)
normal              17 0.717 0.709 0.672 0.655
(0.079) (0.076) (0.059) (0.058)
univ                        20 1.465 1.457 1.012 0.981
(0.046) (0.044) (0.072) (0.069)
INFORMAL
basic                 5 4.142 -0.677 0.099 0.828
(0.067) (0.083) (0.069) (0.099)
inter                 8 -0.090 -0.600 0.356 1.104
(0.073) (0.091) (0.081) (0.107)
medio                12 0.142 -0.473 0.460 1.357
(0.060) (0.084) (0.070) (0.111)
midtech       13 0.234 -0.462 0.666 1.830
(0.138) (0.150) (0.119) (0.164)
hightech         15 0.229 -0.534 0.912 2.204
(0.170) (0.178) (0.242) (0.271)
normal              17 -0.561 -1.287 0.224 2.036
(0.178) (0.190) (0.166) (0.203)
univ                  20 0.458 -0.450 0.817 2.236
(0.092) (0.124) (0.119) (0.178)
Figure 4.1 shows the estimated population distribution of potential earnings in both
sectors according to both models. There is a substantial overlap in the distribution
of earnings in informal and formal sector, caused by variation in observed and
unobserved characteristics. For males, formal sector wages are on average higher
than informal sector wages. Examining the expected wage offer (not accounting for
the unobserved characteristics) for all individuals separately, one finds that for all
males in the sample, the expected wage in the formal sector exceeds that in the
informal sector, according to both models. In this respect, the distribution in the
whole population differs from the distributions in the selected subpopulations. In
particular, the selection effect in the informal sector is quite strong: only those with
relatively high potential informal sector earnings will indeed work in the informal
sector. This is why the sample average of earnings of informal sector workers
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exceeds   that of formal sector earnings. This finding yields some support   for   the
Fields (1975) model: on average, males would be better off in the formal sector.
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Figure 4.1 Estimated Distribution of Hourly Earnings
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For females however, we find exactly the opposite results. According to the
multinomial logit model, expected earnings are higher in the informal sector for all
females in the sample. Using ordered probit, we find that for 9 percent of the
sample the predicted wage offer in the formal sector is higher. These are
exclusively females with normal (mainly teachers) or university training. These
results indicate that we cannot explain sector participation on the basis of expected
wages and restrictions to entry  in the formal sector only. Account  must be taken  of
differences in preferences  for  the two sectors.
Selection equations Interpreting separate parameter estimates in the selection
equations   is   not very useful. Human capital variables appear in various  ways   (age
'8 Wage offers include random draws of the error terms. Smoothing is done using kernel
density estimation with Gaussian kernel and the normal reference rule bandwidth (see Scott 1992,
p. 131).
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and age squared, for example), and selection probabilities are often determined by
more than one linear combination of the regressors. In table 4.3, we therefore
present effects of marginal changes of some of the characteristics on the state
probabilities, for the average male and female. Signs and significance levels of the
effects according to the two models are similar in most cases.
The effect of family composition is captured trough YOUNG, PRIME and OLD.
The presence of young children in the household (YOUNG) significantly decreases
the probability that the female works in the formal sector, and increases her
probability of non-participation. The presence of other prime age individuals
(PRIME) implies that the male or female concerned may not be the main earner in
the household. This significantly reduces the female's informal employment
probability, and increases her probability of non-participation. The latter is also
true far males, at the cost of the formal employment probability. A negative impact
of   PRIME on participation was expected.    It   is not clear why PRIME affects   the
choice between formal and informal employment. The presence of family members
older than 65 (OLD) is significant in one case only; it increases the male's
probability of informal employment.
Individual characteristics are MARRIED, AGE and ETHNIC. For females, being
married strongly and significantly reduces employment probabilities in both sectors.
For males, being married reduces the probability of non-participation and increases
that of formal sector employment. The probability of informal employment
increases significantly with age for both males and females. In return, the female's
probability of not participating decreases with age, and so does the male's
probability of formal employment. This may reflect a cohort effect rather than a
pure age effect. Since we included age and its squared, marginal effects at other
age levels may be different. Note that age effects are a combination of direct and
indirect effects: they include those through the wage rate. For ethnic minorities
(ETHNIC = 1), the probability of informal employment  is significantly larger  than
for others. For males, this must be a direct effect since ETHNIC hardly affects
wages. The relative magnitude of the effect alters with the model chosen.
Education level enters through various variables, and it is not possible to present a
single partial derivative. Effects of education on the participation probabilities
according    to    the two models are virtually identical. In general,     they    are     as
expected: probabilities of formal and informal employment increase and decrease
with education level, respectively. We find a strong positive impact of 'normal'
training on the formal employment probability. This type of education includes
teachers training college, typically used in the formal sector.
Per capita net dissavings has, for both sexes, a significantly positive effect on the
probability of non-participation. Interpreted in labour supply terms, this implies
that leisure is a normal good. An increase of net per capita dissavings by 1 percent
Table 4.3 Predicted partial derivatives of probability of participation for an average individual for ordered
probit and multinomial logit selection model (standard errors in parentheses; *: significance  at  5 % level)
ORDERED PROBIT males females                                               M
formal informal not working formal informal not working
young -0.005 0.004 0.001 -0.009. -0.005 0.014'
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
prime -0.012' -0.004 0.016' -0.002 -0.015' 0.017'
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
old -0.028 0.025 0.003 -0.0075 0.02 007
(0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)                              0
married 0.091' 0.019 -0.110 -0.152' -0.115' 0.267'
(0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
netdissav pc /1000 -0.624' -0.189 0.81£ -0.205' -0.250' 0.455'
(0.176) (0.197) (0.135) (0.097) (0.107) (0.141)             
                 1
age * 100 -0.478' 0.534' -0.057 -0.046 0.547' -0.501
(0.070) (0.073) (0.057) (0.051) (0.054) (0.068)
econ act /10 -0.007 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.026' -0.029. 0
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
unemployment *10 -0.005 -0.060 0.065' -0.144 -0.007 0.151'
(0.041) (0.040) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.038)
ethnic -0.062 0.049. 0.013 -0.056 0.062' -0.006                               1
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013)
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT males females ./
young -0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.010' -0.004 0.014.
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
(0.004)                                 
prime -0.015' -0.003 0.018' -0.004 -0.014' 0.018'
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Old -0.027 0.032. -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 0.004
(0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.019)                           
married 0.103' -0.026 -0.07T -0.154 -0.094. 0.24K
(0.017) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016)
netdissav pc /1000 -0.703' 0.129 0.574' -0.207' -0.360= 0.566'
(0.185) (0.169) (0.108) (0.097) (0.144) (0.155)                                   rn
age *100 -0.585' 0.630' -0.045 -0.061 0.669' -0.60K
(0.073) (0.069) (0.046) (0.052) (0.067) (0.072)                                br.
econ active /10 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.027' -0.034'                                O
(0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (O.009) (O.010)
unemployment *10 0.023 -0.111' 0.088. -0.134' 0.000 0.134*
(0.042) (0.039) (0.026) (0.026) (0.037) (0.041)
ethnic -0.065' 0.058' 0.007 -0.054' 0.098' -0.043'
(0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
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increases the probability of non-participation by 0.9 percent for males and by 0.7
percent for females. For females, both formal and informal sector participation
probabilities are negatively affected. For males, this only is the case for the formal
sector.
"Economic Activity" (EA) and the unemployment rate (UR) characterize the
individual's local labour market. A larger labour market significantly increases the
probability that a female works in the informal sector, at the cost of non-
participation. A high unemployment rate increases non-participation, for both males
and females. This may reflect a discouraged worker effect, or, to some extent, an
indirect wage effect. For females in particular, results suggest that the discouraged
worker effect  in the formal sector is substantial.
Specification tests The models are non-nested. In the (extended) ordered probit
model and the multinomial logit model, the number of slope parameters is the
same. Vuong (1989) developed a test for the null hypothesis that the two models
are equally close, in the Kullback-Leibner sense, to the true data generating
process, against the alternative that one of the models is closer. This test is quite
general, since it does not assume that either of the models represents the truth. 19
For    males     the null hypothesis cannot be rejected    at    a 5 percent level.     The
likelihood of the ordered probit model is larger than that of the multinomial logit
model, but the difference is too small to reject equality of expected log likelihoods.
For females, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the multinomial logit
model. For both sexes, multinomial logit outperforms ordered probit in the
percentage of correctly predicted observations: multinomial logit predicts the labour
market state of 59.0 percent of females and of 62.4 percent of males correctly. For
the ordered probit the percentages are 56.1 and 59.2, respectively. The special case
of a constant ot  of the ordered probit model is clearly rejected by a likelihood ratio
test.
Model specifications were separately tested using (generalized25 Hausman
specification tests (Hausman 1978), based upon comparison of (efficient) ML
estimates with (consistent but inefficient)   two step estimates. Computational details
w  Performing the test is easy here, since we have strictly non-nested models (Vuong 1989,
p. 317). We ignored the preliminary step of estimating the dissavings equation. Since estimates of
ML standard errors which account for this preliminary step, are virtually identical to standard ML
standard errors ignoring the first step uncertainty, we do not think that this leads to biased results.
20 The tests are generalized in the sense that we have no specific alternative in mind for
which ML is inconsistent while the two step estimator remains consistent. This may affect the
power, but does not affect the size of the test.
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are in appendix 4B21. All model specifications are rejected at the 1 percent level.
Given the large number of observations and the previous experience in the
literature with these kind of models, this is no surprise. For example, the model of
Magnac (1991) also fails to pass similar tests. The values of the test statistic lead to
the same conclusions as the likelihood values: for males, the ordered probit version
of the model performs better, for females the multinomial logit model.
4.5 Conclusions
We have analyzed earnings and labour market participation in urban areas of
Bolivia using two different approaches. The first one, the ordered probit model,
explicitly models the informal sector as a buffer sector, between non-participation
and the formal sector. The second one, the multinomial logit model, does not
impose any ordering. We have compared the two models using estimation results,
specification tests and comparative statics.
We have generalized the standard version of the ordered probit model, allowing
one  of the thresholds  to  vary with characteristics. The model  thus  gets  the  same
flexibility as a multinomial model without ordering. This generalization appears to
be an improvement: the special case of a constant threshold is strongly rejected for
both sexes, using e.g. likelihood ratio or Wald tests.
The models are consistent with a life cycle framework in the treatment of income
other than earnings. Moreover, we allow for endogeneity of the other income
measure, net dissavings. This appears to be an improvement also: LM tests
confirm that endogeneity is significant. Estimating the model without allowing for
endogeneity yields some quite different results: the impact of unearned income
changes sign, and the conclusions about selectivity in the wage equations change
substantially. Allowing for endogeneity, we find that leisure is a normal good: The
income effect on non-participation is clearly positive. For males, the income effect
on formal sector participation is clearly negative, whereas it is insignificant for the
informal sector. For females, both income effects of participation are significantly
negative. Although the difference between the two models is in the way sector
participation is modelled, the estimated probabilities correspond reasonably well,
and depend on the regressors in a similar way.
21 Again, we ignored the preliminary OLS estimation of the net dissavings equation. Given the
negligible differences between uncorrected and corrected ML-standard errors, we do not think that
this is important. Two step method standard errors for the wage equation are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and imputing the estimated Mill's ratio following Newey (1984).
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Contrary to Gindling (1991) we find that accounting for selectivity substantially
affects   the wage equation estimates. The direction   of the selectivity effects   is   the
same according to both models. In the informal sector, however, the magnitude of
the selectivity effect substantially depends on the model which is chosen. As a
consequence, the two models lead to substantially different predictions of potential
informal sector earnings of non-participants and formal sector employees. Using
specification tests for non-nested models, we tend to prefer the multinomial logit
model for females. For males, we find slightly more support for the ordered probit
model, but the difference is insignificant.
A   number of conclusions appear   to be robust with respect   to the chosen model.
The dispersion of potential earnings in the informal sector is much larger than in
the formal sector   (see   fig.   4.1).   This   is in accordance   with the notion  that  the
informal sector is strongly heterogeneous (Fields 1990). Wages in both sectors are
higher in larger local labour markets, and lower in areas with high unemployment.
In both sectors females of ethnic minorities are generally underpaid, while for
males this effect is insignificant. In accordance with economic theory, returns to
education in the formal sector exceed those in the informal sector. Predicted wages
are higher in the formal sector for males, which supports the view in theoretical
models (Fields 1975) that formal sector employment is preferred to informal sector
employment, but that formal sector jobs are rationed. For females, however, the
opposite holds. This could indicate  that  it  is not sufficient  to   look at wages   only  to
explain the participation decision of females. It may also indicate relatively more
favourable labour market conditions for females in the informal sector. The result
is not in line with Magnac (1991) who could not reject weakly competitive labour
markets for married woman in Columbia. Further analysis, which disentangles the
effects through rationing and differences in preferences, is presented in the next
chapter.
In general, it thus seems reasonable to conclude that the impact of most
explanatory variables is robust with respect to the specification choice. This is not
the case for the exact magnitude of selectivity effects, particularly in the informal
sector. Looking at two models instead of just one might then be a first step towards
a more robust view on the segmented labour market hypothesis.
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Appendix 4A. Endogeneity of Net Dissavings
In the standard life cycle model, net dissavings and the error terms in the labour
supply equations (due to future uncertainty only) are uncorrelated. Net savings
may, however, be endogenous as a result of unobserved heterogeneity. We add a
reduced form equation  for net dissavings to account  for  this:
netdissav =Q E+u u - N(0,02) (4A. 1)
Here netdissav is per capita net dissavings, and Q is a vector of household specific
variables.22 Endogeneity arises if u is correlated with the errors in the selection
model.
In the ordered probit model, we assume that u and the error E in the selection
equation are bivariate normal. This implies that the conditional expectation of c
given u is linear in u. In the multinomial logit model we make a similar
assumption, concerning the distribution of the error terms 9; in (4.3), conditional
on u:
ni = tli-YB - EI/(i) and 91'92,93 independent GIA.2)
Normalization requires  73=0·  If ·y=(71,72  =(0,0), the specification  is as described
in section 4.3, and net savings are exogenous.
Preliminary OLS-estimates of the dissavings equation (4A. 1) were used for both
models. Results are mentioned in table 4A. 1. As expected, the impact of other
household income is positive and strongly significant.
22   Q includes household non-labour income. Since this is not in the vector Z of explanatory
variables in the selection equations, identification of the model is guaranteed.
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Table  4A. 1 OLS Results net dissavings equation (variables AGE through "years
incompl educ" refer to head of household)
Dependent variable: Household Net dissavings, per capita









ST CRUZ -8.42 49.31
TRINIDAD -82.44 52.61
YOUNG -1.16 8.64
PRIME FEMALE -17.15 11.33
PRIME MALE -38.38 12.33
OLD -15.55 38.38
AGE 8.49 5.58
AGE SQUARED -0.03 0.06









YRS INCOMPL EDUC 21.91 9.56
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Appendix 48. Estimation and Testing
Estimation The likelihood function for the full information maximum likelihood
estimator is given below. We start with the case in which we do not take account
of possible endogeniety of net dissavings. For workers the contribution to the
likelihood consists of the marginal density of the wage times the conditional
probability of participation in the individual's actual sector. For non-workers, the
likelihood contribution equals the marginal probability of non-participation. All
marginal and conditional probabilities can easily be computed, only requiring
univariate normal distribution functions. In case of the multinomial logit model,
this is the motivation for using the transformation given in (4.7).




E ln{f,(,i) ji,(,si,iwe,  + E l. 1 16('0 f f„(,31,21,31 +  E  l'11 j f,(,Ad"I
formol , Wormal ) MA J2(2)
palf/»2111
Log-likelihood multinomial logit model:
4(Z81) c           4(4
E  In  { f,(-,)      f  ·41(•, 1-,)  d.j  +   Eln  if,(f')     j'  .42(6,1,2)  d.,}  .    E     ln(P')
(4B.2)
format - 3 infonnal non
Wa,3,7.&
Here fi and A are the marginal density functions of the error terms in the wage
equations. f31 and ·62 are conditional (normal) density functions of 4, given e 1 and
c2, respectively. Ji, 12 and P3 are defined in (4.5) and (4.7).
The two step estimator is computationally the least demanding. The first step
consists of estimating the selection submodels (ordered probit or multinomial logit)
by maximum likelihood. This yields consistent estimates of 61, 6  and (in the probit
case)  al · Using these estimates,   the wage equations  can be estimated by ordinary
least squares including correction terms to account for endogenous selection.  The
wage equations for the formal and informal sector with correction terms are stated
below. For the ordered probit specification they are (cf. Idson and Feaster 1990)
$(&1-z81)
ln(wl) = X1 1 - 013               + E (fonnal sector) (4B.3)
0(al-z81)
and
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0(al-Z61) - $(d2-z81)    •
ln(w2) = X2 2 + an + <2 (informal sector) (4B.4)
 ( 2-Z61) - *(&1-%81)
where d2 =exp(Z82)·
For the multinomial logit specification we get (cf. Lee 1982):
0(Jiczah i=1 (fworking in formal sector  (4B.5)ln(w,)   =  Xip,   - au .    + €i
Fi(Z6,) i=2  if working  in  informal  sector
Here 0 and * denote the standard normal density and distribution function,
respectively. Fi is defined in (4.5). The errors 4' and €2' now have zero conditional
mean, given that the corresponding wage rate is observed. The equations can be
estimated by OLS, using only those observations for which the relevant wage rate
is observed. Including these correction terms is a straightforward extension of
Heckman's (1974) two stage method. Ordinary least squares yields consistent
estimates but, unless     a,3 = 0, standard errors computed     in the usual     way     are
estimated inconsistently, because of the heteroskedasticity of <* and because the
parameters in the correction terms are replaced by their estimates.
Estimation in case of endogenous net savings The more general model allowing for
correlation between the error u in GIA.1) and the errors in the selection equations,
can be estimated as above, adding one preliminary step: first, the auxiliary equation
GIA. 1) is estimated with OLS. Then the model itself is estimated conditional on the
residual in (4A. 1). For the ordered probit selection model, the approach is the
same  as in Smith and Blundell   (1986). The conditional distribution  of  E3 is again
normal, and its mean is a linear function of u. Inclusion in Z of an unbiased
estimator of u, the OLS-residual 11, corrects for the non-zero conditional
expectation of €3· Significance of the estimated coefficient of Q implies rejection of
exogeneity of net savings. 23
A similar procedure can be followed for the multinomial logit case, based on the
linearity assumption implied by the specification given in GIA.2). The OLS-residual
from  (4A. 1)  is now added  to the regressors  in both selection equations  in  (4.3),  and
thus replace the unobserved error terms in (4A.2). A joint test for the significance
of the two corresponding coefficients indicates whether endogeneity plays a role. In
23 Using the terminology of Gourieroux and Monfort (1989), this estimator procedure can be
interpreted as a quasi-generalized ML-estimator, since the unknown parameters in (8) have been
replaced by their estimates.
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both models, the ML-standard errors in the second step are inconsistent in case of
endogeneity, because the parameters   in  (4A. 1) are replaced by their estimates.
Correction is possible following the procedure given by Newey (1984).
The derivation of the Hausman test statistic The Hausman test is based On the
statistic (8mi-  )'[Vogm'-As)]-1(00,1- i, with Bm, the maximum likelihood
estimator   of  0(kxl)   and   Bt,   the   two step estimator.   Let   L(y, 1 Xi,B)   be   the   log
likelihood contribution for observation i. The maximum likelihood estimator is
defined as
Bmt  =  argmax  E LO'JXpB) (4B. 6)
B
Let  B = (Bl,B2)  and   y = (yl,Y2)·   If  the   log likelihood contribution  can be split  up
according   to   L(yil Xi,B) =LiC)'lil Xi,Bl) +I,2()'2,1 Xi,Bl,BO   the   two step estimator   is
defined as
Biu = argmax Li(YtiIXi,Bi)   ,   B2ts = argmax EL252,|Li'Bits,B2)   (48.7)
Pl i 4      i
AA A
The  calculation of VCBmi - Bts)  is not trivial, Although 9(bm,) -9( ,) is.a consistent
estimator   of the asymptotic variance covariance matrix of VT(Bm,-Bts)   it   is   not
guaranteed that in practice the result will be positive definite. We therefore use a
different method that Zuarantees positive definiteness (see Newey  1984).  It can be
shown that VT(Od-00 =  VT(Om,-m -  lr(A,-0) 4NCO.F)
where F=  IHI Gm,Hiz'+H2G„HY-H JIGm,1761'-Hi'GwJijl
and
Hm'         = E[Bl /aoat '],the hessian matrix  of the maximum likelihood estimator
GE =E[(aL/OB)(BL/80)'],the cross product of the first derivatives of the ML
estimator
65            = a block matrix           0    with
LC DJ
A =E[a2Lt/801801'], the hessian of the first step with respect to #1
C-E[824/aB2801'], the derivative of the moment conditions in the second
step with respect to B,
D=E[B24/8132aB2'], the hessian of the second step with respect to B2
Gu      =E[f f] with f defined as the stacked vectors (aL,/aBl) and (aL2/882).
G„'1,4  =E[(aL/a#)f']
Gwml  =E[f(BL/am']
In the estimation of F, the expectations are replaced by their sample equivalents
evaluated  at the estimated B.
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Table 4(.1. Ordered probit estimates  (ML std errors corrected,  two  step std errors not corrected)                                                                                                                                                      5
MALES: ML two step FEMALES: ML two step
coeff std. error coeff std. error coeff std. error coeff std. error
4 -0.159 0.218 -0.079 0.229 -1.961 0.281 -2.008 0.278
82:cnst -1.919 0.322 -1.843 0.318 -1.177 0.262 -1.137 0.261
young 0.007 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.011
prime 4.050 0.015 -0.051 0.015 -0.039 0.012 -0.044 0.012
old 0.059 0.065 0.093 0.059 0.004 0.050 0.000 0.050
married 0.996 0.186 1.000 0.193 0.023 0.138 -0.014 0.137
net dsav pc /1000 -2.389 0.726 -2.179 0.718 -0.279 0.410 -0.311 0.416
ehat-nets -0.100 0.727 -0.431 0.719 -0.137 0.410 -0.084 0.416                                  b
mar*age -0.018 0.004 -0.017 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003
age 0.014 0.095 0.013 0.011 0.011                                X0.093 0.033 0.033
age square /100 -0.085 0.016 -0.089 0.016 -0.020 0.012 -0.020 0.012
inter 0.084 0.063 0.075 0.062 -0.092 0.057 -0.089 0.058
medio -0.047 0.062 -0.062 0.061 -0.393 0.057 -0.388 0.058
midtech -0.262 0.154 -0.293 0.151 -0.981 0.133 -0.979 0.133
hightech -O.199 0.182 -0.241 0.181 -1.077 0.231 -1.071 0.229
normal -0.484 0.226 -0.531 0.223 -1.625 0.167 -1.626 0.167
university .0.593 0.103 -0.644 0.100 -1.254 0.134 -1.253 0.134
other -0.228 0.127 -0.219 0.132 0.016 0.065 0.013 0.065
yrs incompl educ -0.033 0.019 -0.046 0.019 -0.079 0.014 -0.079 0.014
econ activity /10 -O.001 0.036 -O.010 0.036 0.070 0.028 0.066 0.028
unemployment *10 -0.308 0.143 -0.384 0.138 0.319 0.115 0.303 0.115                                0
ethnic 0.096 0.048 0.087 0.047 0.321 0.039 0.318 0.039
4:young 0.013 0.009 -0.003 0.011 0.043 0.013 0.045 0.014
prime 0.031 0.009 0.066 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.012
old 0.071 0.038 0.077 0.052 0.023 0.053 0.019 0.054                                0
married 0.061 0.108 0.114 0.136 1.098 0.138 1.085 0.137
net dsav pc /1000 1.587 0.454 2.478 0.552 0.942 0.446 0.885 0.442
ehat-nets -0.673 0.453 -2.183 0.551 -0.544 0.451 -0.555 0.446
mar*age -0.008 0.003 -0.007 0.004 -0.011 0.004 -0.010 0.004
age -0.035 0.010 -0.033 0.010 -0.124 0.013 -0.126 0.012                                *
age square /100 0.072 0.012 0.065 0.013 0.181 0.016 0.184 0.016
inter -0.060 0.052 -0.076 0.053 -0.139 0.074 -0.137 0.074
medio -0.111 0.047 -0.154 0.048 -0.325 0.063 -0.319
0.063                                 
midtech -0.321 0.092 -0.380 0.096 -0.964 0.088 -0.958 0.088
hightech -0.349 0.117 -0.447 0.117 -1.196 0.129 -1.188 0.129
normal -0.998 0.106 -1.120 0.103 -1.977 0.078 -1.973 0 78
university -0.598 0.063 -0.706 0.066 -1.424 0.082 -1.418 0.081
Table 4C. 1. Ordered probit estimates continued  (ML std errors corrected,  two step std errors not corrected)
coeff std. error coeff std. error coeff std. error coeff std.  error                                                                   y
other -0.305 0.091 -0.236 0.095 0.118 0.091 0.118 0.091
yrs incompl educ -0.037 0.013 -0.062 0.014 -0.109 0.017 -0.109
0.017                                 econ activity /10 0.017 0.027 -0.004 0.027 -0.017 0.032 -0.021 0.032
unemployment *10 0.012 0.105 -0.035 0.107 0.660 0.126 0.654
0.125                           ethnic 0.158 0.036 0.154 0.037 0.256 0.049 0.253 0.049                                  L-
Bi:cnst 0.042 0.174 0.317 0.252 -1.777 0.288 -1.892 0.301
age 0.026 0.008 0.019 0.009 0.081 0.012 0.083 0.013
age square /100 -0.007 0.010 0.005 0.013 -0.088 0.017 -0.092 0.018
inter 0.082 0.049 0.069 0.044 0.220 0.088 0.227 0.090
ntedio 0.245 0.041 0.225 0.038 0.523 0.075 0.539 0.076
midtech 0.440 0.078 0.385 0.073 0.813 0.104 0.854 0.100
hightech 0.582 0.100 0.532 0.084 1.028 0.141 1.079 0.124
normal 0.078 0.083 -0.050 0.095 0.972 0.121 1.045 0.116
university 0.827 0.048 0.748 0.061 1.311 0.110 1.370 0.106
other 0.211 0.067 0.146 0.073 -0.209 0.098 -0.214 0.118
yrs incompl educ 0.061 0.012 0.057 0.011 0.088 0.017 0.092 0.017
econ activity /10 0.172 0.023 0.180 0.020 0.176 0.032 0.176 0.030
unemployment *10 -0.664 0.090 -0.665 0.082 -0.704 0.121 -0.723 0.118
ethnic -0.061 0.034 -0.037 0.031 -0.183 0.055 -0.194 0.050
B2 Cnst 0.221 0.278 0.327 0.252 0.273 0.331 0.169 0.331
age -0.005 0.012 -0.017 0.013 0.009 0.014 0.013 0.014
age square /100 0.030 0.015 0.047 0.016 0.000 0.017 -0.005 0.017
inter 0.052 0.061 0.052 0.053 0.256 0.071 0.257 0.064
medio 0.284 0.054 0.291 0.048 0.360 0.064 0.364 0.060
midtech 0.377 0.136 0.384 0.120 0.566 0.121 0.589 0.136
hightech 0.371 0.169 0.363 0.144 0.813 0.245 0.844 0.231
normal -0.419 0.166 -0.545 0.177 0.125 0.175 0.199 0.189
university 0.600 0.080 0.565 0.082 0.718 0.117 0.760 0.143
other -0.404 0.106 -0.401 0.107 -0.042 0.074 -0.046 0.072
yrs incompl educ 0.046 0.018 0.037 0.016 -0.002 0.019 -0.001 0.018
econ activity /10 0.136 0.034 0.128 0.031 0.151 0.035 0.153 0.035
unemployment *10 -0.889 0.133 -0.890 0.119 -0.854 0.149 -0.866 0.141
ethnic -0.073 0.045 -0.063 0.041 -0.145 0.048 -0.145 0.045
sigmaf 0.905 0.012 0.684 0.011
Sigmai 0.986 0.026 0.954 0.017
sigf 0.704 0.023 0.949 0.149 -0.080 0.076 -0.140 0.075
Sigi 0.653 0.040 0.765 0.090 0.268 0.062 0.216 0.069
Log Likelihood: 11601 nr obs:6349 Log Likelihood: 10160 or obs:7293                                                 3
MTable 4C.2. Multinomial logit estimates (ML std errors corrected,  two step std errors not corrected) 00
MALES: ML two step FEMALES ML tWO Step
coeff std. error coeff std. error coeff std. error coeff std. error
4:cnst -1.079 0.519 -1.075 0.527 -4.269 0.547 -4.424 0.559
young 0.003 0.025 0.030 0.027 -0.lot 0.026 -0.102 0.027
prime -0.187 0.023 -0.221 0.025 -0.064 0.023 -0.059 0.025
old 0.006 0.116 -0.051 0.122 -0.030 0.102 -0.025 0.104
married 0.511 0.278 0.487 0.307 -2.436 0.271 -2.381 0.285
net dsav pc /1000 -6.247 1.124 -7.310 1.136 -2.525 0.875 -2.242 0.906
ehat-nets 2.871 1.119 4.687 1.144 1.349 0.888 1.030 0.920
mar*age 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.023 0.008 0.021 0.008
age 0.208 0.023 0.213 0.023 0.311 0.025 0.321 0.026
age square /100 -0.295 0.029 -0.297 0.030 -0.436 0.033 -0.450 0.034
inter 0.260 0.140 0.298 0.141 0.272 0.149 0.265 0.145                                »
medio 0.138 0.122 0.223 0.123 0.500 0.126 0.484 0.122
midtech 0.359 0.229 0.397 0.232 1.527 0.164 1.527 0.161                                 
hightech 0.394 0.266 0.466 0.271 1.926 0.236 1.927 0.225
normal 1.446 0.301 1.572 0.289 3.294 0.158 3.293 0.158
university 0.566 0.154 0.725 0.156 2.385 0.157 2.353 0.157
other 0.107 0.216 0.025 0.209 -0.221 0.193 -0.234 0.189                                X
yrs incompl educ 0.032 0.033 0.061 0.034 0.208 0.031 0.206 0.033
econ activity /10 -0.019 0.067 -0.007 0.067 0.110 0.061 0.109 0.062
unemployment *10 -0.735 0.263 -0.759 0.275 -1.248 0.241 -1.287
0.240                                0ethnic -0.167 0.092 -0.177 0.091 -0.339 0.097 -0.347 0.094
82 cnst -3.093 0.566 -3.043 0.579 4.496 0.432 4.446 0.428
young 0.024 0.026 0.027 0.029 -0.039 0.018 -0.049 0.020
prime -0.172 0.026 -0.178 0.028 -0.081 0.019 -0.097 0.021
old 0.161 0.118 0.146 0.133 -0.013 0.090 -0.018 0.093
married 1.114 0.295 1.488 0.330 -0.937 0.213 -1.082 0.224                                *
net dsav pc /1000 -4.621 1.186 -5.519 1.243 -2.269 0.753 -2.312 0.755
chat-nets 3.207 1.185 2.679 1.245 -0.236 0.757 0.574 0.767
mar*age -0.014 0.007 -0.019 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005
trI
age 0.265 0.025 0.256 0.025 0.239 0.018 0.248 0.018
age square /100 -0.306 0.030 -0.292 0.031 -0.281 0.022 -0.294
0.022                                0inter 0.205 0.143
0.244 0.145 -0.034 0.091 -0.020 0.090
medio -0.052 0.127 -0.018 0.128 -0.352 0.084 -0.355 0.083
midtech -0.282 0.263 -0.313 0.263 -0.532 0.173 -0.531 0.173
hightech 4.326 0.308 -0.323 0.310 -0.458 0.299 -0.454 0.290
normal -0.358 0.350 -0.451 0.345 -0.448 0.209 -0.461 0.209
university -0.642 0.178 -0.662 0.177 -0.530 0.172 -0.531 0.175
Table 4C.2. Multinomial logit estimates continued (ML std errors corrected,  two step std errors not corrected)
coeff std. error coeff std. error coeff std. error coeff std. error                                       W
other -0.580 0.226 -0.581 0.227 -0.109 0.104 -0.135 0.104                                    t'
Trl
yrs incompl educ -0.035 0.036 -0.044 0.037 -0.052 0.026 -0.050 0.026
econ activity /10 4.012 0.073 -0.024 0.073 0.154 0.049 0.157 0.048                                n
unemployment  *10 -1.153 0.285 -1.179 0.297 -0.226 0.195 -0.292 0.193 to
ethnic 0.139 0.098 0.129 0.097 0.431 0.065 0.437 0.065
4:cnst -0.058 0.168 -0.757 0.195 -1.887 0.278 -1.911 0.298
age 0.031 0.008 0.052 0.008 0.083 0.012 0.084 0.013
age square /100 -0.013 0.010 -0.046 0.011 -0.092 0.016 -0.093 0.018
inter 0.082 0.048 0.093 0.044 0.227 0.088 0.228 0.090
medio 0.248 0.040 0.268 0.038 0.540 0.073 0.543 0.076
midtech 0.441 0.076 0.513 0.071 0.853 0.100 0.860 0.098
hightech 0.582 0.099 0.679 0.081 1.079 0.137 1.087 0.122
normal 0.106 0.080 0.372 0.071 1.044 0.112 1.054 0.112
university 0.854 0.046 1.002 0.047 1.371 0.102 1.381 0.104
other 0.211 0.064 0.290 0.070 -0.210 0.098 -0.211 0.118
yrs incompl educ 0.062 0.011 0.082 0.010 0.094 0.017 0.095 0.017
econ activity /10 0.169 0.022 0.176 0.020 0.177 0.032 0.178 0.030
unemployment *10 -0.676 0.087 -0.632 0.082 -0.727 0.121 -0.727 0.118
ethnic -0.066 0.033 -0.111 0.029 -0.194 0.054 -0.197 0.050
82:cnst -1.961 0.302 1.357 0.469 1.874 0.387 2.419 0.479
age 0.095 0.013 0.011 0.015 -0.024 0.015 -0.039 0.016
age square /100 -0.094 0.015 -0.008 0.016 0.034 0.018 0.050 0.019
inter 0.077 0.065 0.083 0.054 0.275 0.076 0.286 0.063
medio 0.204 0.058 0.369 0.052 0.529 0.069 0.563 0.065
midtech 0.215 0.137 0.679 0.132 1.001 0.131 1.089 0.144
hightech 0.143 0.167 0.684 0.159 1.375 0.251 1.471 0.236
normal -0.610 0.166 0.649 0.227 1.208 0.161 1.363 0.200
university 0.227 0.091 1.159 0.140 1.407 0.127 1.474 0.150
other -0.537 0.118 -0.065 0.120 -0.042 0.080 -0.041 0.071
yrs incompl educ 0.017 0.018 0.081 0.018 0.039 0.021 0.045 0.019
econ activity /10 0.118 0.036 0.126 0.031 0.117 0.038 0.113 0.036
unemployment *10 -1.218 0.145 -0.814 0.131 -0.904 0.157 -0.922 0.138
ethnic -0.028 0.048 -0.228 0.047 -0.311 0.053 -0.350 0.053
sigmaf 0.878 0.011 0.689 0.013
sigmai 1.110 0.033 1.138 0.039
sig 13 0.655 0.022 0.115 0.081 -0.138 0.068 -0.146 0.070
sig23 -0.923 0.048 0.741 0.204 0.803 0.070 0.988 0.138
Log Likelihood: 11635 nr obs:6349 Log Likelihood: 10120 nr obs:7293                                                                                                                                                 0
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5. Sector Participation in Labour Supply Models: Preferences or
Rationing?
5.1 Introduction
Empirical studies using the dual labour market approach for developing countries have
focused on testing for labour market segmentation. A test for labour market segmentation
usually works as follows: wages (or hourly earnings) of workers   with a similar
background are compared for the formal and informal sector. It is assumed that in
selecting the preferred sector the potential workers consider  the wage offers   only.   In  the
absence of rationing every individual would enter the sector offering the highest wage
and, in equilibrium, wage offers would equalize. In the presence of rationing, however,
some workers desiring a formal sector job (because the wage offer is higher) may not be
able to obtain one and end up working in the informal sector. Thus, labour market
segmentation implies that there are identical workers with different earnings in the two
sectors. See Dickens and Lang (1992) for a survey of segmentation theory and evidence.
A shortcoming of the applied tests for labour market segmentation is that they have not
been able to make a distinction between wage differentials resulting from individual
preferences concerning non-wage job characteristics and those resulting from restrictions
in mobility between sectors. While the latter can be regarded as an indicator  of "true"
labour market segmentation, compensating wage differentials resulting from preferences
would remain existent, even in the absence of rationing. Compensating wage differentials
follow from non-monetary returns to the job such as health insurance, utility associated
with the workplace or job security. Also pure preferences, for example following from
the social status attached to participation in a particular sector, could cause a wage
differential between sectors. Gindling (1991) circumvented this problem by comparing
wages within narrowly defined occupational groups, assuming that within these groups
the non-monetary returns are equal across sectors.
In this chapter we will propose a model that allows us to test for labour market
segmentation between the formal and informal sector in a developing country on the
basis of cross-sectional data. The proposed test overcomes the shortcomings that were
discussed in the previous paragraph. The model exploits the specific features of urban
labour markets in developing countries, in particular the existence of a competitive
informal sector. The model incorporates information on search, including on the job
search, to identify rationed individuals. The organization of the chapter is as follows: in
section 5.2 we discuss the underlying assumptions of the model. Especially the treatment
of information on search and discouragement is a novelty of the model. On the basis of
these assumptions we derive in section   5.3 a formal model of labour supply that deals
simultaneously with wages, sector preferences and rationing. Section 5.4 describes the
data on search activity and looks for empirical evidence of rationing by means of
descriptive statistics. In section 5.5 the estimation strategy for the formal model is
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discussed. In section 5.6 the estimated coefficients are presented, a test for labour market
segmentation is derived and some simulations are presented that could be interesting
from a policy point of view. Section 5.7, finally, concludes.
5.2 Rationing. Search and Discouraged Workers
A labour supply model in which individuals face no entry barriers for any of the sectors
typically comprises two parts: a sector selection part and a wage determination part. In
the sector selection part, the sector in which the individual decides to participate is
explained. In a Heckman (1974) type model the choice would be between working and
not working, but in principle more than two sectors can be allowed for. Sector choice is
explained by the wage offers in each sector (for non-participation the value of home
production) and individual preferences associated with participation in a sector. In the
wage determination part, wage offers in each sector are related to individual
characteristics and local labour market conditions. The wage equations have to be
estimated jointly with the sector selection section because of non-random selection into
sectors.   For the Bolivian setting, models  of  this  kind were analyzed  in the previous
chapter. In this chapter the sector selection section will be replaced by a sector
preference section and a rationing section.
We want to develop a labour supply model that explicitly considers rationing and that
can be estimated on cross-sectional household survey data stemming from urban areas in
a developing country. To this end, some assumptions considering the sectors and the
treatment of rationing have to be made. These are:
-The informal sector is a competitive, free entry sector.
-Rationing is indicated by search or discouragement.
The first assumption is rather standard. It is often used as a way to define the informal
sector. It is also mentioned in a recent review of the informal sector studies by the
OECD  (Lubell 1990). Firms operating  in the informal sector are small and require  low
capital investments. Anyone wishing     to     work     in the informal sector     can     do     so
immediately. As a consequence, all rationing takes place for formal sector jobs only.
The second assumption requires more discussion. If an individual searches, this indicates
that he (or she) is not content with his (or her) present situation. If the individual were
not rationed he (or she) would change to the preferred situation. Search indicates that the
person is not able to do so immediately and is rationed. There may, however, be
individuals who are rationed but do not search. They may have searched in the past but
were unsuccessful in their quest. In our analysis we treat these discouraged persons
(those who report not to be searching for work because no work is available) identical to
the searchers. Finally, it is also possible that an individual searches but is not rationed.
In that case the individual just wants to determine his or her market value by looking
what is available. The model does not allow for this: the individual is assumed to have
perfect information on the distribution of potential earnings in all sectors.
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One   way to interpret discouragement   is the presence of search costs: some people   will
not search because the costs of search exceed the expected gains. These people    are
therefore rationed in the sense that their long run preferred status is different from the
actual state, but they do not search. By treating them as rationed, search costs do not
play a role. The model thus does not explain the search-no search decision, but only the
preferred state, ignoring search costs. In principle, the distinction between discouraged
and searching individuals could be useful to identify search costs but, given the nature of
the cross section data, without information on how long it takes to find a job, this
approach does not seem to be feasible. In the sequel, the term searchers will be used for
both  searching and discouraged individuals.
Under the assumptions stated above, rationing takes place for formal sector jobs only and
individuals rationed for formal sector jobs are identified by their search activity or
because they are discouraged. The sector in which an individual is observed is influenced
by wage offers, preferences and rationing. As yet, the model does not allow for
individuals to search while they are working in the formal sector. Since they are working
in the formal sector, they cannot be rationed for this sector at the same time. Such
observations, however, do appear in the dataset. To allow for this situation we introduce
two types of formal sector jobs: "good" and "bad" jobs. Good jobs have the advantage
over "bad" jobs in that they offer a higher wage. In other respects, such as the non-
monetary returns, the two type of jobs are assumed to be the same24. Thus, any
individual will always prefer a "good" formal sector job to a "bad" one. Those who
work in the formal sector and search are assumed to have a "bad" formal sector job and
to be looking for a "good" one. Those who do not search have a "good" formal sector
job. Search or discouragement thus identifies the difference between "good" and "bad" in
the data. In this setting we assume that rationing takes place for "good" formal sector
jobs only. The nature of the (cross section) data does not allow for a continuum of bad-
good job offers.
The model described above allows us to specify for each individual the preferred sector,
the actual sector and whether the individual is rationed or not. All the possible cases are
given in table 5.1. Entry  into  the "good" formal sector is rationed, all other sectors  are
assumed to operate competitively. Non-workers, by definition, include both voluntary
and involuntary unemployed. For formal and informal sector workers we define search
as looking for another job replacing the current one. One could think of these workers as
underemployed. As hours of work are not considered, those individuals who report to be
looking for additional work are categorized as non-searchers. For non-participants and
workers in the informal sector that do not search we know that their actual status is the
preferred one. For them we do not know whether they are rationed for "good" formal
24In principle, the model can be adjusted to allow for the utility of "good" and "bad" formal
jobs to differ with taste shifters as well. However, since both "good" and "bad" jobs are similar in
the sense that they are both salaried work we do not allow for this in the estimation. Only the
difference in non-monetary returns between the formal and informal sector is analyzed.
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sector jobs. They can directly enter into the preferred sector and rationing for the formal
sector is irrelevant to their actual status.
Table 5.1 Relationship between observed, preferred sector and rationing
Observed Preferred Actual
Sector searching Sector Sector Rationed
forrnal sector yes (good) formal bad formal yes
no (good) formal good formal no
informal sector yes (good) formal informal yes
no informal informal                          ?
non-participation Yes (good) formal non-participation yes
no non-participation non-participation           ?
Identification of the effects of preferences versus rationing is achieved through
incorporation of search information in the model. The coefficients in the rationing
section are identified on the basis of the search information of formal sector workers.
The sector participation decision of non-searchers in combination with their observed
wages identify the coefficients in the preference section of the model. Only the difference
in preferences attached to participation in the informal versus non-participation and
participation in the formal versus non-participation can be identified. The difference in
the wage offer function between good and bad formal sector jobs is identified on the
basis of the observed wages of searchers and non-searchers in the formal sector and on
the assumption that informal sector searchers prefer a good formal sector job to their
current one while this is not the case for a bad formal sector job.
5.3 The Model
We  model  the case where monetary and non-monetary returns are perfect substitutes.
Non-monetary returns are defined as the monetary equivalent of all non-monetary
benefits associated with participation in a sector. The individual is assumed to maximize
a utility function depending on leisure (T-h) and consumption (CD, including non-
monetary consumption. Within a two-stage budgeting framework, consumption in each
period has to be less than or equal to total earnings plus net dissavings (See section 4.2
for   a   discussion   on net dissavings). The budget constraint is assumed linear because
income taxes play a minor role in Bolivia (cf. chapter 2 page 12). The maximization
problem can be written as follows
max  u(T-h,C ') s.t. C'<w'h+Y (5.1)
with
94     = the hourly earnings, including non-monetary,
Y      = net dissavings,
5.3. THE MODEL                                                                         65
h      = hours worked,
T     = time endowment.
Hourly earnings  are a function of monetary and non-monetary earnings. Non-monetary
earnings vary with the sector in which the individual participates.
w'= w.*1     j=l if in formal sector
(5.2)1      j
j =2   if   in   informal   sector
with
wj            = the hourly  wage in sector j,
Aj-1     = non-monetary returns in each sector modelled as a fraction of the wage.
Under the assumption that hourly wage and non-monetary returns do not depend on
hours worked and that the individual is not restricted in the number of working hours it
follows that the individual will participate if the hourly earnings w' in at least one sector
exceed the reservation wage, WR. The reservation wage equals the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption evaluated at zero hours of work. If
participating, the individual will participate in the sector offering the highest w: In this
chapter we focus on the participation decision and ignore hours worked. The complete
labour supply decision is considered in the next chapter.
Wage offers. Wage offers in the formal and informal sector are modelled as a function
of individual specific variables and regional specific variables describing the local labour
market conditions. In the formal sector two wage offers exist, a "good" and a "bad" one.
They differ in that the wage offer for the "good" one is higher than for the "bad" one. In
other respects, such as the non-monetary returns to the job, the two types of jobs are
identical. Bad formal sector jobs can be regarded as underpaid. Any individual will thus
prefer a "good" formal sector job to a "bad" formal sector job. We start by formulating
the "good" formal sector wage. In the informal sector (i=2) no distinction between good
and bad exists. The potential log hourly  wage of individual  i in sector j is modelled  as
111(wg) = XiBj + 9 4 j=12 (5.3)
with
wag      = wage offer of a "good" formal sector job,
Xi       = a vector of explanatory variables influencing returns,
114     = an error term, representing unobserved factors influencing productivity.
Bad formal sector jobs offer a lower wage than good formal sector jobs. This is imposed
in the estimation by including an exponential term on the difference in the wage offer
between "good" and "bad" formal sector jobs. The difference in the wage offer is made
dependent on individual characteristics and local labour market conditions. The potential
log hourly wage for a "bad" formal sector job equals
66                                                  CHAPTER 5: PREFERENCES OR RATIONING?
ln(wib = ln(wil) - exp(Xir) (5.4)
with
Wilb     = wage offer of a "bad" formal sector job.
Preferences. Because both non-monetary returns and the reservation wage are
unobserved we only model the difference between the two. For individual i the model is
ln(AU) -ln(w R)   = Z,6,+€0.
j=l,2 (5.5)
with
Z,        = a vector of explanatory variables influencing preferences for sectors,
EU   = an error term, representing any unobserved taste shifters influencing non-
monetary returns and/or the reservation wage.
Z, contains individual and household specific variables. Zi includes a measure of net
dissavings because it influences the reservation wage. Characteristics of the observed
jobs are not included as they are not constant across sectors.
Rationing. Barriers to entry in the "good" formal sector are modelled in the rationing
equation. Rationing for "good" formal sector jobs is assumed to be a discrete zero/one
variable and to depend on individual and labour market characteristics influencing the
demand for formal sector labour. We model the probability that an individual is rationed
by
rationed if Ri >0,
Ri' = Ria + En with (5
.6)
not rationed if Ri < 0
with
Rt'     = a latent variable indicating whether individual i is rationed,
R,     = Explanatory variables influencing rationing,
6*ri     = an error term, representing "luck" in entering into the good formal sector.
Error structure 4.E2,Vi, 12  and   E,' are assumed  to  be  i.i.d.   with a multivariate normal
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A correlation between the error terms in the wage equations and the rationing equation is
allowed for. The correlation between the errors of the wage equation in the formal and
informal sector is not identified because we observe an individual working in at most one
sector. The variances in the preference section equations (ot and CD are identified
because of exclusion restrictions in Z and X. Rationing is modelled in a probit type
specification and therefore the variance of cJ is normalized to one. The errors in the
rationing equation and the preference section equations are assumed to be independent.
However, some correlation is introduced indirectly as omitted variables appearing in the
wage offer equations are allowed to influence both the probability of rationing as well as
the probability of participation in sectors.
5.4 Data
In chapters 5 and 6 add a capital asset condition to the sector assignment rule. By doing
this, we want to capture credit constraints that may exist for some jobs in self-
employment. From now on we classify self-employed workers as formal sector workers
if their household business assets are greater   than 15.000 bolivianos   ( + / -    u$   5500).
Business assets include property of land, car for business use and telephone. The other
self-employed (about 95 percent) remain categorized as informal sector workers.    As   a
result 1.6 percent of the males  (100 obs)  and 0.8 percent of the females  (55 obs) change
sector definition from informal to formal. The idea behind the definition change is that
businesses requiring high assets are not in reach for every individual. Potential
entrepreneurs in the informal sector face credit constraints because their activities cannot
be well monitored by the lending institution. It implies that jobs in these businesses are
rationed. Defining  them as informal is incompatible  with the assumption that informal
sector jobs are not rationed, which is an explicit assumption in this chapter. A revised
table of descriptive statistics is in appendix 5A. The change in most of the variables is
very small. The most noticeable change is that average formal sector wages now exceed
informal sector wages for both males and females. The difference, however, remains
insignificant.
As indicated in section 5.2, we treat active searchers and discouraged individuals as
rationed in the analysis. In the 1989 survey, both non-participants as well as workers
were asked whether or not they engaged in active search for work. In case they did not,
they were asked why they did not search. We have classified as discouraged those who
answered to the latter "No hay trabajo" (there is no work). This answer expresses a
belief that it would be very hard to get a formal sector job or, in other words, that
search costs are too high. Unfortunately the answer "No vale la peina" (it is not worth
the trouble) was not included in the answer list. This answer would be closer related to
our view of discouragement. The questions relating to search in the 1989 survey are
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copied   in  box 5.125. Between brackets  are the relative frequencies   for all individuals
between 18 and 65 in the survey.
For non-workers: For workers:
LBusca Ud. la semana pasada trabajo? i.Durante la semana pasada busc6
1. si (12) Ud. alguna otra ocupaci6n?
2. no (88) 1.  si  (8)
LPor qut no busc6? 2.  no  (92)
1. licencia, vacacion 0) 6Por que no busc6 otro trabajo?
2. realizar labores de casa (54) 1. no alcanza el tiempo (66)
3.  ser estudiante (24) 2. gana suficiente (5)
4. ser rentista (4) 3.   no hay trabajo  (17)
5. no hay trabajo (3) 4.  otra  (12)
6. salud (6)
7. otra razon (6)
Box 5.1 Questions relating to search in EIH 89 (relative frequencies for individuals
between 18 and 65 in survey between brackets).
Descriptive statistics on search behaviour are given in table   5.2. The pattern   is   very
different for males and females. For males, most of the search takes place in the non-
workers group. 53 percent of males who do not work are involuntary unemployed. For
females, the amount of search is much lower for non-participants. Staying at home is in
most of the cases the preferred status. For both males and females, on the job search
activity is higher in the informal sector than in the formal. This suggests that the
informal sector may function as a buffer, for those who seek a good job in the formal
sector. Getting out of this buffer sector is not that easy, however. The percentage of
discouraged searchers is the highest in the informal sector. This high rate of
discouragement could be caused by high costs of on the job search in the informal sector
or by an adverse selection and/or stigma effect. In the estimation active searchers and
discouraged workers are treated identically. In our model, formal sector workers are
assumed to be searching because they have an underpaid, "bad" job. To get a rough idea
whether this is indeed the case we did a log hourly wage regression for all formal sector
workers including a dummy for search activity in the set of explanatory variables of the
wage equation. For both males and females, the estimated coefficient came out negative,
as expected. For males the estimated coefficient was -0.23 with a t statistic of -7.4 and
2'Translation: For non workers: Did you look for work in the past week? (1) yes, (2) no. Why
did you not search? (1) vacation, (2) engaged in household work, (3) student, (4) person of
private means, (5) there is no work, (6) health, (7) other reason. For workers: During the past
week did you look for any other job? (1) yes, (2) no. Why did you not look for other work? (1)
do not have time, (2) earn enough, (3) there is no work, (4) other.
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for females -0.13 with a t-statistic of -2.526. This result has also been found for
developed countries (see Devine and Kiefer 1991, p.  238).
Table 5.2. Search activity by sector and sex. (percentages)
males females
formal informal not-working formal informal not-working
active searching 6.3 6.6 52.9 2.0 3.5 8.8
discouraged 13.4 22.7 10.9 11.9 14.7 2.4
5.5 Estimation Method
Estimation of the model has been achieved by smooth simulated maximum likelihood
(SSML).   Evaluation  of the likelihood function involves the computation of multiple
integrals. Since these integrals are of a dimension higher than two, numerical integration
requires an infeasible amount of computer time. Lerman and Manski (1981) proposed a
frequency simulator to approximate the probabilities that appear in the likelihood
function. Their simulator involves taking multiple draws from the distribution of the
error terms. It has the disadvantage that a large number of draws is needed to obtain
precise estimates. Moreover, the simulated likelihood function is not a smooth function
of the unknown parameters. Standard optimization routines (for example, Newton-
Raphson), which require differentiability  of the approximated likelihood cannot be used.
We follow a method that is similar to that proposed by Stern (1992). The resulting
simulated likelihood function is a smooth function of the unknown parameters of the
model. The estimates obtained by maximizing the simulated log likelihood function are
consistent if the number of draws per observation tends to infinity with the number of
observations. Moreover, provided that draws for different individuals are independent,
ML  and  SSML  will be asymptotically equivalent as H/VN-*co, where  H  is the number
of draws per individual and N is the number of observations (cf. Gourieroux and
Monfort, 1990)
Define 8 - (61,62,#1.B2,1,0:). The likelihood function can be written as
L = ]  Pr[cljd,Qi'e)<ui<c2jdi'Qi'0) |Qi'bil LC<iloi) (5.8)
i-1
with
26Because of the endogeneity of the search dummy this regression is not valid in the
framework as a whole. The results are given for descriptive purposes only. However, the
Significance of the results does not change if one instruments for search (Heckman 1978) using
taste shifters as instruments. The estimated coefficient on the predicted probability of search
remains negative. For males the estimated coefficient is -1.16 with a t-statistic of 3.7 and for
females -1.21 with a t-statistic of 2.6.
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Qi =/ljft
L =BA
Yi, Qi     = vectors containing dependent and independent variables
The contribution to the likelihood function of one individual can be written as a
conditional probability times a density. The calculation of the conditional probability
involves the evaluation of multiple integrals. Given B. Y, and Xi, the value of fi can be
calculated. The transformed error terms,   r  and  (il I D, follow a normal distribution
N(O,BjEBj')   and  N(B,£1)   with   B=AjEBj'(BjEBj')-11  and   0=AjEAj'-AjEBj'(BjEBj')-18jEAj:
The specification of the matrices Aj and Bj and the functions c4 and c4 depend on the
regime (i) the individual is in. For example, in the case the individual is working in the
informal sector and simultaneously looking for a job, A, B, c, and c2 are defined by
-1  1  -10  0
A=  0  -1  0 0 0 B=FO010] (5.9)
0  0  0 0-1
Z,(61-62)+X,Pl-exp(Xir)-52 Z'(61-62)+X,Pl-wo
Cl= -00                        C2
= Zi62+WU (5.
10)
-00                                  Ria
In this example, t='1;2 equals
Ci=Wi2-Xi'12 (5.11)
The SSML estimator obtains an unbiased estimate of the probability in (5.8) by means of
simulation. The idea is to decompose 11 into two components, each normally distributed.




The Probability in (5.8) can now be written as
PTIci<u<c2 IX,<] =Pr[ct-u2<Ui<C2-u21X,C]
=E{Pr[cl -u2<ul<c2-u2 lX,(,u2]lx,<} (5.13)
is
-fpr[c, -U2 Ul<C2-U2 IX,C,162] »2 IX,0  612
where the subscript i is suppressed. This is simulated by
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1 r9
(5.14)-  ·L Pr[ci -u2k<ul<c2-u2kIX,(,u2kl
11 k=1
where  the  u are drawn independently  from f04  1 X D. the conditional density  of u2,
with H replications.
In the decomposition of u we exploit the restrictions on the covariance matrix E. The
decomposition varies with the regime the individual is in. We include in u2, 711 and/or '12.
if    these are included    in    0.     In the example stated above    u2=[171,0.01'    and
1lt  I  X,1- N(0,0 ).    f does not enter here because  the  errors  in the  two  wage  equations
are assumed independent. The distribution   of  (ui   X, 1,u is normal   N(Bk,Q)   with
Bk=AEB'(BEB')-'(f u261'  and 0=ASA'-AEB'(BEB')-'BEA' where A  and B are defined as
-1  1  0 0  0
F000101A= 0  -1 0 0 0 B=I (5.15)
00100]
.0    0   0  0  -1.
In Stern (1992) the error terms u, and u2 are assumed independent and the covariance
matrix of ui is diagonal. In our method the error terms are dependent and we work with
conditional distributions. The covariance structure  of ui includes one non-zero covariance
element. Computation of the probability remains feasible as this involves at most
evaluating a bivariate cumulative probability. In the cases where it is unknown whether
the individual is rationed, the contribution to the likelihood is calculated without
simulation.
5.6 Estimation Results
The presented estimates coefficients are those obtained with H, the number of draws per
observation equal to 30. The draws are different and independent for each observation.
We experimented with taking different numbers of draws. A change from 10 to 30 draws
made only a small difference in the estimation results. The reported estimates should thus
be   close   to the exact ML estimates. The estimated coefficients are reported in tables
5.A.2. to 5.A.5. in the appendix 5A. Below we will discuss the results.
The estimated coefficients for the preference section of the model are presented in table
5.A.2. For both males and females the effect of net dissaving on the preference of
working is negative. The hypothesis that net dissavings can be treated as exogenous is
rejected for both sexes. For a discussion of why we used this specific other income
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variable and how we corrected for potential endogeneity, see chapter 427. The presence
of other prime age individuals (PRIME) in the household significantly reduces the
preference of working for both males and females. The effect is the strongest for mates.
The presence of young children (YOUNG) significantly reduces the preference of
working for females. For males, formal sector preference increases. The model allows
the effect of being married to be different for different age groups. In table 5.3 we
report the partial derivatives of the probabilities that a sector is preferred with respect to
MARRIED for different age groups and sexes. For males, MARRIED has a positive
effect on the probability of working for every age group. This effect diminishes as the
individual gets older. For females the effect is opposite, MARRIED increases the
probability that non-participation is the preferred sector. Especially when females
approach 30, being married drives them out of formal employment into non-
participation.
Table 5.3. Partial effect of marriage on the probabilities that sectors are preferred
(percentages, calculated at mean values)
rnales fernales
age                    20     30     40             20     30     40
formal 3.54 2.28 2.13 -5.54 -24.8 -30.8
informal 2.40 4.92 -0.09 -0.61 -5.76 -3.50
not working -5.94 -7.20 -2.04 6.15 30.52 34.32
The estimated coefficients on the 28 term in the preference equations can be used to get
an idea of how the non-monetary returns compare in the formal and informal sector. For
males, at mean values, non-monetary returns are higher in the formal sector than in the
informal sector. To the make probabilities of preferring the formal and informal sector
equal, a formal sector wage offer of only 0.46 (std err: 0.04) times that of the informal
sector is needed. The additional security and benefits may cause males to value
participation in the formal sector higher than in the informal sector. For females the
opposite holds, there a formal wage offer  of  1.18   (std  err: 0.11) times  that  of  the
informal sector is needed to equalize probabilities.
To obtain insight in the effects of wages on the sector preferences, we have drawn
figures 5.1 and 5.2. The figures show the probability a sector is preferred as a function
of the wage offer. The figures are ceteris paribus, calculated at the mean values of the
exogenous variables. The wage offer in one sector is varied, the wage offer in the other
sector is held constant at the sample mean. At the mean value the log wage offers are for
2'The standard errors of the ML estimates should be corrected for the error due to replacing
the parameters of the instrumenting equation in the correction term by their estimates. The results
in the previous chapter however showed that the effect of the correction is quite small. Therefore,
for computational convenience, we have not corrected the standard errors here.
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males (females, in parentheses) respectively:  0.62  (-0.38)  in the formal sector  and  -0.14
(-1.06) in the informal sector. For males, the effect of a change in the wage offer is
mostly a substitution effect between sectors. Since not-working is rarely the preferred
status, an increase in the wage offer in one sector reduces the probability that the other
sector is the preferred one. Only for very low formal sector wages, we find a probability
that  non-participation is preferred exceeding  0.1. For females the effects are different.
For them an increase in the wage offer increases the probability of preference for that
sector at the cost of not working. The own wage elasticities (relative change of
probability of participation over a relative change in the wage offer) are 0.21 (1.35) for
the formal sector and  1.19  (1.34)  for the informal sector. The cross elasticities  are  -0.17
(-0.15)  for the effect of the informal wage offer on the participation  in the formal sector
and  -1.12   (-0.26)  for the reverse.
The estimates for the wage equations are presented in table 5.A.3. The specification is
the same as in chapter 4. Differences in the estimates may be due to the different
definition of sectors and/or the change in selection bias correction. The estimates for the
constant terms are quite different, most likely due to the change in selection bias
correction (cf. chapter 4). Ceteris paribus, males reach their highest earnings at 45 years
in the formal sector and at 48 years in the informal sector. For females the peaks are at
40 and 46 respectively. The effect of education is roughly similar in the two models. For
males, returns to education are higher in the formal sector than in the informal sector.
For females, education only has positive returns in the formal sector. In the informal
sector only intermediate education has positive return (contrary to chapter  4).   For   some
categories, such as "normal" even a significant negative return is estimated. Returns to
education  in the formal sector are higher for females   than for males.   For both males  and
females, the estimates are conform the segmented labour market hypothesis. We do
allow the error terms  of  the wage equations  to be correlated  with the rationing equations.
Whether such a correlation should be included for the informal sector is not obvious. In
this sector it is less likely that there are unobserved factors which are used as rationing
devices that influence productivity in the informal sector. For males, this correlation is
not significantly different    from    zero    at    the 5 percent level. For females    it    is.     The
correlation between the formal sector wage equation and the rationing equation is
positive and significant for both sexes. This indicates that formal sector workers (good
and bad) who are overpaid (as a result of strong collective bargaining, for example) have
a higher probability of being rationed.
The local unemployment rate has a significant negative effect on earnings in the informal
sector. The effect is the strongest for males. In the formal sector, both for males and for
females, no significant effect of unemployment can be detected (contrary to chapter 4).
Belonging to an ethnic group significantly lowers the returns in the formal sector for
males. For females, a positive effect of ethnicity is fuund in the informal sector (contrary
to  chapter  4). A possible explanation  is that informal sector activity of females is largely
concentrated    in the commerce and restaurants sector (82 percent).     In that sector    a
positive discrimination of ethnicity for females may exist.
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Table 5.A.4 presents the estimates for T, the coefficient in equation (5.4) that relates the
good and bad formal wage offer. For males the difference is the greatest for higher
technical education and university level training. For normal education the wage
difference is relatively small. For females the effects are smaller. Only the local
unemployment rate and the normal and university education variables have a significant
effect. This suggests that underpayment is not correlated with observed individual
characteristics for females. Their search activity   in  the (bad) formal sector  may  be  more
correlated with other, non-wage job characteristics. A likelihood ratio test rejected the
null hypothesis that the wage differential, T, does not depend on covariates for both sexes
at the 5 percent level.28
Table 5.A.5. presents the estimates for the rationing equation for good formal sector
jobs. A higher value    of   the    left   hand side variable is associated    with an increased
probability of rationing. The probability of rationing decreases with the level of
education. This result holds for both males and females. This suggests that formal
education is used as a screening device for formal sector jobs. A higher local
unemployment rate increases the rationing level, as expected. Belonging to an ethnic
group significantly increases rationing for females, for males the effect is much smaller.
We experimented with incorporating information on migration into the rationing
equation. For 2 out of 8 regions we have information about how long ago the individual
moved to the place where he or she currently lives. In a Harris-Todaro type migration
model, migrants work for a while in the informal sector while they queue up for formal
sector jobs (cf section 3.2). Therefore we would expect the probability of rationing to
increase   if the individual moved   in more recently. We could   not   find any significant
effect of these variables. Because  we  only  have the migration information  for two capital
cities we decided to present the results without the migration variables  only.
Rationing can be viewed as an indicator for labour market segmentation. As is clear
from the estimates, the degree of rationing varies strongly over individuals with different
observed characteristics.    It is therefore not possible   to   give a simple yes/no answer   to
whether there is labour market segmentation between the formal and informal sector in
Bolivia. In table  5.4.  we have calculated the probability of rationing  for some standard
individuals. For all individuals the probability of rationing is substantial, suggesting that
the hypothesis of no labour market segmentation is rejected. The conclusions need not be
that strong, however. If one believes in a natural rate of (frictional) search, one would
test whether the predicted probability is significantly different from the natural search
rate. The probabilities and their standard errors suggest that these frictional search rates
28As noted, it can be tested whether "good" and "bad" formal jobs differ with taste shifters (Z)
as well. An LM test rejected the null hypothesis that good and bad formal jobs only differ in the
wage offer as is assumed in the model at the 5% level. Estimating the model, allowing for the
effect of taste shifters, causes additional complexities as the likelihood may not be defined for
some individuals, since the utility of bad jobs might exceed that of good formal sector jobs.
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are quite large. Note that labour market segmentation as defined in this model only
refers to the rationing of "good" formal sector jobs.
Table 5.4. Predicted probability of rationing for some specific individuals
(percentages, standard errors in parentheses, base: age=30, missed years=0, econ active
and unempl at mean value)
rnales fernales
education ethnic
inter no 33.2 34.1
(1.98) (3.88)
hightech no 27.2 18.03
(4.12) (4.23)
university no 20.0 21.3
(1.66) (2.62)
inter yes 37.4 44.3
(2.25) (4.75)
The goodness of fit of the model can be examined by comparing the predicted
probabilities of participation with the observed outcomes. The first 4 columns of tables
5.5 and 5.6 present the results for males and females. Predicted probabilities were
obtained by simulation, taking multiple (50) draws from the estimated error distribution
for each individual. The preferred status can be obtained by solely taking into
consideration the predicted utilities of participation in a sector, setting the probability of
rationing  to  zero. In general the predicted numbers are relatively close  to the observed.
For males, the model underestimates the number of individuals whose preferred sector is
the formal sector, at the cost of the number of individuals for whom not working is the
preferred status. For females, the number of individuals who prefer not to work is
underestimated. Overall, the fit is reasonable.
Table 5.5. Males: Goodness of fit and simulation (number of individuals)
Observed Predicted Unempl +5 percent
Actual Preferred Actual Preferred Actual Preferred
Formal good 2973 4783 2782 4625 2088 4921
Formal bad 732 936 1275
Informal 1763 1247 1780 1264 1462 837
Not working 881 319 850 460 1523 591
18                                                      CHAPTER 5: PREFERENCES OR RATIONING?
Table 5.6. Females: Goodness of fit and simulation (number of individuals)
C)bserved Predicted Unempl   + 5 percent
Actual Preferred Actual Preferred Actual Preferred
Formal good 1265 2280 1277 2281 765 2210
Formal bad 229 264 202
Informal 1917 1568 1859 1674 1532 1324
Not working 3882 3445 3893 3338 4794 3759
The last two columns in table 5.5 and 5.6 present the results of a simulation exercise.
We have simulated the effect of an exogenous increase in the rate of unemployment by 5
percent on sector participation and preferences. The results should be compared  with  the
predictions     from     the     base case (column    3     and    4). The effect    of an increase     in
unemployment works in several ways. First, it has a negative effect on earnings in both
sectors, thereby making non-participation more attractive. Second, the probability of
rationing for "good" formal sector jobs increases. The combined effect is rather different
for males and females. For males, formal sector preference increases even though the
effect of unemployment on formal sector wages is negative. For only 2 percent of the
males the preferred sector changes from working to non-working. Because the
probability of rationing increases, not all of the workers end up working in the "good"
formal sector. All effects considered, "good" formal and informal sector participation
decrease and the participation in the other sectors increase. For females, the effect of an
increase of unemployment is clearly a move out of employment towards non-
participation. Both the "preferred" as well as the "actual" numbers decrease for both
sectors. The simulation shows that females' labour supply   is more sensitive to labour
market conditions than that of men.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
Labour supply in urban areas of a developing country has been analyzed using a model
that explicitly incorporates rationing for formal sector jobs. Information on search,
including on-the-job search, allows us to disentangle the effects of sector preference and
rationing in the model. The informal sector is taken as a free entry sector. The test of
labour market segmentation that follows is thus a test for rationing of formal sector jobs,
and not a test for wage differentials between sectors, as is common in the literature.  The
model corrects for endogenous selection into sectors and treats earnings in all sectors as
endogenous. In general, estimation results are in line with the segmented labour market
hypothesis.
Rationing is treated as a heterogeneous phenomenon in the model. The results show that
the probability of rationing decreases with additional education. Conclusions on whether
labour market segmentation is present vary with observed characteristics of the
individual. Ethnicity  has a significant positive effect  on the probability of rationing  for
both  males and females. The effect   is the largest for females. Regional variation   is
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exploited to estimate demand side effects on earnings and participation. Larger labour
markets increase the probability of rationing for males. Unemployment has a positive
effect on rationing  for both sexes.
Simulation exercises can be done to investigate the effect of a change in exogenous
variables on earnings and participation in sectors. The structure of the model has the
advantage that the effects resulting from changes in preferences, wages and rationing can
be analyzed separately. For males, exogenous shocks mostly influence the choice
between formal and informal sector participation and not so much the choice of whether
to work or not. For females, on the contrary, the move is more in and out of
employment. The latter is in contradiction with time series macro figures. Over the
period from 1976 to 1988, over which there was a sharp decline in economic growth, the
female participation rate in rural29 areas increased from 16 to 28 percent (UDAPE
1991). (Male participation decreased slightly, in line with the results). This suggests that
females' labour supply decisions are not only driven by their wage offers. Perhaps they
change their labour supply in response to shocks that affect other persons within the
household. They may compensate for the loss of income of the husband, for instance.
These, intra-household, labour supply effects will be analyzed in the next chapter.
29 Urban figures would have been more appropriate to report but are unavailable. Rural
figures are informative because the decline in economic growth was nationwide.
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Appendix 5A
Table 5.A.1. Descriptive statistics
(means and sample fractions; standard deviations in parentheses)
male female
not not-
formal inform working formal inform working
highest level of education attained:
basic/none 0.21 0.35 0.24 0.11 0.40 0.29
inter 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.15
medio 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.22 0.20 0.29
midtech 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.05
hightech 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01
normal 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.03
university 0.19 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.03 0.05
other 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.13
married 0.79 0.84 0.59 0.56 0.71 0.80
ethnic 0.30 0.39 0.33 0.20 0.46 0.34
age 36.1 39.5 38.7 34.0 39.3 36.8
hourly earnings'O 2.50 2.38 2.03 1.94
(4.7) (4.0) (2.6) (4.4)
per cap net dissavings (/100) 0.01 -0.03 0.79 0.24 -0.05 0.37
(2.23) (1.78) (1.71) (2.77)  (1.63)  (1.99)







Table 5.A.2 Sector preference section
Inales females
formal vs non-part informal vs non-part formal vs non-part informal vs non-part
parameter std err parameter std err parameter std err parameter std err
cnst 0.961 0.242 -1.601 0.396 -0.421 0.306 -1.499 0.373
age 0.036 0.013 0.096 0.019 O.lot 0.016 0.123 0.017
age squared /100 -0.075 0.016 -0.094 0.023 -0.160 0.021 -0.134 0.020
young 0.037 0.014 0.020 0.018 -0.047 0.014 -0.032 0.016
prime -0.121 0.014 -0.142 0.019 -0.045 0.013 -0.117 0.016
old 0.034 0.063 0.183 0.086 -0.029 0.062 -0.095 0.080
married -0.028 0.171 0.838 0.225 -1.812 0.143 -0.624 0.185
net pc dissavings /1000 -5.326 0.468 -7.169 0.699 -1.346 0.462 -4.804 0.680
pred error 4.789 0.468 5.764 0.675 1.162 0.478 4.241 0.679
married*age 0.007 0.004 -0.016 0.006 0.021 0.004 0.002 0.004




Table 5.A.3. Wage equations
males fernales
formal informal formal informal
parameter std err parameter std err parameter std err parameter std err
cnst -1.106 0.209 -0.875 0.276 -1.366 0.283 -2.548 0.356
age 0.061 0.010 0.064 0.012 0.037 0.013 0.080 0.015
age squared /100 -0.067 0.012 -0.066 0.014 -0.046 0.017 -0.086 0.018
inter 0.077 0.058 0.068 0.058 0.096 0.066 0.120 0.074
medio 0.219 0.049 0.195 0.050 0.307 0.058 -0.023 0.065
midtech 0.530 0.098 0.212 0.111 0.832 0.088 -0.166 0.113
hightech 0.635 0.134 0.192 0.140 1.078 0.138 -0.032 0.172
normal 0.372 0.098 -0.573 0.116 1.292 0.088 -0.781 0.120
university 0.879 0.058 0.104 0.071 1.467 0.080 -0.177 0.107
other 0.139 0.081 -0.327 0.095 -0.015 0.080 -0.091 0.082
missed years 0.069 0.014 0.006 0.016 0.074 0.016 -0.047 0.019                    4
econ act /10 0.208 0.028 0.094 0.031 0.137 0.032 0.174 0.038
unemployment *10 -0.081 0.110 -1.074 0.121 -0.207 0.125 -0.657 0.147
ethnic -0.120 0.041 -0.022 0.041 -0.048 0.047 0.184 0.051
2 1.031 0.043 0.790 0.034 0.929 0.056 1.502 0.085
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Table 5.A.4. T estimate-difference between good and bad formal sector wage (see
equation  5.4)
nnales fernales
parameter std err parameter std err
cnst 0.241 0.175 0.163 0.350
age 0.016 0.008 -0.007 0.017
age squared /100 -0.020 0.010 0.004 0.023
inter 0.005 0.047 -0.026 0.103
medio 0.054 0.040 -0.024 0.080
midtech 0.122 0.077 0.119 0.119
hightech 0.251 0.084 -0.051 0.196
normal -0.348 0.119 -0.368 0.144
university 0.236 0.045 0.156 0.090
other 0.053 0.079 0.142 0.117
missed years 0.022 0.011 -0.012 0.021
econ act /10 0.006 0.022 -0.044 0.041
unemployment *10 0.116 0.091 0.622 0.189
ethnic -0.059 0.032 0.071 0.063
Table 5.A.5. Rationing equations
males females
parameter std err parameter std err
cnst -0.072 0.241 0.680 0.377
age -0.060 0.010 -0.078 0.017
age squared/100 0.068 0.013 0.076 0.023
inter -0.117 0.061 -0.360 0.107
medio -0.180 0.052 -0.435 0.091
midtech -0.213 0.102 -0.752 0.126
hightech -0.289 0.130 -0.865 0.177
normal -0.378 0.099 -0.689 0.109
university -0.523 0.065 -0.748 0.111
other -0.330 0.101 0.185 0.129
missed years -0.047 0.015 -0.061 0.024
econ act /10 0.103 0.030 0.001 0.043
unemployment *10 0.933 0.122 1.122 0.177
ethnic 0.114 0.041 0.265 0.065
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6. Household Labour Supply
6.1 Introduction
We analyze labour supply behaviour   of   the two partners    in two- adults families.    We
distinguish four types of labour supplied by the family: husband's and wife's hours of
work in the formal sector and in the informal sector. We present a static structural
model, focusing on the relation between these four types of labour supply, their
sensitivity to all four wages, and other family income.
One objective of this study is to see to what extent it is possible for a household in a
developing country, to smooth consumption by reallocating labour supply of the family.
Since poorer families may need more than one income to reach a level of subsistence,
household income is often generated by more than one member of the household. The
labour supply decisions of the individual family members are likely to be correlated. For
instance, if earnings of one family member fall, other family members may increase
their labour supply to compensate for the loss in family income. The combined effect on
household consumption is likely to be less than the initial shock.
The point of departure is a neoclassical family labour supply model. The family is
assumed to take a joint decision regarding household consumption and labour supply of
its members. Its objective is to maximize utility, determined by household consumption
and leisure of all family members, under a household budget restriction. This approach
is used in many studies. For example, Hausman and Ruud (1984) extend the linear
labour supply model to the two adults family case and apply it to US data. Kapteyn et al.
(1990) apply this model to Dutch data. Ransom (1987) uses a quadratic utility function to
analyze labour supply of two adults households. Newman and Gertler (1991) estimate
labour supply of rural households of varying size in Peru.
The focus is on urban labour markets in developing countries and we distinguish between
a formal and an informal sector. This opens another way in which households can adjust
income: if wages fall in one sector, some individuals may find it advantageous to switch
to the other. During a period of economic malaise with a direct negative effect on formal
sector wages, the informal sector is often seen to expand. This is referred to as the
buffer function of the informal sector (Todaro 1989). We incorporate this phenomenon in
our model.
Our structural approach implies that a separate household utility function would have to
be specified for each type of household.31 We therefore limit ourselves to households
3I Even a reduced form approach, as presented in Newman and Gertler (1991), implicitly
makes arbitrary assumptions on the relations between utility functions of families of different
composition.
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with one prime age male and one prime age female, which we refer to as two adults
households. Some information on the position of these households among all households
in the sample, will be presented in section 6.3.
The organization of the chapter is as follows: in section 6.2 the model is introduced. In
section 6.3 we discuss the dataset used in the estimation and provide descriptive
statistics. Section 6.4 contains information on the estimation strategy and the results of
the estimation are presented in section 6.5. Section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 The Model
Since the few individuals with two jobs are removed from the sample, nobody in the
sample works both in the formal and in the informal sector. We assume that an
individual can earn a fixed hourly wage in each sector, where the wages in the two
sectors can be different. The simplest assumption then is to assume that the individual
simply chooses the sector with highest hourly earnings. This however   is not necessarily
consistent with the data (see results page 72). Unobserved non-monetary returns,
representing both preferences and costs of entry, are introduced to explain why people
may choose the sector yielding the lower (monetary) earnings.
As a consequence, three sections of the model have to be distinguished. The labour
supply section models the joint labour supply decision of the two spouses. Labour supply
functions are derived on the basis of wage rates, nonlabour income, and individual taste
shifters. The wage rate of each spouse is the maximum of the wage rates he or she can
earn in the formal and the informal sector, including non-monetary returns. The second
section of the model describes the wage offers in both sectors for both sexes, excluding
the unobserved non-monetary returns. The third part of the model consists  of the non-
monetary returns equations.
Labour supply The labour supply section of the model is identical to that of Ransom
(1987). A household is characterized  by a quadratic direct utility function which  has
household consumption, including non-monetary returns, and leisure of both parmers as
arguments. As in chapter 5, monetary and non-monetary returns are assumed to be
perfect substitutes. The family maximizes utility subject  to a household budget constraint
and nonnegativity conditions on hours worked:
max  U(Z) = a Z - Z 'B Z
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Z= [T-hm,T-hpC]'
T= time endowment
h'„,hI = hours worked by male and female
C= family consumption, including non-monetary returns
Y= nonlabour income
<, w; =     hourly wage of male and female, including non-monetary returns
a E 113; 0=(0'J) E 23*3.
In our case, wage rates are the maximum of formal and informal sector wages, including
non-monetary returns (see below). We assume that the budget constraint is binding, i.e.
that utility increases   with    C. If neither   of   the two nonnegativity conditions on hours
worked are binding, first order conditions (marginal utility with respect to hours worked
set to zero) can be written as
a; +a;wA; -Bith"'- 1 33'v,;(w,;hm+w;h,+Y)- Bi*+Bl)(2w,X+w;h,+Y)+1 23</4  = 0 (6.2)
(6.3)
a ;+a;w;-B22hf-1333w;(<h,„+w;h,+62-B 12hm+1323(2w;h,+w hm+11+Bi3w;hm = 0
The a's are functions of a, B and the time endowment. See Ransom (1987) for details.
The quadratic specification implies that it is not necessary to specify the time
endowment. Following Ransom, we allow ot; and 04 to bea function of observed taste
shifters  Qu and unobserved taste shifters  4,  (k= 1,2), where the subscript i denotes  the
household:
aL = QkiI;+€ki                                €i-N(0,31)k=l,2  €i =  11,1                                   (6.4)li)
If one of nonnegativity constraints becomes binding and one of the partners does not
work, one of the first order conditions changes into an inequality condition. This results
in a simultaneous model of two tobit equations. Due to the quadratic utility function, the
underlying latent model is linear. See Ransom (1987) for details.
Wages The log of the hourly wage in both sectors is modelled as a linear function of
exogenous variables and an error term:
In (wb)=XkrA/+114    11,1-NCO,ob    j=l,2 for formal and informal (6.5)
k=1,2   for mate  and female
For ease of notation we have dropped the index i as we shall continue to do in the rest of
this chapter. We use separate wage equations to describe earnings in both sectors for
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both sexes. The error terms are assumed to be independent of each other and of the
random preference terms  in the labour supply section  of the model.
Non-monetary returns Non-monetary returns reflect the sum of the effects resulting from
sector specific preferences and rationing. Sector specific preferences include non-
monetary (and non-measured) benefits from working such as health insurance or status
attached to participation in a specific sector. Following Magnac (1991) rationing is
modelled as waiting queues, resulting in costs proportional to wages. Magnac assumes
homogeneous preferences and interprets non-monetary returns as evidence of labour
market segmentation. In this model, non-monetary returns are included in the model in
exactly the same way as in Magnac, but we changed the interpretation.
We model non-monetary returns  as a fraction  of the monetary  wage. We normalize
informal non-monetary returns to zero. The log of the (formal sector) non-monetary
returns    NMR     (k= 1    (male), 2 (female)) are written   as a function of individual
characteristics, local labour market conditions and an error term:
ln (NMRk+1)xVEYE+Bk Ilk-N(O,ci)
(6.6)
We assume that each individual chooses the sector with highest wage offer, including
non-monetary returns.   For the formal sector  the  wage  is  wik= (NMRk + l)wik.  For  the
informal sector, the wage offer itself enters because non-monetary returns equal zero.
With probability one, the wage offers will be different, so that the individual chooses one
sector only.
The complete model thus consists of eight equations: two wage equations for each sex,
one non-monetary returns equation for each sex, and two labour supply equations. Note
that the labour supply section of the model is modelled in terms of hourly wages, while
in the second section of the model wages and non-monetary returns are modelled in logs,
so that the model as a whole is nonlinear.
Apart from modelling labour supply and intra-household effects, the model differs from
the one presented in the previous chapter in a number of ways. First of all, the
interpretation of non-monetary returns (NMR) is different. Non-monetary returns now
reflect the combined effect of sector specific preferences and rationing. We do not
distinguish between the two in the estimation and thus ignore information on search in
the dataset. Second, the unobserved reservation wages are now defined in the model by
the first order conditions (6.2) and (6.3). Hence, only the difference in non-monetary
returns between sectors is identified. Third, we use other income instead of net
dissavings. For coherency reasons we would have preferred to use net dissaving.
However, we were unable to obtain estimates this way (the maximization routine did not
converge to a maximum).
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The model is an improvement on the Ransom (1987) model in that the wage equations
are     incorporated and estimated jointly     with the labour supply equations. Ransom
predicted wage offers for nonparticipants using a separate model, thus ignoring wage rate
prediction errors. Furthermore, we distinguish between two sectors. The model also
generalizes the one presented in Magnac (1991): we follow a more structural approach,
and consider not only participation but also hours worked. Moreover, while Magnac
considers individuals, we work on the household level and analyze intra-household
interactions.
6.3 Data
The EIH89 survey covers 7264 households   in 8 urban centers (cf chapter   2).    3712
households contained one prime age male and one prime age female, with both of them
potential workers (between  19  and 65 years  old,  in good health  and not attending  full-
time   education). The definition of formal and informal sector   is   the   same   as   in   the
previous chapter (see page 18 and 67), ie with an asset threshold for self-employed
workers. 476 households were excluded because    one    of the partners could    not    be
classified, 281 because one of the partners had more than one job. Finally, 153
households were excluded due to missing information on one of the necessary variables
(wages (123 cases), education level, hours worked).32 The sample used for estimation
thus contains 2802 families. Table 6.1 contains some descriptive statistics. 91 percent of
all males is working, against 40 percent of all females. The majority of males work in
the formal sector. The opposite holds for females. Most individuals participating in the
informal sector have little education; the higher educated are overrepresented in the
formal sector.
Table 6.2 contains some prima fade evidence of intra-household effects of labour
supply. We have calculated the average female participation rate and the average log
wage of working females by wage quintile of the male. The female participation rate is
highest in the lower and upper male wage brackets. Yet, female wages increase with the
male's wage. The high participation rate in the lower quintile could be explained by the
low income earned by the male: one income is not enough to support the family. For the
high male wage bracket, the own wage effect of the female seems to dominate: the high
wage she can earn induces her to work.
32    For the sample of 3712 households consisting of one prime age female and one prime age
male, average per capita household consumption is 142.8. For the selected sample, it is  136.0.
This suggests that the data cleaning does not lead to serious sample selectivity problems.
Compared to the average in the total survey, per capita income of tWO adults households is about
8 percent lower.
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Table  6.1 Descriptive statistics
(formal and informal sector definition based on worker's status, means and sample
fractions; standard deviations in parentheses)
male not female not
formal inform working formal inform working
highest level of education attended:
basic 0.22 0.36 0.32 0.10 0.44 0.35
inter 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.16
medio 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.28
middle technical 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.04
higher tech 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01
normal 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.02
university 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.04
orher 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.10
married 0.96 0.98 0.92 0.96 0.94 0.97
ethnic 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.22 0.48 0.34
age 35.66 37.63 39.58
34.33 35.55 33.06
wage 2.21 2.16 1.90 1.72
(3.16) (2.55) (1.54)  (2.29)
hours 52.1 53.6 37.4 45.7
(17.1) (17.8) (16.2)  (25.7)
other income (/100) 7.46 4.82 35.66 9.01 5.97 10.94
observations 1755 782 265 423 710 1669
Table 6.2 Female labour supply by male wage quintile (participation rate in percentages,
log female's wage conditional upon working, standard errors in parentheses)
wage quintile participation rate log wage
male femde femde
not working 49.4 0.13
(3.5) (0.07)








5 (rich) 40.6 0.78
(2.2) (0.06)
6.4 Estimation
Due to its nonlinear nature, the model cannot be estimated by maximum likelihood.
Exact likelihood contributions would be too hard to compute at each step of the
6.4. ESTIMATION                                                          91
maximization process. Instead, we maximize an approximation of the likelihood, based
upon simulations of some of the errors in the wage and non-monetary returns equations.
This method is an example of smooth simulated maximum likelihood (cf. Boersch-Supan
and Hajivassiliou (1993), van Praag and Hop (1987), for example). We only describe the
main idea here. Details can be found in the appendix.
If, for a given family, both partners are working and w  and w; are known, the
likelihood contribution of the labour supply part of the model (conditional on wages) is
identical  to  that in Ransom  (1987). We denote   it  by  L,(h,„.hp·   1<. w;).   To keep notation
simple, we suppress the other arguments it depends on (taste shifters, other family
income). The complete likelihood contribution  is then given  by
(6.7)I.(h.,hpsm,spw:,w;) = LAh.J'Awl,wDLJsm,w;)Lms,w;)
Here Lu and Lm are the likelihood contributions of the wage and non-monetary returns
equations for male and female,respectively. Since we do not include any correlation
between the wages and non-monetary returns of males and females in the model, Lu and
Lm can be written as a product. s™ and & are the observed sectors of male and female.
Because of the linearity of this part of the model and independence assumptions of the
errors, Lu and Lm can easily be computed. It factors   out   into a contribution  of  the  male
and a contribution of the female, both similar to Magnac's (1991) likelihood. In this case
therefore, the likelihood contribution can be written down exactly.
This is only relevant however, if both partners work in the informal sector. If either of
them does not participate or works in the formal sector, his or her relevant wage is not
observed.   In  case of nonparticipation,   this   is the familiar problem in estimating structural
labour supply models with unobserved wage rates (cf. MaCurdy et al (1990), for
example). In case of formal sector work, we observe the monetary wage, but we must
include non-monetary returns which are always unobserved. Let us assume that the male
and the female both work in the formal sector. The likelihood contribution can now be
written as
I.Ulm,hps.3rwm,w) = E\L hm,lt,\wl,w;)LIAsm.w )Lm»/w;)1 (6.8)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the unobserved errors in the non-monetary
returns equations, linking the observed wm and w, to the unobserved < and w;. See
appendix 6A for details. This expectation cannot be computed analytically, because 4 is
a complicated nonlinear function of < and w;. It is therefore replaced by a simulated
mean:
LH<hm,hrsm,s,wm,wf) =  E {L,(hm,h, Iw;,w;)LI,(sm,w*Lm(s,wi)}                (6.9)j-1
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where  w; and  w;j  (i= 1....,H) result from adding H independent draws  of the errors  in
the NMR equations to the observed formal sector wages.
This procedure can easily be generalized to other cases. For those individuals who do not
participate, we draw all the errors in the wage and non-monetary returns equations. The
maximum wage offer from the two sectors is substituted in the labour supply part of the
model. This type of nonlinearity was also solved through simulation by Laroque and
Salanie (1989) for a disequilibrium model. The sample log likelihood is replaced by an
approximate log likelihood, replacing each likelihood contribution by its simulated
approximation. The simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimator maximizes the
approximate sample loglikelihood.
The estimator is consistent if both the number of observations N and the number of
draws per observation  H  go to infinity. Moreover, if draws for different observations  are
independent, the estimator is asymptotically efficient if \/N/H goes to zero (Gourieroux
and Monfort 1993). Because the errors in the labour supply part of the model are
retained and not simulated, the approximate likelihood is a continuous and differentiable
function of the parameters. This makes maximization feasible and, according to previous
studies on similar models (Boersch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993, for example), should
lead to acceptable results for small values of H already. Just like in the previous chapter
we use H=30.
6.5 Estimation Results
We first present the estimates of the labour supply model, equations (6.1) through (6.4).
The estimates of P 1 and I'2. determining a; and 04, are in table 6.3. A higher value of a'
is associated with a higher propensity to work, since a' is a negative function of a.
Exogenous variables included  in  Qk  (k= 1,2) refer to family composition  and  age.  The
number of children in the household (YOUNG) significantly increases the propensity to
work for males  and  has the opposite effect for females. The number of older persons   in
the household (OLD) is insignificant. A quadratic age pattern is significant for both
males and females.33 The propensity to work is highest at age 33 for males and at age
42 for females. There is a significant negative correlation between the two random
preference terms indicating, ceteris paribus, a tendency towards specialization.
33 a; and a; depend on the male's and female's age, respectively.
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Table 6.3 Estimates for taste shifters in labour supply model (standard errors in
parentheses)














ai 9.117 7.068 012 (EiD -1.944
(0.416) (2.077) (0.802)
The estimates for the matrix B are presented in table 6.4. To normalize the scale of the
utility function, we have set Bil equal to one, following Ransom (1987). All estimated
coefficients are significant. The marginal utility of leisure increases with additional
leisure of the partner. Moreover, marginal utility of leisure of both partners increases
with family consumption.
Table 6.4 Estimates for B matrix (standard errors in parentheses)
male leisure female leisure consumption (/10)
male leisure                       1
female leisure -0.262 0.414
(0.054) (0.088)
consumption(/10) -0.340 4.326 0.0178
(0.057) (0.055) (0.0029)
In writing down the first order conditions (6.2)-(6.3), we do not take account of the
possibility that an interior point of the budget set is chosen. It is thus assumed that the
utility function increases with family consumption. According to our results, this is the
case   for  2757   out  of 2802 observations.   The 45 remaining observations are discarded   in
the simulations below. If utility increases with family consumption, the solution of the
Lagrange equations (equalities and inequalities) corresponds to the utility maximum if the
utility function is quasiconcave. Positive definiteness of B is a sufficient but not a
necessary condition. Since our estimate of B is not positive definite, we checked
concavity conditions    for all observations. It appears    that    they are satisfied without
exception.
34
34 This also implies that the model is coherent, in the sense that endogenous variables are
uniquely determined (cf. Van Soest et al.,  1993).
94                                               CHAPTER 6: HOUSEHOLD LABOUR SUPPLY
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate the shape of the labour supply curves. Figure 6.1 shows
unconditional supply curves, i.e. predicted numbers of hours worked (divided by 10) for
males and females as a function of both partners' wages (including non-monetary
returns).35   a;   and   a;   are set equal to their sample means   (a; =4.1,04=-1.7), random
preferences are set equal to zero. Male labour supply is forward bending in most of the
range of male wages, and backward bending for very high wage rates, where the income
effect dominates the substitution effect. If w; is low, the female does not work, and male
hours depend on w,1 only. If the female works, male hours are negatively affected by the
female's wage. The female's hours of work increase with her own wage and decrease
with the husband's wage.
Figure 6.2 shows the probability of participation for both males and females as a
function of their own wage and the number of hours worked by the partner (divided by
10).   The  wage  of the partner  and all family characteristics  are  kept  at  the mean predicted
value. Random preferences are taken into account. For females, the own wage effect on
the probability of working is positive. The effect is stronger if the male works fewer
hours. The effect of the husband's wage on the wife's hours is small, and its sign
depends on the female's wage. Only for high wages of the female, this effect is
substantially negative. For the family the graph refers to, the probability that the male
works is always higher than 0.95. There is a slight positive own wage effect and a
negligible effect of the female's hours on this probability.
The estimates of the wage equations and the non-monetary return equation for both sexes
are presented in table 6.5. In the wage equations we have included individual
characteristics   such   as age, education level and ethnicity, and variables describing local
labour market conditions such as the local unemployment rate and a measure for the size
of the economically active population, as a proxy for the size of the local labour market.
The specification is identical to the previous chapters and the results are similar. For
example, returns to education are larger in the formal sector than in the informal sector.
This may indicate that the formal sector requires skills obtained through the formal
education system or that education is used as a screening device in the formal sector. A
larger local labour market generally leads to a higher wage. The effect is significant for
males in the formal sector and for females in the informal sector. The significantly
negative effect of the local unemployment rate is largest in the informal sector. This can
be explained by the fact that the informal sector is more competitive than the formal
sector. In the formal sector, ethnic minorities are paid significantly less than others.
In the non-monetary return equations for formal sector employment, we have included
the  variables  of  the wage equations  and two taste shifters: the numbers of young  and  old
persons  in the family. Non-monetary returns may result from demand side constraints
(rationing) or from individual preferences concerning sector participation. For both male
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Table 6.5 Estimated coefficients for wage equations and non-monetary return equations (standard errors in parentheses)          9
male female                                                            #1
formal informal nmr formal informal
nnlr                        cnst -1.334 0.649 2.399 -2.069 -0.820 -2.055
(0.281) (0.384) (0.372) (0.649) (0.514) (0.944)
b.
age 0.710 O.101 -0.124 0.808 0.429 1.109                              0
(0.137) (0.168) (0.206) (0.318) (0.239) (0.502)
age squared -0.771 -0.083 -0.259 -0.967 -0.483 -1.441
(0.177) (0.202) (0.269) (0.410) (0.299) (0.647)
inter 0.167 -0.059 -0.241 0.553 0.177 0.365
(0.060) (0.076) (0.089) (0.129) (0.103) (0.202)
rnedio 0.351 0.168 0.182 0.812 0.210 0.395
(0.051) (0.070) (0.072) (0.119) (0.091) (0.192)
midtech 0.664 0.206 -0.049 1.120 0.172 1.000
(0.110) (0.172) (0.196) (0.142) (0.204) (0.217)
hightech 0.784 0.311 -0.046 1.165 0.688 1.448
(0.126) (0.223) (0.209) (0.225) (0.264) (0.264)
normal 0.581 -0.375 0.273 1.280 -0.068 2.311
(0.105) (0.175) (0.131) (0.126) (0.254) (0.182)
university 1.181 0.099 -0.159 1.767 0.326 1.130
(0.062) (0.102) (0.094) (0.134) (0.177) (0.208)
other 0.583 -0.190 0.347 0.016 -0.253 -0.377
(0.091) (0.170) (0.098) (0.169) (0.124) (0.283)
miss years 0.068 0.027 -0.001 0.123 0.013 0.121
(0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.027) (0.049)
econ act 0.144 0.041 4.226 0.089 0.199 -0.010
(0.029) (0.044) (0.044) (0.055) (0.054) (0.075)
unempl -0.630 -1.211 -0.351 -0.568 -0.918 -0.507
(0.121) (0.173) (0.162) (0.226) (0.219) (0.308)
ethnic -0.160 -0.031 -0.220 -0.210 0.041 -0.291





0 0.751 0.798 1.086 0.684 0.904 1.113
(0.010) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.054)
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and females we find that "normal" education (primary school teachers) has positive non-
monetary returns. People with this type of training attach a higher status to teaching in a
primary school, which is exclusively formal, to informal sector work. If one assumes
that preferences do not depend on ethnicity, the negative coefficient on "ethnic" can be
interpreted as an indicator of relatively high job search costs for ethnic minorities for
formal sector jobs or, discrimination. The number of young children increases preference
for informal sector jobs. Perhaps this is because of higher flexibility of when and how
much to work in the informal sector. Maybe also, additional income can be generated in
the informal sector by child labour. The hypothesis of weakly competitive markets (all
parameters in non-monetary returns equation equal zero) as defined by Magnac (1991),
is clearly rejected for both males and females. 36
Simulations To see how well the model predicts the distribution of hours worked and
sector participation, we present figure 6.3 and table 6.6. For all observations in the
sample we have simulated wages, non-monetary returns, and the number of hours
worked, taking one draw from the distribution of the error terms. In the top and bottom
panel of figure 6.3, the predicted and actual sample distribution of hours worked are
shown, respectively.    Note   that the scale   of the vertical axis varies per graph. Actual
hours distributions for males are peaked at 40 and 48 hours per week. These peaks are
not fully reproduced by the predictions. This would require a model incorporating
restrictions on hours worked, as in Dickens and Lundberg (1993). For females, the
distribution of both actual and predicted hours worked is more dispersed.
In table 6.6 we present a cross tabulation of the sector in which husband and wife
participate.37 We compare actual and predicted numbers. The model underpredicts the
number of nonparticipants. This is particularly serious for mates. Possible explanations
may be fixed costs of working or a lack of available part-time jobs. The ratios of formal
and informal sector participation rates are predicted with reasonable accuracy.
Table 6.6 cross tabulation of sector participation for male and female (actual and
predicted, percentages)
female=* formal informal not-working total
male 8 actual pred actual pred actual pred actual pred
formal 11.1 10.0 12.0 17.0 39.7 39.9 62.8 66.9
informal 2.7 4.8 9.0 9.5 16.0 15.3 27.6 29.7
not working 1.4 1.3 3.4 0.8 4.9 1.4 9.6 3.5
total 15.1 16.1 24.4 27.3 60.5 56.7 100 100
36 Wald tests statistics are 230 and 580, exceeding critical values of X213, for any sensible
significance level.
37 Tables 6.6 through 6.8 are based on the 2757 observations for which utility increases with
family consumption.
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In Table 6.7 we present the results of some simulation exercises. The objective of the
first two simulations is to examine the importance of intra-household effects. We first
simulate the labour supply response of a 10 percent drop of wage rates for all males.
This has hardly any effect on the average number of hours the male works. Participation
of males slightly decreases. Labour supply of the females however, shows a stronger
response: the average number of hours worked increase by 3.0 percent, corresponding to
a cross labour supply elasticity of -0.3.
A closer look at the own labour supply response for males reveals that the low elasticity
is not uniform over the sample. Males with a positive labour supply response are those
who initially had a high wage. For most males with a low wage, the labour supply
response to a wage decrease is negative. This corresponds with the inverted U shape of
the labour supply curve shown in figure 6.2.
The second simulation concerns a 10 percent decrease of wage rates of females. This has
only a very small effect on hours worked by males and females. Male hours increase and
female hours decrease, but both effects are less than one percent. To get some insight in
aggregate income elasticities, we also performed a simulation in which nonlabour income
increased by 10 percent for all households. For 15 percent of the households this does
not have any effect, since their non-labour income was zero to start with. The effects
were quite small. For both males and females, hours worked decrease slightly. Income
elasticities are 0.005 for males and 0.012 for females.
A main objective of this chapter is to see how well a family can counter an exogenous
shock in income by adjusting hours worked and by switching between sectors.
Therefore, we simulated a fall in all formal sector wages by 10 percent. See tables 6.7
and 6.8. There is a strong direct effect on the income of the majority of males employed
in the formal sector. 2.3 percent of males switch from the formal to the informal sector,
while the participation rate for males remains the same. Labour force participation of
females increases by 0.4 percent. This is a result of two opposite effects: an increase due
to reduced partner's earnings (cf. previous simulation), and a decrease due to the fall of
the own (formal sector)   wage. The average number of hours worked increases   for  both
males and females. Labour supply of males increases because formal sector workers  are
generally in the higher income brackets. The size of the informal sector increases by 5.9
percent. This prediction should be viewed as an upper limit, since a fall in formal sector
wage offers will often be accompanied by a fall in informal sector wages due to a lower
demand for services from the informal sector.
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Table 6.7 Simulations (sample averages and changes of sample averages, standard errors
in parentheses38, wages and incomes excluding non-monetary returns, A = difference
from predicted value)
actual predicted wage male wage female formal wage
-10% -10% -10%
mean                   A                    A                    A
wage offer male 2.05 -0.205             0        -0.135
(0.04) (0.004) (0.005)
wage offer female 1.48            0 -0.148 -0.051
(0.04) (0.004) (0.004)
hours male 47.10 46.93 -0.034 0.156 0.120
(0.55) (0.040) (0.015) (0.031)
perc working 90.40 96.44 -0.208 0.144 -0.009
(0.30) (0.081) (0.072) (0.076)
hours female 16.10 16.86 0.458 -0.129 0.306
(0.77) (0.043) (0.032) (0.035)
perc working 39.50 43.33 0.902 -0.838 0.419
(1.03) (0.191) (0.177) (0.171)
household income 126.30 130.95 -8.581 -2.688 -6.285
(2.23) (0.227) (0.152) (0.278)
Table 6.8 Simulated Sector participation rates after 10 percent drop formal sector wage
(percentages, standard errors in parentheses and changes in percentage points (A))
male female
before after before after
mean A mean           A
formal 66.8 -2.23 16.0 -0.74
(0.95) (0.25) (0.80)  (0.18)
informal 29.6 2.22 27.3 1.15
(0.93) (0.25) (1.07)  (0.19)
not working 3.6 0.01 56.7 -0.42
(0.29) (0.08) (1.03)  (0.17)
6.6 Conclusions
We have analyzed labour supply behaviour and the choice between formal and informal
sector work of the two spouses in two adults families in urban areas of Bolivia. For this
purpose, we have developed a static neoclassical model, combining the family labour
supply model of Ransom (1987) with the model explaining sector choice and earnings of
Magnac     (1991).     Our main empirical conclusion     is that intra-household effects    are
substantial: low earnings of the husband are compensated by more working hours of the
wife. Second, we find that a wage shock in the formal sector would induces people to
38 Based on 300 draws from estimated asymptotic distribution of estimator of B.
A
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move to the informal sector, while the effect on nonparticipation is much smaller. Third,
we find that non-monetary returns in the formal sector are usually positive. This implies
that, on average, if formal and informal sector wage are equal, people prefer a formal
sector job. It can be explained by differences in job characteristics. This finding is
different from that of Magnac (1991), who finds that non-monetary returns are
insignificant.
Although our model captures some features of the data quite well, a simulation makes
clear that it is not fully capable to reproduce the data. In particular, nonparticipation of
males and, to a lesser extent, of females is underpredicted. Allowing for fixed costs of
working or taking account of constraints on hours worked, might help to overcome this
problem. The quadratic specification  of the utility function, together  with the estimation
method of smooth simulated maximum likelihood, make these extensions feasible areas
of future research.
A
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Appendix 6A. Simulated Likelihood Contributions
The likelihood contributions consist of three parts, 4, Lu, and Lm, as introduced in (6.7).
4 is the contribution of the labour supply section of the model, for given wages € and
w; (including NMR) of males and females. The expression for 4 is given in Ransom
(1987). Lu and Lm reflect the likelihood contributions of wage equations and non-
monetary returns, for males and females, respectively. Lu and Lm are stated in terms of
log wages and non-monetary returns. The jacobian of the transformation of the density
functions of log(w') to w' does not depend of the parameters of the model can be ignored
in the formulation of the likelihood contribution. Because males and females are treated
identically in the model, Lu and Lm are similar. We first consider the male and look at
LII'
If the male works in the formal sector, wm is observed, but < is not, because of the
non-monetary returns.  If Fi, the error in the NMR equation, were known, the likelihood
contribution of this section of the model would be given by
112(wil) +1'1Yl + Bl- 1*12
4,(Sm,<('il)) I :f            A1112)dll 12  1111)
(6A. 1)
--
where f denotes the (normal)  p.d.f.  of 412 and Vii respectively. Given  711,  7111 is observed
and equals ln(wil)-X17-11· The integral corresponds to the condition that the informal
sector wage offer is less than the formal sector wage offer, including non-monetary
returns. 4, is thus easy to compute.
If the male works in the informal sector, we observe w . Non-monetary returns in the
informal sector are zero. The likelihood contribution equals
ln(wi:)-X,ril-Ilyl
(6A.2)LA,<) = .f              111+Till)  d(111+ntt) ·R'112)
--
with 1112=ln(11'12)-147 12, which is observed given  1-12· The integral corresponds  to  the
condition that the formal sector wage offer, including non-monetary returns, is less than
in the informal sector. If the male does not participate, we do not know whether the
informal  or the formal sector  wage is relevant,  and  we must condition on  '111,  'ln  and  BI ·
4 equals 1 and vanishes. The wage that enters into 4 equals
(6A.3)Wm(1111,1112'Pl  = exp(max(X1r11+1111+V171+Ill* tr12+1112 
Lm is calculated in a similar way.  The full likelihood contribution of the family is given
by the expectation of the product of 4, Lu and Lm, with respect to the error terms that
104 CHAPTER 6: HOUSEHOLD LABOUR SUPPLY
we conditioned on. For example, if the husband works in the formal sector and the wife




.lfL,(hm'hilw (ill),W;(7121'7122'F2))LU(Sm'W (111)) ·  Bl,n21,1122,512) dlltdn21dn226412
where f denotes the (normal) p.d.f of (pl,911,7122,P2).   The four dimensional integral   in
(6A.4) cannot be computed analytically, because 4 is a complicated nonlinear function
of wI and w;. It is therefore replaced by a simulated mean:
H
(6A.5)LH hm,h,Ism'wm) = - :E {Li(hm'h,Iw (B,j),w;(1121,711221,1 2))Lu(Sm,w,;(plj))}
rl j-1
where (Bij,nze,9221,*21), j= 1,...,H, are i.i.d. draws from the distribution of
  1,92 1,1122,512 · Other cases are treated in a similar way. The integral to be replaced




What have we learned about the functioning of the labour market in Bolivia? Chapters
4,5 and 6 have highlighted various aspects of labour supply behaviour in urban Bolivia.
Each  chapter  had   its own focus. Chapter 4 contained a reduced form analysis of earnings
in both the formal and informal sector. In chapter 5 we developed a more structural
model to test for labour market segmentation. The model disentangled the effects
working through individual preferences and barriers to entry for the formal sector. In
chapter     6 the focus     was on intra-household effects. The chapters     have     a     lot    of
similarities. They are all on the basis of the same dataset. The applied models have some
overlap   as   well.   They   use for example   the same earnings functions. The results   are   not
always    easy to compare.    In this chapter we summarize the results, taking    into
consideration the issues that were introduced in chapter 1.
7.2 Returns to Education
Estimates for the returns to education can be obtained from the estimates of the hourly
earnings equations (Mincer   1974). The specification  of the earnings equation allows  us  to
compare the rates of return for different educational careers. Chapters 4,5 and 6 present
comparable, but different estimation results for the earnings equation. In order to obtain
one estimate for the returns to education for different schooling types we combine the
results of chapter  4  and  5.  We  do  not  use the results in chapter  6  as  they are based  on  a
subsample of 2 adult households. Table 7.1 presents the average private returns to one
year of education after primary (basic) education, i.e. they are averaged over the years
needed to complete the relevant education level. The numbers are calculated assuming
that the individual has completed the training. If the individual did not complete the
training, the negative return for one missed year is given in the last row. Appendix 7A
provides details on how we calculated the numbers in this table.
Returns to education are generally higher in the informal sector for those with the lower
education levels and higher   in the formal sector for those with higher education levels.
Conform to earlier findings (Psacharopoulos 1985), returns to education for females are
higher than for males. For both males and females, an intermediate (INTER) education
has higher returns    if the individual participates    in the informal sector. For "medio"
education, males obtain higher returns in the informal sector while females' returns are
higher in the formal sector. For all other education levels the returns in the formal sector
exceed those   in the informal, where the difference   is the largest for females. Teachers
training (normal) only has positive returns in the formal sector. Investments in vocational
and university training have the most promising prospects on the labour market. The
highest returns in the formal sector are from these, higher, education levels. This is
contrary to earlier findings for developing countries where usually primary education
yielded the highest returns. Not completing education  has  more than average negative
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Table 7.1 Private returns to education (standard errors between parentheses, percent per
year)
years of educ nnales females
at completion formal informal formal informal
inter 8 1.89 2.61 5.22 7.64
(1.23) (1.37) (1.74) (1.68)
medio         12 3.37 3.92 5.61 3.52
(0.44) (0.50) (0.63) (0.64)
midtech 13 5.44 4.05 10.37 5.11
(0.74) (1.04) (0.77) (1.01)
hightech 15 5.95 2.35 9.96 4.25
(0.79) (1.01) (0.90) (1.39)
normal 17 1.80 -3.15 8.95 0.44
(0.48) (0.75) (0.46) (0.75)
university 20 5.73 2.39 9.09 3.63
(0.24) (0.34) (0.35) (0.50)
missed years 7.24 2.43 8.57 -0.31
(0.86) (1.14) (1.13) (1.33)
returns on the formal labour market for males, supporting the hypothesis that diplomas
are used to screen applicants. For males in the informal and females in the formal sector,
the negative returns are of the same order of magnitude as the average rates of return for
other school types, supporting the human capital theory view of education. For females
the negative returns are insignificant in the informal sector.
7.3 Labour Market Segmentation
Chapter 5 is the most comprehensive as far as labour market segmentation is concerned.
We allowed the sector participation to depend on wage offers, sector specific non-
monetary returns and rationing. Segmentation was modelled as a probability of being
rationed for "good" formal sector jobs. For standard individuals (cf table 5.4) the
predicted probability of rationing ranged from about 20 to 40 percent. Generally
speaking, the probability of rationing decreases with additional education. Ethnic
minorities and individuals living in areas with a higher unemployment rate face a higher
probability of rationing.
The conventional test for labour market segmentation is based on predicted wage
differences between sector. A high wage differential is associated with a low degree of
competitiveness, and thus labour market segmentation. The test is derived under the
assumption that individuals select their preferred sector on the basis of wage offers only.
Does the conventional test lead to the same conclusions as chapter 5? To investigate this
we have produced table 7.2. This table presents the predicted difference in the log wage
offer in the formal and informal sector for standard individuals. A high value is
associated with a relatively high formal sector wage offer and a high degree of labour
market segmentation according to the conventional test. We used both models of chapter
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4. The third column presents the predicted probability of rationing using the results of
chapter  5.   A high value is associated  with  a high level of labour market segmentation.
The choices for the standard individuals correspond with table 5.4.
Table 7.2 Comparison of labour market segmentation tests (log formal/informal sector
wage offer ratio, predicted probability of rationing, standard errors between parentheses,
base: age= 30,educ=inter, missed years=0, ethnic=0, econ active and unempl  at  mean
value)
males females
probit logitprob rationing probit logitprob rationing
base 0.72 1.24 0.33 -0.55 -1.45 0.34
(0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.15) (0.16) (0.04)
hightech educ 0.90 1.67 0.27 -0.29 -1.70 0.18
(0.18) (0.19) (0.04) (0.27) (0.30) (0.04)
university educ 0.92 1.86 0.20 0.08 -1.44 0.21
(0.09) (0.12) (0.02) (0.13) (0.19) (0.03)
ethnic = 1 0.73 1.20 0.37 -0.58 -1.34 0.44
(0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.17) (0.17) (0.05)
The   results in table  7.2   do  not  show   a  one  to one relationship between the conventional
test of labour market segmentation  and  the test presented in chapter  5.   For both males
and females, higher education increases the predicted formal sector wage relative to the
informal. However, the probability of rationing decreases. In this example the two tests
lead to opposite conclusions about the effect of education on labour market segmentation.
One possible explanation is that education affects the non-monetary returns (this is not
included in chapter 5). Lower educated might value non-monetary returns   such as health
insurance higher than the wealthier, well educated. Another explanation could be that
there is a segmented formal labour market for high and low skilled labour. The argument
would go as follows: assume that there are no returns to education in the informal sector
and that in the formal sector, the wage for high skilled labour is higher than for low
skilled labour. If high skilled labour is relatively scarce and unskilled labour is abundant,
the informal sector wage will be determined by the equilibrium conditions for the
unskilled workers. Provided that on-the-job search is relatively efficient, the resulting
skilled workers will search from the informal sector. In the resulting equilibrium, the
wage differential will be higher for skilled workers while at the same time the probability
of entering in the formal sector is higher for skilled workers. The results in table 7.2
also indicate that belonging to an ethnic minority has no clear effect on the wage
differential. The probability of rationing however, increases for both male and females.
Discrimination seems to be the most plausible explanation here. In our opinion, the test
results of chapter 5, based on rationing, are intuitively more appealing then those based
on  the wage differential. Additional research  in what affects non-monetary returns seems
appropriate. To this end it would be very useful if the survey would collect a monetary
equivalent of some of most common forms of non-monetary compensations.
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7.4 Sector Preferences
Chapter 5 models non-monetary returns associated with participation in a specific sector.
We found that, on average, non-monetary returns are higher in the formal sector for
males while the opposite holds for females. For the average male, a formal sector wage
offer of 0.46 times (std error 0.04) that of the informal wage is required to make the
(deterministic  part) wage offer including non-monetary returns equate  for both sectors.
For  females, this number  is   1.18  (std  err:   0.11).   To  get  an  idea  of the factors driving
this sector specific preference we have produced table 7A. 1 (in Appendix). This table
shows the effect of the taste shifters on the relative preference for the formal sector (6i-
82).    We find hardly any significant effect   of the family composition variables    on   the
sector preference. Only for females, the presence of other prime age individuals in the
household, increases the relative preference for the formal sector. Other income (net
dissaving, to be precise) has a positive effect on the relative formal sector preference for
both sexes. Both results seem to suggest that additional income sources in the household
reduce the preference of working in the informal sector more than the preference for
working in the formal sector. Marriage, on the other hand, has a stronger negative effect
on the formal sector preference for females (see table  5.3).
7.5 Intra Household Effects
In chapter 6 we introduced a model to investigate the magnitude of intra-household
effects in labour supply. We modelled the labour supply behaviour of two-adult families.
We allowed for non-monetary returns to affect the sector participation decision.
Simulation exercises show that the males' participation rate is not sensitive to his own
wage offer (discussion based on tables 6.7 and 6.8). About 96 percent of the males
work. A 10 percent drop in males' wage offers has a positive effect on hours worked of
high earning males and the opposite effect for males with low wage offer. The average
effect on hours worked is small. Females' hours worked increase by 3 percent. A 10
percent drop in males' wage offers has a stronger effect on female labour supply than a
similar drop of the females' wage offers.  We have simulated the effect of an overall
reduction in formal sector wages by 10 percent. For males the result is mostly a switch
between sectors and not a decrease in the participation rate. For females, average hours
worked increases by 2 percent and the participation rate by 0.4 percent. The total effect
on employment is positive, the fall in formal sector employment would be more than
offset by a rise in informal sector participation. The size of the informal sector is
expected to increase by 5.9 percent. This shows that intra-household effects are
significant. In chapter 5, where we did not include intra-household effects, a reduction in
the wage offer for females was predicted to lead to a lower female participation rate.
7.6 Final Remarks
The view that employment in the informal sector is inferior to formal sector employment
is only partly true in the Bolivian urban labour market. For males, we do find some
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support for this hypothesis. Most males prefer a formal sector job and expected wages
are higher than in the informal sector. Barriers to entry seem to be especially relevant
for the lower educated and for individuals belonging to ethnic minorities. For females,
however, we find that on average, participation in the informal sector is preferred to a
formal sector job and that expected hourly earnings are higher in the informal sector.
Barriers to entry in the formal sector are similar to those for males, but less relevant
since the informal sector is usually preferred. The fact that most working females
participate in the informal sector while the opposite holds for males seems to be supply
driven. There is no evidence for sex-discrimination in the formal sector. The description
of the informal sector as a buffer sector, inferior to formal sector employment, only
seems to be appropriate for males. This is in line with the result of Magnac (1991) who
found no evidence of labour market segmentation for married Columbian females.
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Appendix 7A
Returns to Education. The numbers appearing in table 7.1 are based on the estimates for
the wage equations in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 contains two estimates, chapter 5 one.
For the formal sector in chapter 5 we have used the results for the "good" formal sector.
The estimates are different because we corrected for selection bias in a different way,
because we included a distinction between good and bad formal sector jobs only in
chapter   5 and because the sector definition has changed from chapter  4   to 5. However,
the estimates are correlated as they are based on the same dataset. The specification of
the wage equation is the same in all three models. Table 7.1 is constructed as follows:
first, we estimated the coefficients for the wage equations by asymptotic least squares
(ALS).    Second, we divided the coefficients   on the education dummies   in   the   wage
equation by the corresponding years of education. Because "basic" is the excluded
category in the wage equations we divided by number of years of education belonging to
each  school type minus  5 (the number of years needed to complete basic education).  The
years of education belonging to each type of training are in appendix I. The figures in
table   7.1   are   thus the average rates of return  for  one  year of education after "basic'   for
different educational patterns.
Let   B = (#1,82,B]) be estimates   for the coefficients   in  the wage equations in chapters   4
and  5.  The ALS estimate,BALS, is obtained  by
P-81




The optimal weighting matrix W, is the inverse of the covariance matrix of B. In each of
the models B, is a subvector of the full parameter vector. Denote the latter by /i=(811•82/
with 821= A. The asymptotic distribution of Bi satisfies
TR(Bi-B) -B-r 4 10 +Bel  dog pule, (7A.2)
1  N  Blog p
12  9*     O(}li       '          Rj.1      8821
with
 :1:   t'  =  11: :   21-1       wa    ,·=- 3 11'rl  I t,··11
(7A.3)
and pij the likelihood contribution for obsefvation j in model i. By standard argument the
expression  for the covariance matrix  of  B is obtained using   (7A.2)   for  i= 1,2,3.   The
covariance matrix of BALS is (r'Wr)-1  with r = BAB)/a#.
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Table   7A. 1   Determinants of formal sector vs informal sector preferences   (61-6 ;   see
















net pc dissavings /1000 1.843 3.458
(0.780) (0.809)
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Appendix I.  List of Variables
Individual level variables
married dummy   = 1 if individual is married
ethnic dummy  = 1  if the individual regularly speaks other than spanish
active search if the individual reported to be searching for work in the last week.
discouraged if the individual reported not to be looking for work because "there
is no work"
hourly earnings calculated as total earnings divided through the number of hours
worked (sometimes also referred to as wage)
Education variables
variable dummies description number of years
of education at completion
Basic includes no education and basic education       5
inter intermediate education                            8
medio                                                                                                                    12
midtech vocational training, includes industry, commercial and agriculture
training.                                            13
hightech                                                                                                                                                                       15
normal primary school teacher training                  17
university university both private and public                20
other non-categories, for males probably largely military training
missed years if individual did not complete training:
minus number of years before completion
Household level variables
net pc dissavings total monthly household consumption minus total household labour
income divided by family size
other income total household non-labour income per month
young number household members of less than 15 years old
prime number of household members between   15  and  65
old number of household members greater than 65 years old
Regional variables
unemployment share of labour force unemployed per urban center
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Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift wordt de rol van de informele sector in stedelijke gebieden van
ontwikkelingslanden, en met name Bolivia, onderzocht. De infermele sector wordt vaak
gezien als een buffersector. Volgens deze visie wordt werk in de formele sector
geprefereerd boven werk in de informele sector. Echter, niet iedereen kan tot de formele
sector toetreden. Als een gevolg van restricties op de arbeidsmarkt, zoals bijvoorbeeld
een wettelijk minimum loon, is werk in de formele sector gerantsoeneerd. De informele
sector, daarentegen, is voor iedereen toegankelijk. Werken in de informele sector wordt
gezien als tweede keus, met lagere opbrengsten dan in de formele sector. De laatste jaren
zijn er twijfels gerezen ten aanzien van deze hypothese. Uit empirische studies blijkt dat
een groot gedeelte van de informele sector werkers er de voorkeur aan geeft in deze
sector te blijven. In deze studie proberen we aan te geven wat de rol van de informele
sector is in Bolivia. Het onderzoek is gebaseerd op gegevens van een
huishoudensenqutte, uitgevoerd in 1989 onder 7246 huishoudens in stedelijke gebieden.
De analyse wordt uitgevoerd met behulp van statische arbeidsaanbodmodellen. We
vinden dat de bufferfunctie een goede beschrijving is voor mannen. Echter, voor
vrouwen vinden we dat de informele sector vaak geprefereerd wordt ten opzichte van de
formele sector.
De centrale vraagstelling is in hoeverre huishoudens schokken in de formele sector zullen
opvangen door middel van een reallocatie van hun arbeidsaanbod. Structurele
aanpassingsprogramma's hebben vaak directe negatieve consequenties voor beloningen in
de formele sector. De daaruit volgende inkomensdaling van het huishouden kan worden
opgevangen door meer te gaan werken en/of over te stappen naar de informele sector.
Ook kunnen er binnen het huishouden aanpassing plaatsvinden. De vrouw kan
bijvoorbeeld besluiten te gaan werken als de man wordt getroffen door een
inkomensdaling. De uiteindelijke gevolgen voor huishoudconsumptie zullen
waarschijnlijk lager uitvallen dan het initieel gederfde inkomen. In dit onderzoek zullen
we trachten deze effecten te quantificeren door arbeidsaanbodelasticiteiten te schatten op
basis van cross sectie data. De analyse is partieel in de zin dat we alleen rekening
houden met arbeidsaanbodeffecten. Veranderingen in de vraag naar arbeid worden buiten
beschouwing gelaten.
Hoofdstuk 1 bevat een inleiding en een korte samenvatting van wat zal volgen.
Het empirische gedeelte van dit proefschrift heeft betrekking op Bolivia. Hoofdstuk 2
bevat achtergrondinformatie betreffende de economische geschiedenis, het
belastingstelsel, de regelgeving met betrekking tot de arbeidsmarkt en het datamateriaal
dat zal worden gebruikt in de empirische hoofdstukken. Na een periode van hyperinflatie
in het begin van jaren tachtig werd de economie in 1985 gestabiliseerd. Het
aanpassingsprogramma was rigoureus en had grote consequenties voor de arbeidsmarkt.
De informele sector groeide met 14 procent. In 1986 was 60 procent van de werkenden
in de informele sector. De daarop volgende jaren werden gekenmerkt door een geringe
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groei en een relatief stabiele economie. Het leeuwedeel van de belastingen wordt
geheven door middel van een toegevoegde waarde belasting. Inkomstenbelastingen spelen
een geringe rol, slechts 3 procent van de totale overheidsinkomsten wordt via deze
belastingen verkregen. We zullen daarom geen rekening houden met inkomstenbelasting
bij het modelleren van de arbeidsaanbodbeslissing in de empirische hoofdstukken.
Hoofdstuk 3 bevat een overzicht van de literatuur betreffende arbeidsmarkten in
ontwikkelingslanden. Het eerste gedeelte geeft een overzicht van de theoretische
modellen. De eerste modellen komen voort uit de migratieliteratuur. In het begin van de
jaren zeventig werden deze modellen uitgebreid met een informele sector. In deze
modellen werd de informele sector gezien als een springplank naar de formele sector:
vanuit de informele sector kon worden gezocht naar een baan in de formele sector.
Empirische studies, die in het tweede gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk worden behandeld,
geven echter aan dat deze hypothese niet altijd opgaat. Een substantieel gedeelte van de
informele sector werkers is niet op zoek naar een formele sector baan. Studies waarbij
lonen tussen de twee sectoren worden vergeleken geven geen eenduidige conclusie. In
het algemeen wordt gevonden dat de beloningsstructuur in de formele en informele sector
verschillen. De conclusies betreffende arbeidsmarktsegmentatie, ofwel rantsoenering van
formele sector banen, verschillen per studie. Tenslotte worden in dit hoofdstuk een aantal
suggesties gedaan voor verbetering van de theoretische en empirische modellen. Het
belangrijkste euvel van de theoretische modellen is dat de informele sector homogeen
wordt verondersteld. We geven een suggestie voor een alternatief model met een
ongelijke inkomensverdeling in de informele sector. Verbeteringen van de empirische
modellen volgen in de latere hoofdstukken.
In hoofdstuk 4 analyseren we participatie en beloningen in de formele en informele
sector in Bolivia in 1989. Een bekend probleem bij het schatten van loonfuncties is dat
simpelweg kleinste kwadraten toepassen niet consistent is indien er sprake is van niet
geobserveerde karakteristieken die zowel de lonen als de sectorparticipatie beYnvloeden.
Voor modellen waarbij de keuze slechts uit twee alternatieven (werken/niet werken)
bestaat, is een uitgebreide literatuur voorhanden. Echter, in ons geval is er sprake van
drie keuzes: Werken in de formele sector, in de informele sector en niet werken. We
experimenteren met twee modellen om de participatie te modelleren. In het eerste model
veronderstellen we dat de informele sector een buffersector is, tussen niet werken en
werken in de formele sector. In het tweede model wordt geen a priori ordening tussen
sectoren verondersteld. Op basis van specificatietoetsen hebben we een lichte voorkeur
voor het eerste model voor mannen en het tweede voor vrouwen. Verder vinden we dat
de keuze van het participatiemodel een grote invloed heeft op de schattingen voor de
loonfuncties. In het algemeen vinden we dat de voorspelde lonen hoger zijn in de
formele sector dan in de informele sector voor mannen terwijl voor de vrouwen de
voorspelde lonen hoger zijn in de informele sector. Dit laatste is verrassend. In andere
opzichten zijn de resultaten conform de verwachtingen: opbrengsten van scholing zijn
hoger in de formele sector dan in de informele sector en zijn hoger voor vrouwen dan
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voor mannen, de informele sector is gevoeliger voor lokale arbeidsmarkt omstandigheden
en etnische minderheden worden slechter betaald.
Een toets voor arbeidsmarktsegmentatie gaat in het algemeen als volgt: op basis van
geobserveerde en niet geobserveerde karakteristieken worden de lonen in de formele en
informele sector voorspeld. Als het voorspelde loon in de formele sector consequent
hoger is dan in de informele sector wordt dit geinterpreteerd als een teken van
arbeidsmarktsegmentatie. Echter, het is ook mogelijk dat loonverschillen voortkomen uit
sectorspecifieke preferenties van individuen. Het kan bijvoorbeeld zo zijn dat de vrijheid
die de informele sector biedt, wordt gewaardeerd en meegenomen in de sectorparticipatie
keuze. In dat geval zou het loon in de informele sector lager kunnen zijn, zonder dat er
sprake is van rantsoenering in de formele sector. Het is dus belangrijk de effecten van
sector specifieke preferenties te kunnen onderscheiden van rantsoenering bij het toetsen
van arbeidsmarktsegmentatie. Hoofdstuk 5 presenteert een model waarbij de effecten van
preferenties en rantsoenering in de participatie beslissing apart worden gemodelleerd. Dit
gebeurt door gebruikt te maken van zoekinformatie in de dataset. De veronderstelling is
dat zoeken naar werk kan worden gezien als een indicatie van rantsoenering. Indien
iemand op zoek is naar werk geeft dat aan dat hij of zij niet tevreden is met de huidige
situatie en verwacht een betere baan te kunnen vinden. Het is echter ook mogelijk dat
iemand het zoeken heeft opgegeven omdat de kans op beter werk te klein was. Deze
mensen zijn ook gerantsoeneerd en wij hebben hen daarom identiek behandeld als actieve
zoekers.   Nu we rantsoenering hebben gemodelleerd kunnen   we het overige gedeelte  van
de voorspelde loonverschillen toeschrijven aan preferenties. We vinden dat, gemiddeld
gezien, mannen de formele sector prefereren en vrouwen de informele. De kans op
rantsoenering voor formele sector banen ligt voor beide sexen rondom 30 procent. De
relatief hoge participatie van vrouwen in de formele sector is dus toe te schrijven aan
verschillen in preferenties, en niet het gevolg van discriminatie van vrouwen voor
formele sector banen.
De arbeidsaanbodbeslissing van een individu kan worden beYnvloed door de arbeidsmarkt
positie en inkomen van overige leden in het huishouden. Bijvoorbeeld, indien de man in
een familie een salarisverlaging krijgt kan de vrouw besluiten te gaan werken om het
gederfde inkomen te compenseren. In hoofdstuk 6 analyseren de
arbeidsaanbodbeslissingen van huishoudens met 66n volwassen man en 66n volwassen
vrouw. In het model veronderstellen we dat de arbeidsaanbodbeslissingen simultaan
worden genomen, dat wil zeggen: de man en de vrouw beslissen gezamenlijk over wie
gaan werken en hoeveel uren zij gaan werken. We onderscheiden weer de formele en de
informele sector. Rantsoenering en sectorspecifieke preferenties worden gezamenlijk
gemodelleerd en aangeduid met "niet-monetaire beloningen" van werk. We vinden
substantiele intra-huishoudeffecten. Lagere lonen van de man worden gecompenseerd
door extra werk van de vrouw. Een gesimuleerde loonsdaling in de formele sector van
10 procent geeft een positief effect op de algehele participatie. De participatie van
mannen neemt iets af, vrouwen gaan echter meer werken. De informele sector groeit met
6 procent. Dit moet worden gezien als een overschatting van het werkelijke effect. Indien
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rekening zou worden gehouden met algemeen evenwicht effecten, en de dating van de
vraag naar goederen uit de informele sector zou worden meegemodelleerd, zou de
toename lager uitvallen.
Hoofdstuk 7 bevat conclusies.
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